diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c | 754 |
1 files changed, 754 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7016c87d3b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c | |||
| @@ -0,0 +1,754 @@ | |||
| 1 | /* ssl/ssl_sess.c */ | ||
| 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
| 3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
| 4 | * | ||
| 5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
| 6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
| 8 | * | ||
| 9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
| 10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
| 11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
| 12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
| 13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
| 14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 15 | * | ||
| 16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
| 17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
| 18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
| 19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
| 20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
| 21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
| 22 | * | ||
| 23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
| 24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
| 25 | * are met: | ||
| 26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
| 27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
| 28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
| 29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
| 30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
| 31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
| 32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
| 33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
| 34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
| 35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
| 36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
| 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
| 38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
| 39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
| 40 | * | ||
| 41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
| 42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
| 43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
| 44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
| 45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
| 46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
| 47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
| 49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
| 50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
| 51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
| 52 | * | ||
| 53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
| 54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
| 55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
| 56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
| 57 | */ | ||
| 58 | |||
| 59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
| 60 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> | ||
| 61 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | ||
| 62 | #include "ssl_locl.h" | ||
| 63 | |||
| 64 | static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); | ||
| 65 | static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s); | ||
| 66 | static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); | ||
| 67 | |||
| 68 | SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl) | ||
| 69 | /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ | ||
| 70 | { | ||
| 71 | return(ssl->session); | ||
| 72 | } | ||
| 73 | |||
| 74 | SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) | ||
| 75 | /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ | ||
| 76 | { | ||
| 77 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | ||
| 78 | /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that | ||
| 79 | * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's | ||
| 80 | * non-null and when we up the reference count. */ | ||
| 81 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
| 82 | sess = ssl->session; | ||
| 83 | if(sess) | ||
| 84 | sess->references++; | ||
| 85 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
| 86 | return(sess); | ||
| 87 | } | ||
| 88 | |||
| 89 | int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | ||
| 90 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | ||
| 91 | { | ||
| 92 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp, | ||
| 93 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | ||
| 94 | } | ||
| 95 | |||
| 96 | int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) | ||
| 97 | { | ||
| 98 | return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); | ||
| 99 | } | ||
| 100 | |||
| 101 | void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) | ||
| 102 | { | ||
| 103 | return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); | ||
| 104 | } | ||
| 105 | |||
| 106 | SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) | ||
| 107 | { | ||
| 108 | SSL_SESSION *ss; | ||
| 109 | |||
| 110 | ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); | ||
| 111 | if (ss == NULL) | ||
| 112 | { | ||
| 113 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 114 | return(0); | ||
| 115 | } | ||
| 116 | memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); | ||
| 117 | |||
| 118 | ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ | ||
| 119 | ss->references=1; | ||
| 120 | ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ | ||
| 121 | ss->time=time(NULL); | ||
| 122 | ss->prev=NULL; | ||
| 123 | ss->next=NULL; | ||
| 124 | ss->compress_meth=0; | ||
| 125 | CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); | ||
| 126 | return(ss); | ||
| 127 | } | ||
| 128 | |||
| 129 | /* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1 | ||
| 130 | * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly | ||
| 131 | * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much | ||
| 132 | * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations | ||
| 133 | * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call | ||
| 134 | * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly | ||
| 135 | * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might | ||
| 136 | * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */ | ||
| 137 | |||
| 138 | #define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 | ||
| 139 | static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, | ||
| 140 | unsigned int *id_len) | ||
| 141 | { | ||
| 142 | unsigned int retry = 0; | ||
| 143 | do | ||
| 144 | RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len); | ||
| 145 | while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && | ||
| 146 | (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)); | ||
| 147 | if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) | ||
| 148 | return 1; | ||
| 149 | /* else - woops a session_id match */ | ||
| 150 | /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- | ||
| 151 | * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and | ||
| 152 | * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions | ||
| 153 | * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means | ||
| 154 | * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists | ||
| 155 | * and make a reservation for it if it does not | ||
| 156 | * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well). | ||
| 157 | */ | ||
| 158 | return 0; | ||
| 159 | } | ||
| 160 | |||
| 161 | int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) | ||
| 162 | { | ||
| 163 | /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ | ||
| 164 | |||
| 165 | unsigned int tmp; | ||
| 166 | SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL; | ||
| 167 | GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; | ||
| 168 | |||
| 169 | if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0); | ||
| 170 | |||
| 171 | /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ | ||
| 172 | if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0) | ||
| 173 | ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s); | ||
| 174 | else | ||
| 175 | ss->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout; | ||
| 176 | |||
| 177 | if (s->session != NULL) | ||
| 178 | { | ||
| 179 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | ||
| 180 | s->session=NULL; | ||
| 181 | } | ||
| 182 | |||
| 183 | if (session) | ||
| 184 | { | ||
| 185 | if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) | ||
| 186 | { | ||
| 187 | ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION; | ||
| 188 | ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; | ||
| 189 | } | ||
| 190 | else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) | ||
| 191 | { | ||
| 192 | ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION; | ||
| 193 | ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; | ||
| 194 | } | ||
| 195 | else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) | ||
| 196 | { | ||
| 197 | ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION; | ||
| 198 | ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; | ||
| 199 | } | ||
| 200 | else | ||
| 201 | { | ||
| 202 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); | ||
| 203 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
| 204 | return(0); | ||
| 205 | } | ||
| 206 | /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ | ||
| 207 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 208 | if(s->generate_session_id) | ||
| 209 | cb = s->generate_session_id; | ||
| 210 | else if(s->ctx->generate_session_id) | ||
| 211 | cb = s->ctx->generate_session_id; | ||
| 212 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 213 | /* Choose a session ID */ | ||
| 214 | tmp = ss->session_id_length; | ||
| 215 | if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) | ||
| 216 | { | ||
| 217 | /* The callback failed */ | ||
| 218 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, | ||
| 219 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); | ||
| 220 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
| 221 | return(0); | ||
| 222 | } | ||
| 223 | /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. | ||
| 224 | * nor set it higher than it was. */ | ||
| 225 | if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) | ||
| 226 | { | ||
| 227 | /* The callback set an illegal length */ | ||
| 228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, | ||
| 229 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); | ||
| 230 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
| 231 | return(0); | ||
| 232 | } | ||
| 233 | /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */ | ||
| 234 | if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)) | ||
| 235 | memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp); | ||
| 236 | else | ||
| 237 | ss->session_id_length = tmp; | ||
| 238 | /* Finally, check for a conflict */ | ||
| 239 | if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, | ||
| 240 | ss->session_id_length)) | ||
| 241 | { | ||
| 242 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, | ||
| 243 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); | ||
| 244 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
| 245 | return(0); | ||
| 246 | } | ||
| 247 | } | ||
| 248 | else | ||
| 249 | { | ||
| 250 | ss->session_id_length=0; | ||
| 251 | } | ||
| 252 | |||
| 253 | if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) | ||
| 254 | { | ||
| 255 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
| 256 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
| 257 | return 0; | ||
| 258 | } | ||
| 259 | memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length); | ||
| 260 | ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length; | ||
| 261 | s->session=ss; | ||
| 262 | ss->ssl_version=s->version; | ||
| 263 | ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | ||
| 264 | |||
| 265 | return(1); | ||
| 266 | } | ||
| 267 | |||
| 268 | int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len) | ||
| 269 | { | ||
| 270 | /* This is used only by servers. */ | ||
| 271 | |||
| 272 | SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data; | ||
| 273 | int fatal = 0; | ||
| 274 | |||
| 275 | data.ssl_version=s->version; | ||
| 276 | data.session_id_length=len; | ||
| 277 | if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) | ||
| 278 | goto err; | ||
| 279 | memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len); | ||
| 280 | |||
| 281 | if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) | ||
| 282 | { | ||
| 283 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 284 | ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data); | ||
| 285 | if (ret != NULL) | ||
| 286 | /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ | ||
| 287 | CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
| 288 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 289 | } | ||
| 290 | |||
| 291 | if (ret == NULL) | ||
| 292 | { | ||
| 293 | int copy=1; | ||
| 294 | |||
| 295 | s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++; | ||
| 296 | ret=NULL; | ||
| 297 | if (s->ctx->get_session_cb != NULL | ||
| 298 | && (ret=s->ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,©)) | ||
| 299 | != NULL) | ||
| 300 | { | ||
| 301 | s->ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++; | ||
| 302 | |||
| 303 | /* Increment reference count now if the session callback | ||
| 304 | * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures | ||
| 305 | * returned by the callback are shared between threads, | ||
| 306 | * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], | ||
| 307 | * or things won't be thread-safe). */ | ||
| 308 | if (copy) | ||
| 309 | CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
| 310 | |||
| 311 | /* Add the externally cached session to the internal | ||
| 312 | * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */ | ||
| 313 | if(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) | ||
| 314 | /* The following should not return 1, otherwise, | ||
| 315 | * things are very strange */ | ||
| 316 | SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret); | ||
| 317 | } | ||
| 318 | if (ret == NULL) | ||
| 319 | goto err; | ||
| 320 | } | ||
| 321 | |||
| 322 | /* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */ | ||
| 323 | |||
| 324 | if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER) | ||
| 325 | && (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length | ||
| 326 | || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length))) | ||
| 327 | { | ||
| 328 | /* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't | ||
| 329 | * want to use it in this context. */ | ||
| 330 | |||
| 331 | if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0) | ||
| 332 | { | ||
| 333 | /* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context | ||
| 334 | * -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard | ||
| 335 | * of this session, but then applications could effectively | ||
| 336 | * disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */ | ||
| 337 | |||
| 338 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); | ||
| 339 | fatal = 1; | ||
| 340 | goto err; | ||
| 341 | } | ||
| 342 | else | ||
| 343 | { | ||
| 344 | #if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate, | ||
| 345 | * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */ | ||
| 346 | |||
| 347 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); | ||
| 348 | #endif | ||
| 349 | goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ | ||
| 350 | } | ||
| 351 | } | ||
| 352 | |||
| 353 | if (ret->cipher == NULL) | ||
| 354 | { | ||
| 355 | unsigned char buf[5],*p; | ||
| 356 | unsigned long l; | ||
| 357 | |||
| 358 | p=buf; | ||
| 359 | l=ret->cipher_id; | ||
| 360 | l2n(l,p); | ||
| 361 | if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) | ||
| 362 | ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2])); | ||
| 363 | else | ||
| 364 | ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1])); | ||
| 365 | if (ret->cipher == NULL) | ||
| 366 | goto err; | ||
| 367 | } | ||
| 368 | |||
| 369 | |||
| 370 | #if 0 /* This is way too late. */ | ||
| 371 | |||
| 372 | /* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got | ||
| 373 | * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could | ||
| 374 | * be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement | ||
| 375 | * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */ | ||
| 376 | CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
| 377 | #endif | ||
| 378 | |||
| 379 | if ((long)(ret->time+ret->timeout) < (long)time(NULL)) /* timeout */ | ||
| 380 | { | ||
| 381 | s->ctx->stats.sess_timeout++; | ||
| 382 | /* remove it from the cache */ | ||
| 383 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,ret); | ||
| 384 | goto err; | ||
| 385 | } | ||
| 386 | |||
| 387 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | ||
| 388 | |||
| 389 | /* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */ | ||
| 390 | /* again, just leave the session | ||
| 391 | * if it is the same session, we have just incremented and | ||
| 392 | * then decremented the reference count :-) */ | ||
| 393 | if (s->session != NULL) | ||
| 394 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | ||
| 395 | s->session=ret; | ||
| 396 | s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; | ||
| 397 | return(1); | ||
| 398 | |||
| 399 | err: | ||
| 400 | if (ret != NULL) | ||
| 401 | SSL_SESSION_free(ret); | ||
| 402 | if (fatal) | ||
| 403 | return -1; | ||
| 404 | else | ||
| 405 | return 0; | ||
| 406 | } | ||
| 407 | |||
| 408 | int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) | ||
| 409 | { | ||
| 410 | int ret=0; | ||
| 411 | SSL_SESSION *s; | ||
| 412 | |||
| 413 | /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache | ||
| 414 | * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a | ||
| 415 | * doubly linked list and an lhash */ | ||
| 416 | CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
| 417 | /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ | ||
| 418 | |||
| 419 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 420 | s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c); | ||
| 421 | |||
| 422 | /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. | ||
| 423 | * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify | ||
| 424 | * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */ | ||
| 425 | if (s != NULL && s != c) | ||
| 426 | { | ||
| 427 | /* We *are* in trouble ... */ | ||
| 428 | SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s); | ||
| 429 | SSL_SESSION_free(s); | ||
| 430 | /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache | ||
| 431 | * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical | ||
| 432 | * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when | ||
| 433 | * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external | ||
| 434 | * cache) */ | ||
| 435 | s = NULL; | ||
| 436 | } | ||
| 437 | |||
| 438 | /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */ | ||
| 439 | if (s == NULL) | ||
| 440 | SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c); | ||
| 441 | |||
| 442 | if (s != NULL) | ||
| 443 | { | ||
| 444 | /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference | ||
| 445 | * count because it already takes into account the cache */ | ||
| 446 | |||
| 447 | SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ | ||
| 448 | ret=0; | ||
| 449 | } | ||
| 450 | else | ||
| 451 | { | ||
| 452 | /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */ | ||
| 453 | |||
| 454 | ret=1; | ||
| 455 | |||
| 456 | if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) | ||
| 457 | { | ||
| 458 | while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > | ||
| 459 | SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) | ||
| 460 | { | ||
| 461 | if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, | ||
| 462 | ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) | ||
| 463 | break; | ||
| 464 | else | ||
| 465 | ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++; | ||
| 466 | } | ||
| 467 | } | ||
| 468 | } | ||
| 469 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 470 | return(ret); | ||
| 471 | } | ||
| 472 | |||
| 473 | int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) | ||
| 474 | { | ||
| 475 | return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); | ||
| 476 | } | ||
| 477 | |||
| 478 | static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck) | ||
| 479 | { | ||
| 480 | SSL_SESSION *r; | ||
| 481 | int ret=0; | ||
| 482 | |||
| 483 | if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) | ||
| 484 | { | ||
| 485 | if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 486 | if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c) | ||
| 487 | { | ||
| 488 | ret=1; | ||
| 489 | r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c); | ||
| 490 | SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c); | ||
| 491 | } | ||
| 492 | |||
| 493 | if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 494 | |||
| 495 | if (ret) | ||
| 496 | { | ||
| 497 | r->not_resumable=1; | ||
| 498 | if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) | ||
| 499 | ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r); | ||
| 500 | SSL_SESSION_free(r); | ||
| 501 | } | ||
| 502 | } | ||
| 503 | else | ||
| 504 | ret=0; | ||
| 505 | return(ret); | ||
| 506 | } | ||
| 507 | |||
| 508 | void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) | ||
| 509 | { | ||
| 510 | int i; | ||
| 511 | |||
| 512 | if(ss == NULL) | ||
| 513 | return; | ||
| 514 | |||
| 515 | i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
| 516 | #ifdef REF_PRINT | ||
| 517 | REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss); | ||
| 518 | #endif | ||
| 519 | if (i > 0) return; | ||
| 520 | #ifdef REF_CHECK | ||
| 521 | if (i < 0) | ||
| 522 | { | ||
| 523 | fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n"); | ||
| 524 | abort(); /* ok */ | ||
| 525 | } | ||
| 526 | #endif | ||
| 527 | |||
| 528 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); | ||
| 529 | |||
| 530 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg); | ||
| 531 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key); | ||
| 532 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id); | ||
| 533 | if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert); | ||
| 534 | if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer); | ||
| 535 | if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers); | ||
| 536 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss)); | ||
| 537 | OPENSSL_free(ss); | ||
| 538 | } | ||
| 539 | |||
| 540 | int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) | ||
| 541 | { | ||
| 542 | int ret=0; | ||
| 543 | SSL_METHOD *meth; | ||
| 544 | |||
| 545 | if (session != NULL) | ||
| 546 | { | ||
| 547 | meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version); | ||
| 548 | if (meth == NULL) | ||
| 549 | meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version); | ||
| 550 | if (meth == NULL) | ||
| 551 | { | ||
| 552 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD); | ||
| 553 | return(0); | ||
| 554 | } | ||
| 555 | |||
| 556 | if (meth != s->method) | ||
| 557 | { | ||
| 558 | if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth)) | ||
| 559 | return(0); | ||
| 560 | if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0) | ||
| 561 | session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s); | ||
| 562 | else | ||
| 563 | session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout; | ||
| 564 | } | ||
| 565 | |||
| 566 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 | ||
| 567 | if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ && | ||
| 568 | session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) | ||
| 569 | { | ||
| 570 | s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1); | ||
| 571 | memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ, | ||
| 572 | session->krb5_client_princ_len); | ||
| 573 | s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0'; | ||
| 574 | } | ||
| 575 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ | ||
| 576 | |||
| 577 | /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ | ||
| 578 | CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
| 579 | if (s->session != NULL) | ||
| 580 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | ||
| 581 | s->session=session; | ||
| 582 | s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; | ||
| 583 | /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ | ||
| 584 | ret=1; | ||
| 585 | } | ||
| 586 | else | ||
| 587 | { | ||
| 588 | if (s->session != NULL) | ||
| 589 | { | ||
| 590 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | ||
| 591 | s->session=NULL; | ||
| 592 | } | ||
| 593 | |||
| 594 | meth=s->ctx->method; | ||
| 595 | if (meth != s->method) | ||
| 596 | { | ||
| 597 | if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth)) | ||
| 598 | return(0); | ||
| 599 | } | ||
| 600 | ret=1; | ||
| 601 | } | ||
| 602 | return(ret); | ||
| 603 | } | ||
| 604 | |||
| 605 | long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) | ||
| 606 | { | ||
| 607 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
| 608 | s->timeout=t; | ||
| 609 | return(1); | ||
| 610 | } | ||
| 611 | |||
| 612 | long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s) | ||
| 613 | { | ||
| 614 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
| 615 | return(s->timeout); | ||
| 616 | } | ||
| 617 | |||
| 618 | long SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_SESSION *s) | ||
| 619 | { | ||
| 620 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
| 621 | return(s->time); | ||
| 622 | } | ||
| 623 | |||
| 624 | long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) | ||
| 625 | { | ||
| 626 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
| 627 | s->time=t; | ||
| 628 | return(t); | ||
| 629 | } | ||
| 630 | |||
| 631 | long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) | ||
| 632 | { | ||
| 633 | long l; | ||
| 634 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
| 635 | l=s->session_timeout; | ||
| 636 | s->session_timeout=t; | ||
| 637 | return(l); | ||
| 638 | } | ||
| 639 | |||
| 640 | long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *s) | ||
| 641 | { | ||
| 642 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
| 643 | return(s->session_timeout); | ||
| 644 | } | ||
| 645 | |||
| 646 | typedef struct timeout_param_st | ||
| 647 | { | ||
| 648 | SSL_CTX *ctx; | ||
| 649 | long time; | ||
| 650 | LHASH *cache; | ||
| 651 | } TIMEOUT_PARAM; | ||
| 652 | |||
| 653 | static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p) | ||
| 654 | { | ||
| 655 | if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */ | ||
| 656 | { | ||
| 657 | /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to | ||
| 658 | * save on locking overhead */ | ||
| 659 | lh_delete(p->cache,s); | ||
| 660 | SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s); | ||
| 661 | s->not_resumable=1; | ||
| 662 | if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) | ||
| 663 | p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s); | ||
| 664 | SSL_SESSION_free(s); | ||
| 665 | } | ||
| 666 | } | ||
| 667 | |||
| 668 | static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *) | ||
| 669 | |||
| 670 | void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) | ||
| 671 | { | ||
| 672 | unsigned long i; | ||
| 673 | TIMEOUT_PARAM tp; | ||
| 674 | |||
| 675 | tp.ctx=s; | ||
| 676 | tp.cache=s->sessions; | ||
| 677 | if (tp.cache == NULL) return; | ||
| 678 | tp.time=t; | ||
| 679 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 680 | i=tp.cache->down_load; | ||
| 681 | tp.cache->down_load=0; | ||
| 682 | lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp); | ||
| 683 | tp.cache->down_load=i; | ||
| 684 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
| 685 | } | ||
| 686 | |||
| 687 | int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) | ||
| 688 | { | ||
| 689 | if ( (s->session != NULL) && | ||
| 690 | !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && | ||
| 691 | !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) | ||
| 692 | { | ||
| 693 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); | ||
| 694 | return(1); | ||
| 695 | } | ||
| 696 | else | ||
| 697 | return(0); | ||
| 698 | } | ||
| 699 | |||
| 700 | /* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ | ||
| 701 | static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) | ||
| 702 | { | ||
| 703 | if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return; | ||
| 704 | |||
| 705 | if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) | ||
| 706 | { /* last element in list */ | ||
| 707 | if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) | ||
| 708 | { /* only one element in list */ | ||
| 709 | ctx->session_cache_head=NULL; | ||
| 710 | ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL; | ||
| 711 | } | ||
| 712 | else | ||
| 713 | { | ||
| 714 | ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev; | ||
| 715 | s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); | ||
| 716 | } | ||
| 717 | } | ||
| 718 | else | ||
| 719 | { | ||
| 720 | if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) | ||
| 721 | { /* first element in list */ | ||
| 722 | ctx->session_cache_head=s->next; | ||
| 723 | s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); | ||
| 724 | } | ||
| 725 | else | ||
| 726 | { /* middle of list */ | ||
| 727 | s->next->prev=s->prev; | ||
| 728 | s->prev->next=s->next; | ||
| 729 | } | ||
| 730 | } | ||
| 731 | s->prev=s->next=NULL; | ||
| 732 | } | ||
| 733 | |||
| 734 | static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) | ||
| 735 | { | ||
| 736 | if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL)) | ||
| 737 | SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s); | ||
| 738 | |||
| 739 | if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) | ||
| 740 | { | ||
| 741 | ctx->session_cache_head=s; | ||
| 742 | ctx->session_cache_tail=s; | ||
| 743 | s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); | ||
| 744 | s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); | ||
| 745 | } | ||
| 746 | else | ||
| 747 | { | ||
| 748 | s->next=ctx->session_cache_head; | ||
| 749 | s->next->prev=s; | ||
| 750 | s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); | ||
| 751 | ctx->session_cache_head=s; | ||
| 752 | } | ||
| 753 | } | ||
| 754 | |||
