1 files changed, 746 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0c3100b29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,746 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl)
+/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
+        {
+        return(ssl->session);
+        }
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
+/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
+        {
+        SSL_SESSION *sess;
+        /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+         * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
+         * non-null and when we up the reference count. */
+        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+        sess = ssl->session;
+        if(sess)
+                sess->references++;
+        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+        return(sess);
+        }
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+             CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+        {
+        return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
+                        new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+        }
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
+        {
+        return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
+        }
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
+        {
+        return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
+        }
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+        {
+        SSL_SESSION *ss;
+
+        ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+        if (ss == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+
+        ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
+        ss->references=1;
+        ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
+        ss->time=time(NULL);
+        ss->prev=NULL;
+        ss->next=NULL;
+        ss->compress_meth=0;
+        CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+        return(ss);
+        }
+
+/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
+ * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
+ * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
+ * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
+ * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
+ * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
+ * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
+ * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
+
+#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+                                unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+        unsigned int retry = 0;
+        do
+                RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len);
+        while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+                (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+        if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+                return 1;
+        /* else - woops a session_id match */
+        /* XXX We should also check the external cache --
+         * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
+         * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
+         * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
+         * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
+         * and make a reservation for it if it does not
+         * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
+         */
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
+        {
+        /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+        unsigned int tmp;
+        SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
+        GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
+
+        if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
+
+        /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
+        if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+                ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+        else
+                ss->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
+
+        if (s->session != NULL)
+                {
+                SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+                s->session=NULL;
+                }
+
+        if (session)
+                {
+                if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+                        {
+                        ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION;
+                        ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+                        }
+                else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+                        {
+                        ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION;
+                        ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+                        }
+                else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+                        {
+                        ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
+                        ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                if(s->generate_session_id)
+                        cb = s->generate_session_id;
+                else if(s->ctx->generate_session_id)
+                        cb = s->ctx->generate_session_id;
+                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                /* Choose a session ID */
+                tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+                if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
+                        {
+                        /* The callback failed */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                                SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
+                 * nor set it higher than it was. */
+                if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
+                        {
+                        /* The callback set an illegal length */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                                SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
+                if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
+                        memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
+                else
+                        ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+                /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+                if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+                                                ss->session_id_length))
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                                SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                ss->session_id_length=0;
+                }
+
+        die(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof ss->sid_ctx);
+        memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
+        ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
+        s->session=ss;
+        ss->ssl_version=s->version;
+        ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len)
+        {
+        /* This is used only by servers. */
+
+        SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data;
+        int fatal = 0;
+
+        data.ssl_version=s->version;
+        data.session_id_length=len;
+        if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
+                goto err;
+        memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
+
+        if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
+                {
+                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data);
+                if (ret != NULL)
+                    /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+                    CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                }
+
+        if (ret == NULL)
+                {
+                int copy=1;
+        
+                s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+                ret=NULL;
+                if (s->ctx->get_session_cb != NULL
+                    && (ret=s->ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,&copy))
+                       != NULL)
+                        {
+                        s->ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
+
+                        /* Increment reference count now if the session callback
+                         * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
+                         * returned by the callback are shared between threads,
+                         * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
+                         * or things won't be thread-safe). */
+                        if (copy)
+                                CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
+                        /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
+                         * things are very strange */
+                        SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret);
+                        }
+                if (ret == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                }
+
+        /* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
+        if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+           && (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
+               || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)))
+            {
+                /* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
+                 * want to use it in this context. */
+                
+                if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
+                        {
+                        /* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context
+                         * -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard
+                         * of this session, but then applications could effectively
+                         * disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */
+
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+                        fatal = 1;
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
+           * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
+
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+#endif
+                        goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
+                        }
+                }
+
+        if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+                {
+                unsigned char buf[5],*p;
+                unsigned long l;
+
+                p=buf;
+                l=ret->cipher_id;
+                l2n(l,p);
+                if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+                        ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
+                else 
+                        ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
+                if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                }
+
+
+#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
+
+        /* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
+         * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could
+         * be in trouble.  So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
+         * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
+        CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+#endif
+
+        if ((long)(ret->time+ret->timeout) < (long)time(NULL)) /* timeout */
+                {
+                s->ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
+                /* remove it from the cache */
+                SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,ret);
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+        /* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */
+        /* again, just leave the session 
+         * if it is the same session, we have just incremented and
+         * then decremented the reference count :-) */
+        if (s->session != NULL)
+                SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session=ret;
+        s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+        return(1);
+
+ err:
+        if (ret != NULL)
+                SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+        if (fatal)
+                return -1;
+        else
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+        {
+        int ret=0;
+        SSL_SESSION *s;
+
+        /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
+         * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
+         * doubly linked list and an lhash */
+        CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+        /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
+        
+        /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
+         * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+         * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
+        if (s != NULL && s != c)
+                {
+                /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+                SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
+                SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+                /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
+                 * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
+                 * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
+                 * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
+                 * cache) */
+                s = NULL;
+                }
+
+        /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+        if (s == NULL)
+                SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
+
+        if (s != NULL)
+                {
+                /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+                 * count because it already takes into account the cache */
+
+                SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
+                ret=0;
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
+                
+                ret=1;
+
+                if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
+                        {
+                        while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
+                                SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
+                                {
+                                if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
+                                        ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+                                        break;
+                                else
+                                        ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
+                                }
+                        }
+                }
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+        return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
+        {
+        SSL_SESSION *r;
+        int ret=0;
+
+        if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
+                {
+                if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
+                        {
+                        ret=1;
+                        r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
+                        SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
+                        }
+
+                if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+                if (ret)
+                        {
+                        r->not_resumable=1;
+                        if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+                                ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r);
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(r);
+                        }
+                }
+        else
+                ret=0;
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
+        {
+        int i;
+
+        if(ss == NULL)
+            return;
+
+        i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+        REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss);
+#endif
+        if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+        if (i < 0)
+                {
+                fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
+                abort(); /* ok */
+                }
+#endif
+
+        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+
+        memset(ss->key_arg,0,SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
+        memset(ss->master_key,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+        memset(ss->session_id,0,SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
+        if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
+        if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
+        if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
+        memset(ss,0,sizeof(*ss));
+        OPENSSL_free(ss);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
+        {
+        int ret=0;
+        SSL_METHOD *meth;
+
+        if (session != NULL)
+                {
+                meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+                if (meth == NULL)
+                        meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+                if (meth == NULL)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+
+                if (meth != s->method)
+                        {
+                        if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
+                                return(0);
+                        if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+                                session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+                        else
+                                session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
+                        }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+                if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
+                    session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
+                {
+                    s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
+                    memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
+                            session->krb5_client_princ_len);
+                    s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
+                }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+                /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
+                CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+                if (s->session != NULL)
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+                s->session=session;
+                s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+                /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
+                ret=1;
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                if (s->session != NULL)
+                        {
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+                        s->session=NULL;
+                        }
+
+                meth=s->ctx->method;
+                if (meth != s->method)
+                        {
+                        if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
+                                return(0);
+                        }
+                ret=1;
+                }
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL) return(0);
+        s->timeout=t;
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL) return(0);
+        return(s->timeout);
+        }
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_SESSION *s)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL) return(0);
+        return(s->time);
+        }
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL) return(0);
+        s->time=t;
+        return(t);
+        }
+
+long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
+        {
+        long l;
+        if (s == NULL) return(0);
+        l=s->session_timeout;
+        s->session_timeout=t;
+        return(l);
+        }
+
+long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *s)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL) return(0);
+        return(s->session_timeout);
+        }
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st
+        {
+        SSL_CTX *ctx;
+        long time;
+        LHASH *cache;
+        } TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
+        {
+        if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */
+                {
+                /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
+                 * save on locking overhead */
+                lh_delete(p->cache,s);
+                SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
+                s->not_resumable=1;
+                if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+                        p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s);
+                SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+                }
+        }
+
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *)
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
+        {
+        unsigned long i;
+        TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+        tp.ctx=s;
+        tp.cache=s->sessions;
+        if (tp.cache == NULL) return;
+        tp.time=t;
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        i=tp.cache->down_load;
+        tp.cache->down_load=0;
+        lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp);
+        tp.cache->down_load=i;
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        }
+
+int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (    (s->session != NULL) &&
+                !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+                !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)))
+                {
+                SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+                return(1);
+                }
+        else
+                return(0);
+        }
+
+/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
+        {
+        if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
+
+        if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
+                { /* last element in list */
+                if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
+                        { /* only one element in list */
+                        ctx->session_cache_head=NULL;
+                        ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL;
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev;
+                        s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+                        }
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
+                        { /* first element in list */
+                        ctx->session_cache_head=s->next;
+                        s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+                        }
+                else
+                        { /* middle of list */
+                        s->next->prev=s->prev;
+                        s->prev->next=s->next;
+                        }
+                }
+        s->prev=s->next=NULL;
+        }
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
+        {
+        if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
+                SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
+
+        if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL)
+                {
+                ctx->session_cache_head=s;
+                ctx->session_cache_tail=s;
+                s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+                s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                s->next=ctx->session_cache_head;
+                s->next->prev=s;
+                s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+                ctx->session_cache_head=s;
+                }
+        }
+