1 files changed, 21 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
index 3939d7c8c1..be279b34b6 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ecs_ossl.c,v 1.12 2018/06/14 18:51:01 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ecs_ossl.c,v 1.13 2018/06/15 05:00:41 tb Exp $ */
 /*
  * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project
  */
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
         BIGNUM   *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL;
         EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
         const EC_GROUP *group;
-        int      order_bits, ret = 0;
+        int order_bits, ret = 0;
 
         if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
                 ECDSAerror(ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
                 goto err;
         }
 
-        /* Preallocate space */
+        /* Preallocate space. */
         order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
         if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) ||
             !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) ||
@@ -135,16 +135,17 @@ ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
                 /* get random k */
                 do
                         if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) {
-                                ECDSAerror(ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+                                ECDSAerror(
+                                    ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
                                 goto err;
                         }
                 while (BN_is_zero(k));
 
                 /*
                  * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
-                 * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+                 * so we compute G * k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
                  * bit-length.
-                 * 
+                 *
                  * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent
                  * a small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum
                  * that is one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the
@@ -175,8 +176,7 @@ ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
                         }
                 }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-                else /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-                {
+                else {  /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
                         if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group,
                             tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
                                 ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
@@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
         *kinvp = k;
         ret = 1;
 
-err:
-        if (!ret) {
+ err:
+        if (ret == 0) {
                 BN_clear_free(k);
                 BN_clear_free(r);
         }
@@ -259,20 +259,19 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                 goto err;
         }
         i = BN_num_bits(order);
-        /* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole
-         * bytes.
-         */
+        /* Truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. */
         if (8 * dgst_len > i)
                 dgst_len = (i + 7)/8;
         if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
                 ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                 goto err;
         }
-        /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
+        /* If it is still too long, truncate the remaining bits with a shift. */
         if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
                 ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                 goto err;
         }
+
         do {
                 if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
                         if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r)) {
@@ -298,7 +297,7 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                  *
                  * where b is a random value in the range [1, order-1].
                  */
-                
+
                 /* Generate b in range [1, order-1]. */
                 if (!BN_sub(range, order, BN_value_one())) {
                         ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -359,7 +358,7 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 
         ok = 1;
 
-err:
+ err:
         if (!ok) {
                 ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
                 ret = NULL;
@@ -429,16 +428,14 @@ ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
         }
         /* digest -> m */
         i = BN_num_bits(order);
-        /* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole
-         * bytes.
-         */
+        /* Truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. */
         if (8 * dgst_len > i)
                 dgst_len = (i + 7)/8;
         if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) {
                 ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                 goto err;
         }
-        /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
+        /* If it is still too long, truncate the remaining bits with a shift. */
         if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) {
                 ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                 goto err;
@@ -471,8 +468,7 @@ ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
                 }
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-        else /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-        {
+        else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
                 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group,
                     point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
                         ECDSAerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);
@@ -484,10 +480,11 @@ ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig,
                 ECDSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                 goto err;
         }
-        /*  if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
+
+        /* If the signature is correct, then u1 is equal to sig->r. */
         ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0);
 
-err:
+ err:
         BN_CTX_end(ctx);
         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
         EC_POINT_free(point);