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1/* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.1 2017/01/26 05:51:54 jsing Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111/* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124/* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151#include <stdio.h>
152
153#include "ssl_locl.h"
154
155#include <openssl/bn.h>
156#include <openssl/buffer.h>
157#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
158#include <openssl/evp.h>
159#include <openssl/dh.h>
160#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
161#include <openssl/gost.h>
162#endif
163#include <openssl/hmac.h>
164#include <openssl/md5.h>
165#include <openssl/objects.h>
166#include <openssl/x509.h>
167
168#include "bytestring.h"
169
170int
171ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
172{
173 unsigned long alg_k;
174 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
175 int ret = -1;
176 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
177
178 ERR_clear_error();
179 errno = 0;
180
181 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
182 cb = s->internal->info_callback;
183 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
184 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
185
186 /* init things to blank */
187 s->internal->in_handshake++;
188 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
189 SSL_clear(s);
190
191 if (s->cert == NULL) {
192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
193 ret = -1;
194 goto end;
195 }
196
197 for (;;) {
198 state = s->internal->state;
199
200 switch (s->internal->state) {
201 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
202 s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
203 /* s->internal->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204
205 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
206 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
207 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
209
210 s->server = 1;
211 if (cb != NULL)
212 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
213
214 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
216 ret = -1;
217 goto end;
218 }
219 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
220
221 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
222 ret = -1;
223 goto end;
224 }
225 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
226 ret = -1;
227 goto end;
228 }
229
230 s->internal->init_num = 0;
231
232 if (s->internal->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
233 /*
234 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO
235 * so that the output is sent in a way that
236 * TCP likes :-)
237 */
238 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
239 ret = -1;
240 goto end;
241 }
242
243 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
244 ret = -1;
245 goto end;
246 }
247
248 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++;
250 } else if (!S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) {
251 /*
252 * Server attempting to renegotiate with
253 * client that doesn't support secure
254 * renegotiation.
255 */
256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
257 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
258 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
259 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
260 ret = -1;
261 goto end;
262 } else {
263 /*
264 * s->internal->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
265 * we will just send a HelloRequest
266 */
267 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
268 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
269 }
270 break;
271
272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
274
275 s->internal->shutdown = 0;
276 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
277 if (ret <= 0)
278 goto end;
279 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
280 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
281 s->internal->init_num = 0;
282
283 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
284 ret = -1;
285 goto end;
286 }
287 break;
288
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
290 s->internal->state = SSL_ST_OK;
291 break;
292
293 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
294 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
295 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
296
297 s->internal->shutdown = 0;
298 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
299 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
300 if (ret <= 0)
301 goto end;
302 }
303
304 s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
305 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
306 s->internal->init_num = 0;
307 break;
308
309 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
310 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
311 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
312 if (ret <= 0)
313 goto end;
314 if (s->internal->hit) {
315 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
316 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
317 else
318 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
319 }
320 else
321 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
322 s->internal->init_num = 0;
323 break;
324
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
327 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */
328 if (!(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
329 SSL_aNULL)) {
330 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
331 if (ret <= 0)
332 goto end;
333 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected)
334 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
335 else
336 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
337 } else {
338 skip = 1;
339 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
340 }
341 s->internal->init_num = 0;
342 break;
343
344 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
346 alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
347
348 /*
349 * Only send if using a DH key exchange.
350 *
351 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange
352 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other
353 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's
354 * public key for key exchange.
355 */
356 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
357 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
358 if (ret <= 0)
359 goto end;
360 } else
361 skip = 1;
362
363 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
364 s->internal->init_num = 0;
365 break;
366
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
368 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
369 /*
370 * Determine whether or not we need to request a
371 * certificate.
372 *
373 * Do not request a certificate if:
374 *
375 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset).
376 *
377 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are
378 * renegotiating.
379 *
380 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites
381 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
382 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application
383 * insists on verification (against the specs, but
384 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3).
385 */
386 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
387 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
388 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
389 ((S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
390 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode &
391 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
392 /* No cert request */
393 skip = 1;
394 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0;
395 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
396 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
397 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
398 ret = -1;
399 goto end;
400 }
401 }
402 } else {
403 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1;
404 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
405 if (ret <= 0)
406 goto end;
407 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
408 s->internal->init_num = 0;
409 }
410 break;
411
412 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
414 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
415 if (ret <= 0)
416 goto end;
417 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
418 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
419 s->internal->init_num = 0;
420 break;
421
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
423
424 /*
425 * This code originally checked to see if
426 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
427 * and then flushed. This caused problems
428 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
429 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
430 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
431 * still exist. So instead we just flush
432 * unconditionally.
433 */
434
435 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
436 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
437 ret = -1;
438 goto end;
439 }
440 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
441
442 s->internal->state = S3I(s)->tmp.next_state;
443 break;
444
445 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
446 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
447 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
448 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
449 if (ret <= 0)
450 goto end;
451 }
452 s->internal->init_num = 0;
453 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
454 break;
455
456 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
457 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
458 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
459 if (ret <= 0)
460 goto end;
461 alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
462 if (ret == 2) {
463 /*
464 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when
465 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
466 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
467 * message is not sent.
468 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
469 * the client uses its key from the certificate
470 * for key exchange.
471 */
472 if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen)
473 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
474 else
475 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
476 s->internal->init_num = 0;
477 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) {
478 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
479 s->internal->init_num = 0;
480 if (!s->session->peer)
481 break;
482 /*
483 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
484 * at this point and digest cached records.
485 */
486 if (!S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
488 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
489 ret = -1;
490 goto end;
491 }
492 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
493 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
494 ret = -1;
495 goto end;
496 }
497 } else {
498 int offset = 0;
499 int dgst_num;
500
501 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
502 s->internal->init_num = 0;
503
504 /*
505 * We need to get hashes here so if there is
506 * a client cert, it can be verified
507 * FIXME - digest processing for
508 * CertificateVerify should be generalized.
509 * But it is next step
510 */
511 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
512 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
513 ret = -1;
514 goto end;
515 }
516 }
517 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST;
518 dgst_num++)
519 if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
520 int dgst_size;
521
522 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
523 EVP_MD_CTX_type(
524 S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),
525 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
526 dgst_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(
527 S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
528 if (dgst_size < 0) {
529 ret = -1;
530 goto end;
531 }
532 offset += dgst_size;
533 }
534 }
535 break;
536
537 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
538 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
539 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
540
541 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
542 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
543 if (ret <= 0)
544 goto end;
545
546 if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen)
547 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
548 else
549 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
550 s->internal->init_num = 0;
551 break;
552
553 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
554 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
555 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
556 if (ret <= 0)
557 goto end;
558 s->internal->init_num = 0;
559 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
560 break;
561
562 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
563 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
564 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
565 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
566 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
567 if (ret <= 0)
568 goto end;
569 if (s->internal->hit)
570 s->internal->state = SSL_ST_OK;
571 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
572 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
573 else
574 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
575 s->internal->init_num = 0;
576 break;
577
578 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
580 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
581 if (ret <= 0)
582 goto end;
583 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
584 s->internal->init_num = 0;
585 break;
586
587 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
588 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
589 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
590 if (ret <= 0)
591 goto end;
592 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
593 s->internal->init_num = 0;
594 break;
595
596
597 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
598 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
599
600 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher;
601 if (!s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
602 ret = -1;
603 goto end;
604 }
605
606 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
607 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
608
609 if (ret <= 0)
610 goto end;
611 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
612 s->internal->init_num = 0;
613
614 if (!s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(
615 s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
616 ret = -1;
617 goto end;
618 }
619
620 break;
621
622 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
623 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
624 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
625 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
626 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
627 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
628 if (ret <= 0)
629 goto end;
630 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
631 if (s->internal->hit) {
632 if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen) {
633 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
634 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state =
635 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
636 } else
637 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state =
638 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
639 } else
640 S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
641 s->internal->init_num = 0;
642 break;
643
644 case SSL_ST_OK:
645 /* clean a few things up */
646 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
647
648 BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf);
649 s->internal->init_buf = NULL;
650
651 /* remove buffering on output */
652 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
653
654 s->internal->init_num = 0;
655
656 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
657 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) {
658 s->internal->renegotiate = 0;
659 s->internal->new_session = 0;
660
661 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
662
663 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++;
664 /* s->server=1; */
665 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
666
667 if (cb != NULL)
668 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
669 }
670
671 ret = 1;
672 goto end;
673 /* break; */
674
675 default:
676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
677 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
678 ret = -1;
679 goto end;
680 /* break; */
681 }
682
683 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
684 if (s->internal->debug) {
685 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
686 goto end;
687 }
688
689
690 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->internal->state != state)) {
691 new_state = s->internal->state;
692 s->internal->state = state;
693 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
694 s->internal->state = new_state;
695 }
696 }
697 skip = 0;
698 }
699end:
700 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
701
702 s->internal->in_handshake--;
703 if (cb != NULL)
704 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
705 return (ret);
706}
707
708int
709ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
710{
711 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
712 ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST);
713 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0);
714
715 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
716 }
717
718 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
719 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
720}
721
722int
723ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
724{
725 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
726 unsigned int cookie_len;
727 long n;
728 unsigned long id;
729 unsigned char *p, *d;
730 SSL_CIPHER *c;
731 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
732 unsigned long alg_k;
733 const SSL_METHOD *method;
734 uint16_t shared_version;
735
736 /*
737 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
738 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
739 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
740 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
741 * TLSv1.
742 */
743 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
744 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
745 }
746
747 s->internal->first_packet = 1;
748 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
749 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
750 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
751
752 if (!ok)
753 return ((int)n);
754 s->internal->first_packet = 0;
755
756 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
757
758 if (2 > n)
759 goto truncated;
760 /*
761 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header.
762 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
763 */
764 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8)|(int)p[1];
765 p += 2;
766
767 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, s->client_version, &shared_version) != 1) {
768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
769 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
770 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) {
771 /*
772 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote
773 * version number.
774 */
775 s->version = s->client_version;
776 }
777 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
778 goto f_err;
779 }
780 s->version = shared_version;
781
782 if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL)
783 method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version);
784 if (method == NULL) {
785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
786 goto err;
787 }
788 s->method = method;
789
790 /*
791 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello doesn't
792 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
793 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
794 */
795 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
796 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
797
798 if (p - d + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 >= n)
799 goto truncated;
800 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
801
802 if (p - d + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= n)
803 goto truncated;
804 cookie_length = p[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1];
805
806 if (cookie_length == 0)
807 return (1);
808 }
809
810 if (p - d + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 > n)
811 goto truncated;
812
813 /* load the client random */
814 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
815 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
816
817 /* get the session-id */
818 j= *(p++);
819 if (p - d + j > n)
820 goto truncated;
821
822 s->internal->hit = 0;
823 /*
824 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
825 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
826 * ignore resumption requests with flag
827 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
828 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
829 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older
830 * library versions).
831 *
832 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated()
833 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session
834 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
835 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
836 * ignored.
837 */
838 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options &
839 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
840 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
841 goto err;
842 } else {
843 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
844 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
845 s->internal->hit = 1;
846 } else if (i == -1)
847 goto err;
848 else {
849 /* i == 0 */
850 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
851 goto err;
852 }
853 }
854
855 p += j;
856
857 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
858 /* cookie stuff */
859 if (p - d + 1 > n)
860 goto truncated;
861 cookie_len = *(p++);
862
863 /*
864 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
865 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
866 * does not cause an overflow.
867 */
868 if (cookie_len > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) {
869 /* too much data */
870 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
872 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
873 goto f_err;
874 }
875
876 if (p - d + cookie_len > n)
877 goto truncated;
878
879 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
880 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
881 cookie_len > 0) {
882 memcpy(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
883
884 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
885 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
886 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) {
887 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
889 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
890 goto f_err;
891 }
892 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
893 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, D1I(s)->cookie,
894 D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) {
895 /* default verification */
896 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
898 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
899 goto f_err;
900 }
901
902 ret = 2;
903 }
904
905 p += cookie_len;
906 }
907
908 if (p - d + 2 > n)
909 goto truncated;
910 n2s(p, i);
911 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
912 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
913 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
915 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
916 goto f_err;
917 }
918 if (p - d + i > n)
919 goto truncated;
920 if (i > 0) {
921 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i)) == NULL)
922 goto err;
923 }
924 p += i;
925
926 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
927 if ((s->internal->hit) && (i > 0)) {
928 j = 0;
929 id = s->session->cipher->id;
930
931 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
932 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
933 if (c->id == id) {
934 j = 1;
935 break;
936 }
937 }
938 if (j == 0) {
939 /*
940 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher
941 * list if we are asked to reuse it
942 */
943 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
945 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
946 goto f_err;
947 }
948 }
949
950 /* compression */
951 if (p - d + 1 > n)
952 goto truncated;
953 i= *(p++);
954 if (p - d + i > n)
955 goto truncated;
956 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
957 if (p[j] == 0)
958 break;
959 }
960
961 p += i;
962 if (j >= i) {
963 /* no compress */
964 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
966 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
967 goto f_err;
968 }
969
970 /* TLS extensions*/
971 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
972 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
974 goto f_err;
975 }
976 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
978 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
979 goto err;
980 }
981
982 /*
983 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
984 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
985 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
986 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation.
987 */
988 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
989
990 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) {
991 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
992
993 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
994 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
995 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher,
996 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
997 s->internal->hit = 1;
998 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
999 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1000
1001 ciphers = NULL;
1002
1003 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1004 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
1005 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1006 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1007 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1008 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1010 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1011 goto f_err;
1012 }
1013
1014 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1015
1016 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1017 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id);
1018
1019 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1020 s->internal->cipher_list_by_id =
1021 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1022 }
1023 }
1024
1025 /*
1026 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1027 * pick a cipher
1028 */
1029
1030 if (!s->internal->hit) {
1031 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1032 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1033 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1034 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1036 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1037 goto f_err;
1038 }
1039 ciphers = NULL;
1040 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1041 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1042
1043 if (c == NULL) {
1044 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1046 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1047 goto f_err;
1048 }
1049 S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1050 } else {
1051 S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1052 }
1053
1054 alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1055 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) ||
1056 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1057 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1058 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1059 goto f_err;
1060 }
1061 }
1062
1063 /*
1064 * We now have the following setup.
1065 * client_random
1066 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1067 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1068 * compression - basically ignored right now
1069 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1070 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1071 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag
1072 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1073 */
1074
1075 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1076 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1078 goto err;
1079 }
1080
1081 if (ret < 0)
1082 ret = 1;
1083 if (0) {
1084truncated:
1085 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1087f_err:
1088 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1089 }
1090err:
1091 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1092
1093 return (ret);
1094}
1095
1096int
1097ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1098{
1099 unsigned char *bufend;
1100 unsigned char *p, *d;
1101 CBB cbb, session_id;
1102 size_t outlen;
1103 int sl;
1104
1105 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1106
1107 bufend = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1108
1109 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1110 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO);
1111
1112 if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, p, bufend - p))
1113 goto err;
1114
1115 if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, s->version))
1116 goto err;
1117 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->server_random,
1118 sizeof(s->s3->server_random)))
1119 goto err;
1120
1121 /*
1122 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1123 * back in the server hello:
1124 *
1125 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1126 * we send back the old session ID.
1127 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1128 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1129 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1130 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1131 * session ID.
1132 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1133 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1134 *
1135 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1136 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1137 * to send back.
1138 */
1139 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1140 && !s->internal->hit)
1141 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1142
1143 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1144 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
1146 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 goto err;
1148 }
1149
1150 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id))
1151 goto err;
1152 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl))
1153 goto err;
1154
1155 /* Cipher suite. */
1156 if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb,
1157 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher)))
1158 goto err;
1159
1160 /* Compression method. */
1161 if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0))
1162 goto err;
1163
1164 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &outlen))
1165 goto err;
1166
1167 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p + outlen,
1168 bufend)) == NULL) {
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
1170 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1171 goto err;
1172 }
1173
1174 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d);
1175 }
1176
1177 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1178 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1179
1180 err:
1181 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
1182
1183 return (-1);
1184}
1185
1186int
1187ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1188{
1189 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1190 ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE);
1191 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0);
1192
1193 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1194 }
1195
1196 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1197 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1198}
1199
1200int
1201ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
1202{
1203 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
1204 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1205 unsigned char *data;
1206 int al;
1207
1208 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1209 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) {
1210 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 goto f_err;
1214 }
1215 } else
1216 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp;
1217
1218 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)
1219 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
1220 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher));
1221
1222 if (dhp == NULL) {
1223 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1225 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1226 goto f_err;
1227 }
1228
1229 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1231 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1232 goto err;
1233 }
1234
1235 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1236 dh = dhp;
1237 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1239 goto err;
1240 }
1241 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh;
1242 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1244 goto err;
1245 }
1246
1247 /*
1248 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key.
1249 */
1250 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p))
1251 goto err;
1252 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p)))
1253 goto err;
1254 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data);
1255
1256 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g))
1257 goto err;
1258 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g)))
1259 goto err;
1260 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data);
1261
1262 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys))
1263 goto err;
1264 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key)))
1265 goto err;
1266 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data);
1267
1268 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1269 goto err;
1270
1271 return (1);
1272
1273 f_err:
1274 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1275 err:
1276 return (-1);
1277}
1278
1279static int
1280ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
1281{
1282 CBB ecpoint;
1283 unsigned char *data;
1284 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1285 const EC_GROUP *group;
1286 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1287 int encodedlen = 0;
1288 int curve_id = 0;
1289 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1290 int al;
1291
1292 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
1293 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1294 if (nid != NID_undef)
1295 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1296 } else if (ecdhp == NULL && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
1297 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
1298 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher));
1299 }
1300 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1301 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1303 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1304 goto f_err;
1305 }
1306
1307 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1309 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1310 goto err;
1311 }
1312
1313 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1314 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1315 ecdh = ecdhp;
1316 } else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1318 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1319 goto err;
1320 }
1321 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1322
1323 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1324 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1325 (s->internal->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1326 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1328 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1329 goto err;
1330 }
1331 }
1332
1333 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1334 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1335 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1337 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1338 goto err;
1339 }
1340
1341 /*
1342 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1343 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1344 */
1345 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(
1346 EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) {
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1348 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1349 goto err;
1350 }
1351
1352 /*
1353 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1354 * allocate memory accordingly.
1355 */
1356 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1357 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
1358
1359 encodedPoint = malloc(encodedlen);
1360
1361 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1362 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1364 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1365 goto err;
1366 }
1367
1368 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1369 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1370
1371 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1373 goto err;
1374 }
1375
1376 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1377 bn_ctx = NULL;
1378
1379 /*
1380 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1381 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has:
1382 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1383 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1384 * the actual encoded point itself.
1385 */
1386 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
1387 goto err;
1388 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
1389 goto err;
1390 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
1391 goto err;
1392 if (!CBB_add_space(&ecpoint, &data, encodedlen))
1393 goto err;
1394
1395 memcpy(data, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1396
1397 free(encodedPoint);
1398 encodedPoint = NULL;
1399
1400 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1401 goto err;
1402
1403 return (1);
1404
1405 f_err:
1406 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1407 err:
1408 free(encodedPoint);
1409 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1410
1411 return (-1);
1412}
1413
1414static int
1415ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
1416{
1417 uint8_t *public_key = NULL;
1418 int curve_id;
1419 CBB ecpoint;
1420 int ret = -1;
1421
1422 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */
1423 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) {
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1426 goto err;
1427 }
1428 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1429 goto err;
1430 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1431 goto err;
1432 X25519_keypair(public_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519);
1433
1434 /* Serialize public key. */
1435 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1437 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1438 goto err;
1439 }
1440
1441 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
1442 goto err;
1443 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
1444 goto err;
1445 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
1446 goto err;
1447 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH))
1448 goto err;
1449 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1450 goto err;
1451
1452 ret = 1;
1453
1454 err:
1455 free(public_key);
1456
1457 return (ret);
1458}
1459
1460static int
1461ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
1462{
1463 int nid;
1464
1465 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
1466
1467 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0 && nid == NID_X25519)
1468 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb);
1469
1470 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb);
1471}
1472
1473int
1474ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1475{
1476 CBB cbb;
1477 unsigned char *params = NULL;
1478 size_t params_len;
1479 unsigned char *q;
1480 int j, num;
1481 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1482 unsigned int u;
1483 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1484 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1485 unsigned char *p, *d;
1486 int al, i;
1487 unsigned long type;
1488 int n;
1489 int kn;
1490 BUF_MEM *buf;
1491 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1492
1493 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1494
1495 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1496 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1497 type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1498
1499 buf = s->internal->init_buf;
1500
1501 if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0))
1502 goto err;
1503
1504 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1505 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb) != 1)
1506 goto err;
1507 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1508 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb) != 1)
1509 goto err;
1510 } else {
1511 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1513 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1514 goto f_err;
1515 }
1516
1517 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &params, &params_len))
1518 goto err;
1519
1520 if (!(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) {
1521 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(
1522 s, S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) {
1523 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1524 goto f_err;
1525 }
1526 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1527 } else {
1528 pkey = NULL;
1529 kn = 0;
1530 }
1531
1532 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) +
1533 params_len + kn)) {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1535 ERR_LIB_BUF);
1536 goto err;
1537 }
1538
1539 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1540 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE);
1541
1542 memcpy(p, params, params_len);
1543
1544 free(params);
1545 params = NULL;
1546
1547 n = params_len;
1548 p += params_len;
1549
1550 /* not anonymous */
1551 if (pkey != NULL) {
1552 /*
1553 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1554 * and p points to the space at the end.
1555 */
1556 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1557 q = md_buf;
1558 j = 0;
1559 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1560 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1561 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->internal->md5 :
1562 s->ctx->internal->sha1, NULL))
1563 goto err;
1564 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
1565 s->s3->client_random,
1566 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1567 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
1568 s->s3->server_random,
1569 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1570 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1571 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1572 (unsigned int *)&i);
1573 q += i;
1574 j += i;
1575 }
1576 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1577 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1578 SSLerr(
1579 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1580 ERR_LIB_RSA);
1581 goto err;
1582 }
1583 s2n(u, p);
1584 n += u + 2;
1585 } else if (md) {
1586 /* Send signature algorithm. */
1587 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1588 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1589 /* Should never happen */
1590 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1591 SSLerr(
1592 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1593 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 goto f_err;
1595 }
1596 p += 2;
1597 }
1598 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1599 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
1600 s->s3->client_random,
1601 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1602 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
1603 s->s3->server_random,
1604 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1605 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1606 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2],
1607 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1608 SSLerr(
1609 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1610 ERR_LIB_EVP);
1611 goto err;
1612 }
1613 s2n(i, p);
1614 n += i + 2;
1615 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1616 n += 2;
1617 } else {
1618 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1619 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1621 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1622 goto f_err;
1623 }
1624 }
1625
1626 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
1627 }
1628
1629 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1630
1631 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1632
1633 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1634
1635 f_err:
1636 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1637 err:
1638 free(params);
1639 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1640 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
1641
1642 return (-1);
1643}
1644
1645int
1646ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1647{
1648 unsigned char *p, *d;
1649 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1650 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1651 X509_NAME *name;
1652 BUF_MEM *buf;
1653
1654 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1655 buf = s->internal->init_buf;
1656
1657 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1658 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST);
1659
1660 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1661 p++;
1662 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
1663 d[0] = n;
1664 p += n;
1665 n++;
1666
1667 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1668 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
1669 s2n(nl, p);
1670 p += nl + 2;
1671 n += nl + 2;
1672 }
1673
1674 off = n;
1675 p += 2;
1676 n += 2;
1677
1678 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1679 nl = 0;
1680 if (sk != NULL) {
1681 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1682 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1683 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
1684 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,
1685 ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + n + j
1686 + 2)) {
1687 SSLerr(
1688 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1689 ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1690 goto err;
1691 }
1692 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1693 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + n;
1694 s2n(j, p);
1695 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
1696 n += 2 + j;
1697 nl += 2 + j;
1698 }
1699 }
1700 /* else no CA names */
1701 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1702 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + off;
1703 s2n(nl, p);
1704
1705 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
1706
1707 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1708 }
1709
1710 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1711 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1712err:
1713 return (-1);
1714}
1715
1716static int
1717ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1718{
1719 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
1720 unsigned char *d;
1721 RSA *rsa = NULL;
1722 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1723 int i, al;
1724
1725 d = p;
1726
1727 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey));
1728 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1729 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1730
1731 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1732 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1733 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
1734 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1736 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1737 goto f_err;
1738 }
1739 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
1740
1741 if (2 > n)
1742 goto truncated;
1743 n2s(p, i);
1744 if (n != i + 2) {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1746 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1747 goto err;
1748 } else
1749 n = i;
1750
1751 i = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1752
1753 ERR_clear_error();
1754
1755 al = -1;
1756
1757 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
1758 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1759 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1760 }
1761
1762 if (p - d + 2 > n) /* needed in the SSL3 case */
1763 goto truncated;
1764 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) &&
1765 (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
1766 /*
1767 * The premaster secret must contain the same version
1768 * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback
1769 * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such
1770 * protection for DH ciphersuites).
1771 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated
1772 * protocol version instead if the server does not
1773 * support the requested protocol version.
1774 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
1775 * clients.
1776 */
1777 if (!((s->internal->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1778 (p[0] == (s->version >> 8)) &&
1779 (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) {
1780 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1781 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1782
1783 /*
1784 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
1785 * Bleichenbacher's attack
1786 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits
1787 * the version number check as a "bad version
1788 * oracle" -- an alert would reveal that the
1789 * plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1790 * made up by the adversary is properly
1791 * formatted except that the version number is
1792 * wrong.
1793 * To avoid such attacks, we should treat this
1794 * just like any other decryption error.
1795 */
1796 }
1797 }
1798
1799 if (al != -1) {
1800 /*
1801 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
1802 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack
1803 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
1804 * section 7.4.7.1).
1805 */
1806 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1807 p = fakekey;
1808 }
1809
1810 s->session->master_key_length =
1811 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1812 s->session->master_key, p, i);
1813
1814 explicit_bzero(p, i);
1815
1816 return (1);
1817truncated:
1818 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1820f_err:
1821 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1822err:
1823 return (-1);
1824}
1825
1826static int
1827ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1828{
1829 BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
1830 int key_size, al;
1831 CBS cbs, dh_Yc;
1832 DH *dh;
1833
1834 if (n < 0)
1835 goto err;
1836
1837 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n);
1838
1839 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &dh_Yc))
1840 goto truncated;
1841
1842 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
1843 goto truncated;
1844
1845 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) {
1846 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1848 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1849 goto f_err;
1850 }
1851 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh;
1852
1853 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) {
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1855 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1856 goto err;
1857 }
1858
1859 key_size = DH_compute_key(p, bn, dh);
1860 if (key_size <= 0) {
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1862 BN_clear_free(bn);
1863 goto err;
1864 }
1865
1866 s->session->master_key_length =
1867 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
1868 s, s->session->master_key, p, key_size);
1869
1870 explicit_bzero(p, key_size);
1871
1872 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh);
1873 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL;
1874
1875 BN_clear_free(bn);
1876
1877 return (1);
1878
1879 truncated:
1880 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1882 f_err:
1883 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1884 err:
1885 return (-1);
1886}
1887
1888static int
1889ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1890{
1891 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1892 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1893 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1894 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1895 int i, al;
1896
1897 int ret = 1;
1898 int key_size;
1899 const EC_KEY *tkey;
1900 const EC_GROUP *group;
1901 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
1902
1903 /* Initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair. */
1904 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1906 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1907 goto err;
1908 }
1909
1910 /*
1911 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when
1912 * generating the ServerKeyExchange message.
1913 */
1914 tkey = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh;
1915
1916 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
1917 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
1918
1919 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
1920 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1922 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1923 goto err;
1924 }
1925
1926 /* Let's get client's public key */
1927 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1929 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1930 goto err;
1931 }
1932
1933 if (n == 0L) {
1934 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
1935 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
1936 s->session->peer)) == NULL) ||
1937 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
1938 /*
1939 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
1940 * authentication using ECDH certificates
1941 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
1942 * never executed. When that support is
1943 * added, we ought to ensure the key
1944 * received in the certificate is
1945 * authorized for key agreement.
1946 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
1947 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
1948 * group.
1949 */
1950 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1952 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
1953 goto f_err;
1954 }
1955
1956 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
1957 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec))
1958 == 0) {
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1960 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1961 goto err;
1962 }
1963 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
1964 } else {
1965 /*
1966 * Get client's public key from encoded point
1967 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
1968 */
1969 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1971 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1972 goto err;
1973 }
1974
1975 /* Get encoded point length */
1976 i = *p;
1977
1978 p += 1;
1979 if (n != 1 + i) {
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1981 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1982 goto err;
1983 }
1984 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
1985 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1987 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1988 goto err;
1989 }
1990 /*
1991 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
1992 * currently, so set it to the start.
1993 */
1994 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data;
1995 }
1996
1997 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
1998 key_size = ECDH_size(srvr_ecdh);
1999 if (key_size <= 0) {
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2001 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2002 goto err;
2003 }
2004 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, key_size, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2005 NULL);
2006 if (i <= 0) {
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2008 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2009 goto err;
2010 }
2011
2012 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2013 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2014 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2015 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2016 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh);
2017 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2018
2019 /* Compute the master secret */
2020 s->session->master_key_length =
2021 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
2022 s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2023
2024 explicit_bzero(p, i);
2025 return (ret);
2026
2027 f_err:
2028 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2029 err:
2030 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2031 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2032 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2033 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2034 return (-1);
2035}
2036
2037static int
2038ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
2039{
2040 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL;
2041 CBS cbs, ecpoint;
2042 int ret = -1;
2043
2044 if (n < 0)
2045 goto err;
2046
2047 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n);
2048 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &ecpoint))
2049 goto err;
2050 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH)
2051 goto err;
2052
2053 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
2054 goto err;
2055 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint)))
2056 goto err;
2057
2058 explicit_bzero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
2059 free(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519);
2060 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL;
2061
2062 s->session->master_key_length =
2063 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
2064 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
2065
2066 ret = 1;
2067
2068 err:
2069 if (shared_key != NULL)
2070 explicit_bzero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
2071 free(shared_key);
2072
2073 return (ret);
2074}
2075
2076static int
2077ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
2078{
2079 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL)
2080 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, p, n);
2081
2082 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, p, n);
2083}
2084
2085static int
2086ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
2087{
2088
2089 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2090 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2091 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2092 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2093 unsigned long alg_a;
2094 int Ttag, Tclass;
2095 long Tlen;
2096 int al;
2097 int ret = 0;
2098
2099 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2100 alg_a = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2101 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2102 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2103
2104 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2105 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2106 /*
2107 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type,
2108 * maybe use it for key exchange.
2109 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because
2110 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for
2111 * authorization only.
2112 */
2113 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2114 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2115 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
2116 client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2117 ERR_clear_error();
2118 }
2119 if (2 > n)
2120 goto truncated;
2121 /* Decrypt session key */
2122 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2123 &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2124 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2126 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2127 goto gerr;
2128 }
2129 start = p;
2130 inlen = Tlen;
2131 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen,
2132 start, inlen) <=0) {
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2134 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2135 goto gerr;
2136 }
2137 /* Generate master secret */
2138 s->session->master_key_length =
2139 s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
2140 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
2141 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2142 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1,
2143 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2144 ret = 2;
2145 else
2146 ret = 1;
2147 gerr:
2148 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2149 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2150 if (ret)
2151 return (ret);
2152 else
2153 goto err;
2154
2155 truncated:
2156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2158 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2159 err:
2160 return (-1);
2161}
2162
2163int
2164ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2165{
2166 unsigned long alg_k;
2167 unsigned char *p;
2168 int al, ok;
2169 long n;
2170
2171 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */
2172 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2173 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2174 if (!ok)
2175 return ((int)n);
2176
2177 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
2178
2179 alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2180
2181 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2182 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, p, n) != 1)
2183 goto err;
2184 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2185 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, p, n) != 1)
2186 goto err;
2187 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2188 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, p, n) != 1)
2189 goto err;
2190 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2191 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, p, n) != 1)
2192 goto err;
2193 } else {
2194 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2196 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2197 goto f_err;
2198 }
2199
2200 return (1);
2201
2202 f_err:
2203 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2204 err:
2205 return (-1);
2206}
2207
2208int
2209ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2210{
2211 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2212 unsigned char *p;
2213 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2214 long n;
2215 int type = 0, i, j;
2216 X509 *peer;
2217 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2218 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2219 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2220
2221 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2222 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2223 if (!ok)
2224 return ((int)n);
2225
2226 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2227 peer = s->session->peer;
2228 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2229 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2230 } else {
2231 peer = NULL;
2232 pkey = NULL;
2233 }
2234
2235 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2236 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2237 if (peer != NULL) {
2238 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2240 SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2241 goto f_err;
2242 }
2243 ret = 1;
2244 goto end;
2245 }
2246
2247 if (peer == NULL) {
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2249 SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2250 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2251 goto f_err;
2252 }
2253
2254 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2256 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2257 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2258 goto f_err;
2259 }
2260
2261 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) {
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2263 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2264 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2265 goto f_err;
2266 }
2267
2268 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2269 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
2270 /*
2271 * Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites.
2272 *
2273 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is a bare
2274 * signature without length field.
2275 */
2276 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2277 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) {
2278 i = 64;
2279 } else {
2280 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2281 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2282 /* Should never happen */
2283 if (sigalg == -1) {
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2286 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2287 goto f_err;
2288 }
2289 if (2 > n)
2290 goto truncated;
2291 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2292 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2294 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2295 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 goto f_err;
2297 }
2298 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2299 if (md == NULL) {
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2301 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2302 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 goto f_err;
2304 }
2305 p += 2;
2306 n -= 2;
2307 }
2308 if (2 > n)
2309 goto truncated;
2310 n2s(p, i);
2311 n -= 2;
2312 if (i > n)
2313 goto truncated;
2314 }
2315 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2316 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2318 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2319 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2320 goto f_err;
2321 }
2322
2323 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2324 long hdatalen = 0;
2325 void *hdata;
2326 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2327 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2329 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2330 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2331 goto f_err;
2332 }
2333 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
2334 !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2336 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2337 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2338 goto f_err;
2339 }
2340
2341 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
2342 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2344 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2345 goto f_err;
2346 }
2347 } else
2348 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2349 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2350 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2351 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2352 if (i < 0) {
2353 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2355 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2356 goto f_err;
2357 }
2358 if (i == 0) {
2359 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2361 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2362 goto f_err;
2363 }
2364 } else
2365 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
2366 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2367 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2368 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
2369 if (j <= 0) {
2370 /* bad signature */
2371 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2373 SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2374 goto f_err;
2375 }
2376 } else
2377 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2378 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2379 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2380 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
2381 if (j <= 0) {
2382 /* bad signature */
2383 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2385 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2386 goto f_err;
2387 }
2388 } else
2389#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2390 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2391 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2392 long hdatalen = 0;
2393 void *hdata;
2394 unsigned char signature[128];
2395 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(signature);
2396 int nid;
2397 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
2398
2399 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2400 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2403 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2404 goto f_err;
2405 }
2406 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
2407 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2409 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2410 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2411 goto f_err;
2412 }
2413 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2414 if (!pctx) {
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2416 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2417 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2418 goto f_err;
2419 }
2420 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
2421 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
2422 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signature, &siglen) ||
2423 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) ||
2424 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
2425 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
2426 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
2427 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE,
2428 NULL) <= 0)) {
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2430 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2431 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2432 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2433 goto f_err;
2434 }
2435
2436 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, p, i, signature, siglen) <= 0) {
2437 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2439 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2440 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2441 goto f_err;
2442 }
2443
2444 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2445 } else
2446#endif
2447 {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2449 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2450 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2451 goto f_err;
2452 }
2453
2454
2455 ret = 1;
2456 if (0) {
2457truncated:
2458 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2460f_err:
2461 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2462 }
2463end:
2464 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
2465 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer);
2466 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2467 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
2468 }
2469 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2470 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2471 return (ret);
2472}
2473
2474int
2475ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2476{
2477 CBS cbs, client_certs;
2478 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
2479 X509 *x = NULL;
2480 long n;
2481 const unsigned char *q;
2482 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2483
2484 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2485 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
2486
2487 if (!ok)
2488 return ((int)n);
2489
2490 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
2491 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2492 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2494 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2495 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2496 goto f_err;
2497 }
2498 /*
2499 * If tls asked for a client cert,
2500 * the client must return a 0 list.
2501 */
2502 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2504 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
2505 );
2506 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2507 goto f_err;
2508 }
2509 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2510 return (1);
2511 }
2512
2513 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
2514 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2516 SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2517 goto f_err;
2518 }
2519
2520 if (n < 0)
2521 goto truncated;
2522
2523 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
2524
2525 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2527 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2528 goto err;
2529 }
2530
2531 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) ||
2532 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
2533 goto truncated;
2534
2535 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) {
2536 CBS cert;
2537
2538 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) {
2539 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2541 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2542 goto f_err;
2543 }
2544
2545 q = CBS_data(&cert);
2546 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
2547 if (x == NULL) {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2549 ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2550 goto err;
2551 }
2552 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
2553 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2555 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2556 goto f_err;
2557 }
2558 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2560 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2561 goto err;
2562 }
2563 x = NULL;
2564 }
2565
2566 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2567 /*
2568 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned.
2569 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate.
2570 */
2571 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2572 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2574 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2575 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2576 goto f_err;
2577 }
2578 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2579 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
2580 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2581 goto f_err;
2582 }
2583 } else {
2584 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2585 if (i <= 0) {
2586 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2588 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2589 goto f_err;
2590 }
2591 }
2592
2593 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2594 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2595 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2596
2597 /*
2598 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2599 * when we arrive here
2600 */
2601 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
2602 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2603 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2605 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2606 goto err;
2607 }
2608 }
2609 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2610 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
2611
2612 /*
2613 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2614 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2615 */
2616
2617 sk = NULL;
2618
2619 ret = 1;
2620 if (0) {
2621truncated:
2622 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2624 SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2625f_err:
2626 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2627 }
2628err:
2629 X509_free(x);
2630 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2631
2632 return (ret);
2633}
2634
2635int
2636ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2637{
2638 CBB cbb, server_cert;
2639 X509 *x;
2640
2641 /*
2642 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2.
2643 */
2644
2645 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2646
2647 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
2648 if ((x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s)) == NULL) {
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
2650 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2651 return (0);
2652 }
2653
2654 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &server_cert,
2655 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE))
2656 goto err;
2657 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, x))
2658 goto err;
2659 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb))
2660 goto err;
2661
2662 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2663 }
2664
2665 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2666 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2667
2668 err:
2669 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
2670
2671 return (0);
2672}
2673
2674/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
2675int
2676ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2677{
2678 unsigned char *d, *p, *macstart;
2679 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2680 const unsigned char *const_p;
2681 int len, slen_full, slen;
2682 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2683 unsigned int hlen;
2684 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2685 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2686 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2687 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2688 unsigned char key_name[16];
2689
2690 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
2691 /* get session encoding length */
2692 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2693 /*
2694 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2695 * too long
2696 */
2697 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
2698 goto err;
2699 senc = malloc(slen_full);
2700 if (!senc)
2701 goto err;
2702 p = senc;
2703 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2704
2705 /*
2706 * Create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to
2707 * clean up
2708 */
2709 const_p = senc;
2710 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2711 if (sess == NULL)
2712 goto err;
2713
2714 /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2715 sess->session_id_length = 0;
2716
2717 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2718 if (slen > slen_full) {
2719 /* shouldn't ever happen */
2720 goto err;
2721 }
2722 p = senc;
2723 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
2724 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2725
2726 /*
2727 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2728 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2729 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2730 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2731 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2732 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2733 */
2734 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) +
2735 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2736 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2737 goto err;
2738
2739 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET);
2740
2741 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2742 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2743
2744 /*
2745 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2746 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2747 * from parent ctx.
2748 */
2749 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2750 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s,
2751 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) {
2752 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2753 goto err;
2754 }
2755 } else {
2756 arc4random_buf(iv, 16);
2757 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2758 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2759 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2760 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2761 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2762 }
2763
2764 /*
2765 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
2766 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session
2767 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
2768 * sessions will live as long as their sessions.
2769 */
2770 l2n(s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
2771
2772 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2773 p += 2;
2774 /* Output key name */
2775 macstart = p;
2776 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2777 p += 16;
2778 /* output IV */
2779 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2780 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2781 /* Encrypt session data */
2782 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2783 p += len;
2784 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len);
2785 p += len;
2786 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2787
2788 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2789 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2790 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2791 p += hlen;
2792
2793 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2794 /* Total length */
2795 len = p - d;
2796
2797 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint. */
2798 p = d + 4;
2799 s2n(len - 6, p); /* Message length */
2800
2801 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, len);
2802
2803 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2804
2805 explicit_bzero(senc, slen_full);
2806 free(senc);
2807 }
2808
2809 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2810 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2811
2812 err:
2813 if (senc != NULL)
2814 explicit_bzero(senc, slen_full);
2815 free(senc);
2816
2817 return (-1);
2818}
2819
2820int
2821ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2822{
2823 unsigned char *p;
2824
2825 if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
2826 /*
2827 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2828 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2829 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2830 * + (ocsp response)
2831 */
2832 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 4 +
2833 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2834 return (-1);
2835
2836 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS);
2837
2838 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
2839 l2n3(s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2840 memcpy(p, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2841
2842 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4);
2843
2844 s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2845 }
2846
2847 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2848 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2849}
2850
2851/*
2852 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
2853 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
2854 */
2855int
2856ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
2857{
2858 CBS cbs, proto, padding;
2859 int ok;
2860 long n;
2861 size_t len;
2862
2863 /*
2864 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
2865 * extension in their ClientHello
2866 */
2867 if (!S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen) {
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
2869 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
2870 return (-1);
2871 }
2872
2873 /* 514 maxlen is enough for the payload format below */
2874 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
2875 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
2876 if (!ok)
2877 return ((int)n);
2878
2879 /*
2880 * s->internal->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
2881 * in this handshake, but S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
2882 * by ssl3_get_finished).
2883 */
2884 if (!S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) {
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
2886 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
2887 return (-1);
2888 }
2889
2890 if (n < 2)
2891 return (0);
2892 /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
2893
2894 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, s->internal->init_num);
2895
2896 /*
2897 * The payload looks like:
2898 * uint8 proto_len;
2899 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
2900 * uint8 padding_len;
2901 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
2902 */
2903 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &proto) ||
2904 !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &padding) ||
2905 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
2906 return 0;
2907
2908 /*
2909 * XXX We should not NULL it, but this matches old behavior of not
2910 * freeing before malloc.
2911 */
2912 s->internal->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
2913 s->internal->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
2914
2915 if (!CBS_stow(&proto, &s->internal->next_proto_negotiated, &len)) {
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
2917 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2918 return (0);
2919 }
2920 s->internal->next_proto_negotiated_len = (uint8_t)len;
2921
2922 return (1);
2923}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-10-25 09:35:20 +0000