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1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <openssl/objects.h>
114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117#include <openssl/rand.h>
118#include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123static int
124tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127#endif
128
129SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
130 tls1_enc,
131 tls1_mac,
132 tls1_setup_key_block,
133 tls1_generate_master_secret,
134 tls1_change_cipher_state,
135 tls1_final_finish_mac,
136 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
137 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_alert_code,
141 tls1_export_keying_material,
142};
143
144long
145tls1_default_timeout(void)
146{
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
149 return (60*60*2);
150}
151
152int
153tls1_new(SSL *s)
154{
155 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return (0);
156 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 return (1);
158}
159
160void
161tls1_free(SSL *s)
162{
163#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
164 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
165 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 }
167#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 ssl3_free(s);
169}
170
171void
172tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173{
174 ssl3_clear(s);
175 s->version = s->method->version;
176}
177
178#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
179
180static int nid_list[] = {
181 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
182 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
183 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
184 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
185 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
186 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
187 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
188 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
189 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
190 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
191 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
192 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
193 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
194 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
195 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
196 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
197 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
198 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
199 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
200 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
201 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
202 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
203 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
204 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
205 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
206};
207
208static int pref_list[] = {
209 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
210 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
213 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
214 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
215 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
216 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
217 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
218 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
219 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
220 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
221 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
222 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
223 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
224 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
225 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
226 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
227 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
228 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
229 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
230 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
231 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
232 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
233 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234};
235
236int
237tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
238{
239 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
240 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
241 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
242 return 0;
243 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
244}
245
246int
247tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
248{
249 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
250 switch (nid) {
251 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
252 return 1;
253 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
254 return 2;
255 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
256 return 3;
257 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
258 return 4;
259 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
260 return 5;
261 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
262 return 6;
263 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
264 return 7;
265 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
266 return 8;
267 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
268 return 9;
269 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
270 return 10;
271 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
272 return 11;
273 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
274 return 12;
275 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 return 13;
277 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 return 14;
279 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
280 return 15;
281 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
282 return 16;
283 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
284 return 17;
285 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
286 return 18;
287 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
288 return 19;
289 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
290 return 20;
291 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 return 21;
293 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
294 return 22;
295 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
296 return 23;
297 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
298 return 24;
299 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
300 return 25;
301 default:
302 return 0;
303 }
304}
305#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
306
307#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
308
309/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
310 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
311 */
312
313#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
314#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
315#else
316#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
317#endif
318
319#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
320#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
321#else
322#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
323#endif
324
325#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
326#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
327#else
328#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
329#endif
330
331#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
332 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
333 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
334 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
335
336static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
337#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
338 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
340#endif
341#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
342 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
344#endif
345#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
346 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
347#endif
348};
349
350int
351tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
352{
353 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
354 if (p)
355 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
356 return (int)slen;
357}
358
359unsigned char
360*ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
361{
362 int extdatalen = 0;
363 unsigned char *ret = p;
364
365 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
366 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
367 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
368 return p;
369
370 ret += 2;
371
372 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
373
374 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
375 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
376 unsigned long size_str;
377 long lenmax;
378
379
380 /* check for enough space.
381 4 for the servername type and entension length
382 2 for servernamelist length
383 1 for the hostname type
384 2 for hostname length
385 + hostname length
386 */
387
388 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
389 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
390 return NULL;
391
392 /* extension type and length */
393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
394
395 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
396
397 /* length of servername list */
398 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
399
400 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
401 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
402 s2n(size_str, ret);
403 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
404 ret += size_str;
405 }
406
407 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
408 if (s->renegotiate) {
409 int el;
410
411 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 return NULL;
414 }
415
416 if ((limit - p - 4 - el)
417 < 0) return NULL;
418
419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
420 s2n(el, ret);
421
422 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
424 return NULL;
425 }
426
427 ret += el;
428 }
429
430#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
431 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
432 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
433 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
434
435 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
436
437 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
439 return NULL;
440 }
441
442 /* check for enough space.
443 4 for the srp type type and entension length
444 1 for the srp user identity
445 + srp user identity length
446 */
447 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len)
448 < 0) return NULL;
449
450
451 /* fill in the extension */
452 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
453 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
454 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
455 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
456 ret += login_len;
457 }
458#endif
459
460#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
461 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
462 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
463 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
464 long lenmax;
465
466
467 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5)
468 < 0) return NULL;
469
470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
473 return NULL;
474 }
475
476 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
477 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
478 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
479 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
480 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
481 }
482 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
483 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
484 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
485 long lenmax;
486
487
488 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6)
489 < 0) return NULL;
490
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
492 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) {
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
494 return NULL;
495 }
496
497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
499
500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
503 * resolves this to two bytes.
504 */
505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
507 ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
508 }
509#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
510
511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
512 int ticklen;
513 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
514 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
515 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
516 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
517 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
518 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
519 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
520 return NULL;
521 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
522 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
523 ticklen);
524 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
525 } else
526 ticklen = 0;
527 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
528 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
529 goto skip_ext;
530 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
531 * rest for ticket
532 */
533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
534 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
535
536 s2n(ticklen, ret);
537 if (ticklen) {
538 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
539 ret += ticklen;
540 }
541 }
542 skip_ext:
543
544 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
545 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
546 return NULL;
547
548 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
549 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
550 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
551 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
552 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
553 }
554
555#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
556 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
557 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
558 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
559
560 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
561 return NULL;
562 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
563 return NULL;
564
565 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
566
567 s2n(col + 2, ret);
568 s2n(col, ret);
569 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
570 ret += col;
571 }
572#endif
573
574 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
575 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
576 int i;
577 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
578 OCSP_RESPID *id;
579
580 idlen = 0;
581 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
582 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
583 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
584 if (itmp <= 0)
585 return NULL;
586 idlen += itmp + 2;
587 }
588
589 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
590 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
591 if (extlen < 0)
592 return NULL;
593 } else
594 extlen = 0;
595
596 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
598 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
599 return NULL;
600 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
601 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
602 s2n(idlen, ret);
603 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
604 /* save position of id len */
605 unsigned char *q = ret;
606 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
607 /* skip over id len */
608 ret += 2;
609 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
610 /* write id len */
611 s2n(itmp, q);
612 }
613 s2n(extlen, ret);
614 if (extlen > 0)
615 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
616 }
617
618#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
619 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
620 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
621 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
622 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
623 return NULL;
624 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
625 s2n(0, ret);
626 }
627#endif
628
629#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
630 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
631 int el;
632
633 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
634
635 if ((limit - p - 4 - el)
636 < 0) return NULL;
637
638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
639 s2n(el, ret);
640
641 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
643 return NULL;
644 }
645 ret += el;
646 }
647#endif
648
649#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
650 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
651 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
652 *
653 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
654 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
655 */
656 {
657 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
658 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
659 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
660 * not. */
661 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
662 hlen -= 5;
663 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
664 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
665 if (hlen >= 4)
666 hlen -= 4;
667 else
668 hlen = 0;
669
670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
671 s2n(hlen, ret);
672 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
673 ret += hlen;
674 }
675 }
676#endif
677
678 if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0)
679 return p;
680
681 s2n(extdatalen, p);
682 return ret;
683}
684
685unsigned char
686*ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
687{
688 int extdatalen = 0;
689 unsigned char *ret = p;
690#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
691 int next_proto_neg_seen;
692#endif
693
694 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
695 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
696 return p;
697
698 ret += 2;
699 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
700
701 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
702 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
703
704
705 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
706 s2n(0, ret);
707 }
708
709 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
710 int el;
711
712 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
714 return NULL;
715 }
716
717 if ((limit - p - 4 - el)
718 < 0) return NULL;
719
720 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
721 s2n(el, ret);
722
723 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
725 return NULL;
726 }
727
728 ret += el;
729 }
730
731#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
732 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
733 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
734 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
735 long lenmax;
736
737
738 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5)
739 < 0) return NULL;
740
741 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
742 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
744 return NULL;
745 }
746
747 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
748 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
749 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
750 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
751 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
752
753 }
754 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
755#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
756
757 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
758 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
759 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
760
761 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
762 s2n(0, ret);
763 }
764
765 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
766 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
767
768 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
769 s2n(0, ret);
770 }
771
772#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
773 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
774 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
775 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
776
777 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
778 return NULL;
779 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
780 return NULL;
781
782 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
783
784 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
785 s2n(sol, ret);
786 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
787 ret += sol;
788 }
789#endif
790
791#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
792 if (s->srtp_profile) {
793 int el;
794
795 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
796
797 if ((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0)
798 return NULL;
799
800 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
801 s2n(el, ret);
802
803 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
805 return NULL;
806 }
807 ret += el;
808 }
809#endif
810
811 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
812 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
813 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
814 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
815 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
816 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
817 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
818 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
819 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
820 };
821 if (limit - ret < 36)
822 return NULL;
823 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
824 ret += 36;
825 }
826
827#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
828 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
829 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
830 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
831 const unsigned char *npa;
832 unsigned int npalen;
833 int r;
834
835 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
836 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
837 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
838 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
839 s2n(npalen, ret);
840 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
841 ret += npalen;
842 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
843 }
844 }
845#endif
846
847 if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0)
848 return p;
849
850 s2n(extdatalen, p);
851 return ret;
852}
853
854#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
855/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
856 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
857 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
858 * SNI,
859 * elliptic_curves
860 * ec_point_formats
861 *
862 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
863 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
864 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
865 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
866 */
867static void
868ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
869 unsigned short type, size;
870 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
871 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
872 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
873 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
874 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
875 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
876 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
877
878 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
879 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
880 0x01, /* 1 point format */
881 0x00, /* uncompressed */
882 };
883
884 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
885 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
886 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
887 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
888 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
889 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
890 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
891 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
892 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
893 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
894 };
895
896 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
897 return;
898 data += 2;
899
900 if (data > (d + n - 4))
901 return;
902 n2s(data, type);
903 n2s(data, size);
904
905 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
906 return;
907
908 if (data + size > d + n)
909 return;
910 data += size;
911
912 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
913 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
914 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
915
916 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
917 return;
918 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
919 return;
920 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
921 return;
922 } else {
923 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
924
925 if (data + len != d + n)
926 return;
927 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
928 return;
929 }
930
931 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
932}
933#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
934
935int
936ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
937 int n, int *al)
938{
939 unsigned short type;
940 unsigned short size;
941 unsigned short len;
942 unsigned char *data = *p;
943 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
944 int sigalg_seen = 0;
945
946 s->servername_done = 0;
947 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
948#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
949 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
950#endif
951
952#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
953 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
954 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
955#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
956
957 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
958 goto ri_check;
959 n2s(data, len);
960
961 if (data > (d + n - len))
962 goto ri_check;
963
964 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
965 n2s(data, type);
966 n2s(data, size);
967
968 if (data + size > (d + n))
969 goto ri_check;
970#if 0
971 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
972#endif
973 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
974 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
975 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
976/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
977
978 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
979 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
980 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
981 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
982 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
983 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
984 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
985 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
986 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
987 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
988 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
989 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
990 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
991 the value of the Host: field.
992 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
993 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
994 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
995 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
996
997*/
998
999 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1000 unsigned char *sdata;
1001 int servname_type;
1002 int dsize;
1003
1004
1005 if (size < 2) {
1006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1007 return 0;
1008 }
1009 n2s(data, dsize);
1010
1011 size -= 2;
1012 if (dsize > size) {
1013 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1014 return 0;
1015 }
1016
1017 sdata = data;
1018 while (dsize > 3) {
1019 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1020
1021 n2s(sdata, len);
1022 dsize -= 3;
1023
1024 if (len > dsize) {
1025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1026 return 0;
1027 }
1028 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1029 switch (servname_type) {
1030 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1031 if (!s->hit) {
1032 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1033 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1034 return 0;
1035 }
1036 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1037 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1038 return 0;
1039 }
1040 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1041 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1042 return 0;
1043 }
1044 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1045 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1046 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1047 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1048 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1049 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1050 return 0;
1051 }
1052 s->servername_done = 1;
1053
1054
1055 } else
1056 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1057 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1058 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1059
1060 break;
1061
1062 default:
1063 break;
1064 }
1065
1066 dsize -= len;
1067 }
1068 if (dsize != 0) {
1069 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 return 0;
1071 }
1072
1073 }
1074#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1075 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1076 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
1077 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1078 return 0;
1079 }
1080 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1082 return 0;
1083 }
1084 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
1085 return -1;
1086 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1087 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
1088
1089 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
1090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 return 0;
1092 }
1093 }
1094#endif
1095
1096#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1098 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1099 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1100 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1101
1102 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
1103 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1104 return 0;
1105 }
1106 if (!s->hit) {
1107 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
1108 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1109 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1110 }
1111 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1112 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1113 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1114 return 0;
1115 }
1116 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1117 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1118 }
1119#if 0
1120 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1121 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1122 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1123 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1124 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1125#endif
1126 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1127 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1128 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1129 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1130 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1131
1132 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1133 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1) {
1134 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1135 return 0;
1136 }
1137 if (!s->hit) {
1138 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
1139 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 return 0;
1141 }
1142 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1143 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
1144 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1145 return 0;
1146 }
1147 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1148 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1149 }
1150#if 0
1151 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1152 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1153 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1154 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1155 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1156#endif
1157 }
1158#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1159#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1160 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1161 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1162 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1163
1164 if (size < 2) {
1165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1166 return 0;
1167 }
1168 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1169 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
1170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1171 return 0;
1172 }
1173
1174 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1175 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1176 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1177 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1178 else
1179 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1180 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1181 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1182 return 0;
1183 }
1184 }
1185#endif
1186 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1187 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1188 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
1189 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1190 return 0;
1191 }
1192 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1193 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1194 return 0;
1195 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1196 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1197 int dsize;
1198 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) {
1199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1200 return 0;
1201 }
1202 sigalg_seen = 1;
1203 n2s(data, dsize);
1204 size -= 2;
1205 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) {
1206 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1207 return 0;
1208 }
1209 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
1210 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1211 return 0;
1212 }
1213 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1214 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1215
1216 if (size < 5) {
1217 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1218 return 0;
1219 }
1220
1221 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1222 size--;
1223 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 const unsigned char *sdata;
1225 int dsize;
1226 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1227 n2s(data, dsize);
1228 size -= 2;
1229 if (dsize > size ) {
1230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1231 return 0;
1232 }
1233 while (dsize > 0) {
1234 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1235 int idsize;
1236 if (dsize < 4) {
1237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1238 return 0;
1239 }
1240 n2s(data, idsize);
1241 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1242 size -= 2 + idsize;
1243 if (dsize < 0) {
1244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 return 0;
1246 }
1247 sdata = data;
1248 data += idsize;
1249 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1250 &sdata, idsize);
1251 if (!id) {
1252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1253 return 0;
1254 }
1255 if (data != sdata) {
1256 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1258 return 0;
1259 }
1260 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1261 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1262 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
1263 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1264 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1265 return 0;
1266 }
1267 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1268 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
1269 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1270 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1271 return 0;
1272 }
1273 }
1274
1275 /* Read in request_extensions */
1276 if (size < 2) {
1277 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1278 return 0;
1279 }
1280 n2s(data, dsize);
1281 size -= 2;
1282 if (dsize != size) {
1283 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 return 0;
1285 }
1286 sdata = data;
1287 if (dsize > 0) {
1288 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1289 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1290 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1291 }
1292
1293 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1294 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1295 &sdata, dsize);
1296 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1297 || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
1298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1299 return 0;
1300 }
1301 }
1302 }
1303 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1304 * so ignore it.
1305 */
1306 else
1307 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1308 }
1309#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1310 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1311 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1312 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1313 * renegotiation.
1314 *
1315 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1316 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1317 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1318 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1319 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1320 * anything like that, but this might change).
1321
1322 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1323 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1324 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1325 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1326 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1327 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1328 }
1329#endif
1330
1331 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1332#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1333 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1334 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1335 al))
1336 return 0;
1337 }
1338#endif
1339
1340 data += size;
1341 }
1342
1343 *p = data;
1344
1345 ri_check:
1346
1347 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1348
1349 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1350 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1351 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1353 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1354 return 0;
1355 }
1356
1357 return 1;
1358}
1359
1360#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1361/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1362 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1363 * the length of the block. */
1364static char
1365ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1366{
1367 unsigned int off = 0;
1368
1369 while (off < len) {
1370 if (d[off] == 0)
1371 return 0;
1372 off += d[off];
1373 off++;
1374 }
1375
1376 return off == len;
1377}
1378#endif
1379
1380int
1381ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1382{
1383 unsigned short length;
1384 unsigned short type;
1385 unsigned short size;
1386 unsigned char *data = *p;
1387 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1388 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1389
1390#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1391 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1392#endif
1393
1394 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1395 goto ri_check;
1396
1397 n2s(data, length);
1398 if (data + length != d + n) {
1399 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1400 return 0;
1401 }
1402
1403 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1404 n2s(data, type);
1405 n2s(data, size);
1406
1407 if (data + size > (d + n))
1408 goto ri_check;
1409
1410 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1411 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1412 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1413
1414 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1415 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
1416 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1417 return 0;
1418 }
1419 tlsext_servername = 1;
1420
1421 }
1422
1423#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1424 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1425 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1426 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1427 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1428
1429 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1430 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
1431 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1432 return 0;
1433 }
1434 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1435 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1436 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1437 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1438 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1439 return 0;
1440 }
1441 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1442 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1443#if 0
1444 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1445 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1446 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1447 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1448 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1449#endif
1450 }
1451#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1452
1453 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1454 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1455 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
1456 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1457 return 0;
1458 }
1459 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1460 || (size > 0)) {
1461 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1462 return 0;
1463 }
1464 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1465 }
1466#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1467 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1468 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1469 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1470
1471 if (size < 2) {
1472 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1473 return 0;
1474 }
1475 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1476 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
1477 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1478 return 0;
1479 }
1480
1481 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1482 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1483 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1484 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1485 else
1486 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1487
1488 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1489 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1490 return 0;
1491 }
1492 }
1493#endif
1494 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1495 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1496 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1497 * a status request message.
1498 */
1499 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
1500 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1501 return 0;
1502 }
1503 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1504 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1505 }
1506#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1508 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1509 unsigned char *selected;
1510 unsigned char selected_len;
1511
1512 /* We must have requested it. */
1513 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
1514 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1515 return 0;
1516 }
1517 /* The data must be valid */
1518 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
1519 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1520 return 0;
1521 }
1522 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1523 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1524 return 0;
1525 }
1526 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1527 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
1528 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1529 return 0;
1530 }
1531 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1532 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1533 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1534 }
1535#endif
1536 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1537 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1538 return 0;
1539 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1540 }
1541#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1542 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1543 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1544 al))
1545 return 0;
1546 }
1547#endif
1548
1549 data += size;
1550
1551 }
1552
1553 if (data != d + n) {
1554 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1555 return 0;
1556 }
1557
1558 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
1559 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
1560 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
1561 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1562
1563 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1564 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1565 return 0;
1566 }
1567 } else {
1568 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1569 return 0;
1570 }
1571 }
1572 }
1573
1574 *p = data;
1575
1576 ri_check:
1577
1578 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1579 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1580 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1581 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1582 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1583 * absence on initial connect only.
1584 */
1585 if (!renegotiate_seen
1586 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1587 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1588 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1590 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1591 return 0;
1592 }
1593
1594 return 1;
1595}
1596
1597
1598int
1599ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1600{
1601#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1602 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1603 * and elliptic curves we support.
1604 */
1605 int using_ecc = 0;
1606 int i;
1607 unsigned char *j;
1608 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1609 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1610
1611 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1612 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1613
1614 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1615 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1616 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1617 using_ecc = 1;
1618 break;
1619 }
1620 }
1621 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1622 if (using_ecc) {
1623 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1624 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1625 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1627 return -1;
1628 }
1629 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1630 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1631 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1632 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1633
1634 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1635 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
1636 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1637 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1638 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
1639 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1641 return -1;
1642 }
1643 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1644 (unsigned int)i <
1645 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]);
1646 i++) {
1647 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1648 s2n(id, j);
1649 }
1650 }
1651#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1652
1653#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1654 {
1655 int r = 1;
1656
1657 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
1658 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1659 if (!r)
1660 return -1;
1661 }
1662
1663 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1664 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1665 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1666
1667 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1668 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1669 else
1670 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1671 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1673 return -1;
1674 }
1675 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1676 }
1677
1678 if (r == 2)
1679 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1680 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1681 }
1682#endif
1683
1684 return 1;
1685}
1686
1687int
1688ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1689{
1690#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1691 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1692 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1693 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1694 */
1695
1696 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1697 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1698 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1699 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1700
1701 if (using_ecc) {
1702 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1703 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1704 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1706 return -1;
1707 }
1708 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1709 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1710 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1711 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1712 }
1713#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1714
1715 return 1;
1716}
1717
1718int
1719ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1720{
1721 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1722 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1723
1724#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1725 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1726 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1727 */
1728 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1729 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1730 */
1731#endif
1732
1733 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1734 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1735 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1736 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1737
1738#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1739 {
1740 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1741 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1742 * so this has to happen here in
1743 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1744
1745 int r = 1;
1746
1747 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
1748 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1749 if (!r) {
1750 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1751 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1752 goto err;
1753 }
1754 }
1755
1756 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1757 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1758 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1759
1760 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1761 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1762 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
1763 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1764 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1765
1766 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1767 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1768 else
1769 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1770 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1771 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1772 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1773 goto err;
1774 }
1775 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1776 }
1777 }
1778
1779 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1780 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1781 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1782 * abort the handshake.
1783 */
1784 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1785 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1786 }
1787 }
1788
1789 err:
1790#endif
1791 switch (ret) {
1792 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1794
1795 return -1;
1796
1797 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1798 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
1799 return 1;
1800
1801
1802 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1803 s->servername_done = 0;
1804 default:
1805 return 1;
1806 }
1807}
1808
1809int
1810ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1811{
1812 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1813 int al;
1814
1815 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1816 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1817 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1818 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1819 */
1820 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
1821 int r;
1822 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1823 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1824 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1825 if (certpkey == NULL) {
1826 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1827 return 1;
1828 }
1829 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
1830 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
1831 */
1832 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1833 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1834 switch (r) {
1835 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1836 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1837 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1838 break;
1839 /* status request response should be sent */
1840 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1841 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1842 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1843 else
1844 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1845 break;
1846 /* something bad happened */
1847 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1848 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1849 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1850 goto err;
1851 }
1852 } else
1853 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1854
1855err:
1856 switch (ret) {
1857 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1858 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1859
1860 return -1;
1861
1862 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1863 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
1864 return 1;
1865
1866
1867 default:
1868 return 1;
1869 }
1870}
1871
1872int
1873ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1874{
1875 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1876 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1877
1878#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1879 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1880 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1881 * it must contain uncompressed.
1882 */
1883 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1884 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1885 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1886 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1887 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1888 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1889 size_t i;
1890 unsigned char *list;
1891 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1892 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1893 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
1894 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
1895 found_uncompressed = 1;
1896 break;
1897 }
1898 }
1899 if (!found_uncompressed) {
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1901 return -1;
1902 }
1903 }
1904 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1905#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1906
1907 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1908 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1909 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1910 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1911
1912#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1913 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
1914 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1915 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1916
1917 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1918 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1919 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1920 }
1921
1922 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1923 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1924 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1925 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
1926 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1927 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1928 }
1929 }
1930#endif
1931
1932 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1933 * tell the callback
1934 */
1935 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1936 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
1937 int r;
1938 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1939 * there is no response.
1940 */
1941 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
1942 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1943 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1944 }
1945 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1946 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1947 if (r == 0) {
1948 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1949 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1950 }
1951 if (r < 0) {
1952 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1953 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1954 }
1955 }
1956
1957 switch (ret) {
1958 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1959 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1960
1961 return -1;
1962
1963 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1964 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
1965 return 1;
1966
1967
1968 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1969 s->servername_done = 0;
1970 default:
1971 return 1;
1972 }
1973}
1974
1975/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
1976 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
1977 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
1978 *
1979 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
1980 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
1981 * extension, if any.
1982 * len: the length of the session ID.
1983 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
1984 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1985 * point to the resulting session.
1986 *
1987 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1988 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1989 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
1990 *
1991 * Returns:
1992 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1993 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1994 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1995 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1996 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1997 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1998 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1999 *
2000 * Side effects:
2001 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2002 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2003 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2004 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2005 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2006 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2007 */
2008int
2009tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2010 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2011{
2012 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2013 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2014 unsigned short i;
2015
2016 *ret = NULL;
2017 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2018
2019 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2020 * to permit stateful resumption.
2021 */
2022 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2023 return 0;
2024 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2025 return 0;
2026 if (p >= limit)
2027 return -1;
2028 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2029 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2030 i = *(p++);
2031 p += i;
2032 if (p >= limit)
2033 return -1;
2034 }
2035 /* Skip past cipher list */
2036 n2s(p, i);
2037 p += i;
2038 if (p >= limit)
2039 return -1;
2040 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2041 i = *(p++);
2042 p += i;
2043 if (p > limit)
2044 return -1;
2045 /* Now at start of extensions */
2046 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2047 return 0;
2048 n2s(p, i);
2049 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2050 unsigned short type, size;
2051 n2s(p, type);
2052 n2s(p, size);
2053 if (p + size > limit)
2054 return 0;
2055 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2056 int r;
2057 if (size == 0) {
2058 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2059 * currently have one. */
2060 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2061 return 1;
2062 }
2063 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2064 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2065 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2066 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2067 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2068 * calculate the master secret later. */
2069 return 2;
2070 }
2071 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2072 switch (r) {
2073 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2074 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2075 return 2;
2076 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2077 return r;
2078 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2079 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2080 return 3;
2081 default: /* fatal error */
2082 return -1;
2083 }
2084 }
2085 p += size;
2086 }
2087 return 0;
2088}
2089
2090/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2091 *
2092 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2093 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2094 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2095 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2096 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2097 * point to the resulting session.
2098 *
2099 * Returns:
2100 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2101 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2102 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2103 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2104 */
2105static int
2106tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2107 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2108{
2109 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2110 unsigned char *sdec;
2111 const unsigned char *p;
2112 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2113 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2114 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2116 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2117 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2118 if (eticklen < 48)
2119 return 2;
2120 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2121 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2122 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2123 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2124 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2125 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2126 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2127 if (rv < 0)
2128 return -1;
2129 if (rv == 0)
2130 return 2;
2131 if (rv == 2)
2132 renew_ticket = 1;
2133 } else {
2134 /* Check key name matches */
2135 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2136 return 2;
2137 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2138 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2139 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2140 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2141 }
2142 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2143 * integrity checks on ticket.
2144 */
2145 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2146 if (mlen < 0) {
2147 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2148 return -1;
2149 }
2150 eticklen -= mlen;
2151 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2152 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2153 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2154 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2155 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2156 return 2;
2157 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2158 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2159 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2160 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2161 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2162 if (!sdec) {
2163 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2164 return -1;
2165 }
2166 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2167 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2168 return 2;
2169 slen += mlen;
2170 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2171 p = sdec;
2172
2173 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2174 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2175 if (sess) {
2176 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2177 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2178 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2179 * as required by standard.
2180 */
2181 if (sesslen)
2182 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2183 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2184 *psess = sess;
2185 if (renew_ticket)
2186 return 4;
2187 else
2188 return 3;
2189 }
2190 ERR_clear_error();
2191 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2192 * ticket. */
2193 return 2;
2194}
2195
2196/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2197
2198typedef struct {
2199 int nid;
2200 int id;
2201} tls12_lookup;
2202
2203static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2204#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2205 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2206#endif
2207#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2208 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2209#endif
2210#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2211 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2212 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2213#endif
2214#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2215 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2216 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2217#endif
2218};
2219
2220static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2221#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2222 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2223#endif
2224#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2225 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2226#endif
2227#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2228 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2229#endif
2230};
2231
2232static int
2233tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2234{
2235 size_t i;
2236 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2237 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2238 return table[i].id;
2239 }
2240 return -1;
2241}
2242#if 0
2243static int
2244tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2245{
2246 size_t i;
2247 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2248 if (table[i].id == id)
2249 return table[i].nid;
2250 }
2251 return -1;
2252}
2253#endif
2254
2255int
2256tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2257{
2258 int sig_id, md_id;
2259 if (!md)
2260 return 0;
2261 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2262 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2263 if (md_id == -1)
2264 return 0;
2265 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2266 if (sig_id == -1)
2267 return 0;
2268 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2269 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2270 return 1;
2271}
2272
2273int
2274tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2275{
2276 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2277 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2278}
2279
2280const EVP_MD
2281*tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2282{
2283 switch (hash_alg) {
2284#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2285 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2286 return EVP_sha1();
2287#endif
2288#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2289 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2290 return EVP_sha224();
2291
2292 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2293 return EVP_sha256();
2294#endif
2295#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2296 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2297 return EVP_sha384();
2298
2299 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2300 return EVP_sha512();
2301#endif
2302 default:
2303 return NULL;
2304
2305 }
2306}
2307
2308/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2309
2310int
2311tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2312{
2313 int i, idx;
2314 const EVP_MD *md;
2315 CERT *c = s->cert;
2316 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2317 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2318 return 1;
2319 /* Should never happen */
2320 if (!c)
2321 return 0;
2322
2323 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2324 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2325 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2326 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2327
2328 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) {
2329 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1];
2330
2331 switch (sig_alg) {
2332#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2333 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2334 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2335 break;
2336#endif
2337#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2338 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2339 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2340 break;
2341#endif
2342#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2343 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2344 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2345 break;
2346#endif
2347 default:
2348 continue;
2349 }
2350
2351 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
2352 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2353 if (md) {
2354 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2355 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2356 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2357 }
2358 }
2359
2360 }
2361
2362
2363 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2364 * supported it stays as NULL.
2365 */
2366#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2367 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2368 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2369#endif
2370#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2371 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
2372 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2373 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2374 }
2375#endif
2376#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2377 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2378 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2379#endif
2380 return 1;
2381}
2382
2383#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-10-07 18:02:20 +0000