| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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ok bcook inoguchi deraadt
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Otherwise we fail to do PSS signatures since the key size is too small.
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regress on i386 after inoguchi moved some symbols to const.
ok inoguchi jsing deraadt
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In compatibility mode, a TLSv1.3 server MUST send a dummy CCS message
immediately after its first handshake message. This is normally after the
ServerHello message, but it can be after the HelloRetryRequest message.
As such we accept one CCS message from the server during the handshake.
However, it turns out that in the HelloRetryRequest case, Facebook's fizz
TLSv1.3 stack sends CCS messages after both the HelloRetryRequest message
and the ServerHello message. This is unexpected and as far as I'm aware,
no other TLSv1.3 implementation does this. Unfortunately the RFC is rather
ambiguous here, which probably means it is not strictly an RFC violation.
Relax the CCS message handling to allow two dummy CCS messages during a
TLSv1.3. This makes our TLSv1.3 client work with Facebook Fizz when HRR
is triggered.
Issue discovered by inoguchi@ and investigated by tb@.
ok deraadt@ tb@
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ok tb@
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It is possible to do this by abusing the EVP_CTRL_INIT API.
Pointed out by jsing.
ok inoguchi jsing (as part of a larger diff)
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We might remove static again for further regress around record layer
in the future.
ok jsing@ tb@
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ok jsing@ tb@
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No functional change.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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The server-side will need to use the same function.
No functional change.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Move functions so that they are in the order that the TLSv1.3 messages are
processed. While here, also move tls13_client_end_of_early_data_send() from
tls13_client.c to tls13_server.c.
No functional change.
ok beck@ tb@
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1. Use the correct slice for comparing the cipher output
2. Fix logic error similar to the one in AES-GCM in the previous commit
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This issue was fixed in lib/libcrypto/evp/e_aes.c r1.40.
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EVP_AEAD_CTX_{open,seal}, as this leaks the authentication key.
Issue reported and fix tested by Guido Vranken.
ok beck, jsing
This commit adds a constant to a public header despite library lock,
as discussed with deraadt and sthen.
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queue -> list; mention "intrusive"; element -> member at one place;
delete a bogus remark that maybe referred to a long-gone
implementation in VAX assembly code.
Much more could be improved, but i don't want to waste too much time here.
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ok schwarze
kill a Tn while here...
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Add TLSv1.3 extension type, and sort by the definition order in tls1.h.
This helps that openssl(1) s_server and s_client with -tlsextdebug
displays the TLS extension type instead of "unknown".
ok beck@ jsing@ tb@
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Set initial value to variable 'p' and 'pending'.
Reported and fix requested from leonklingele by GitHub pull request.
https://github.com/libressl-portable/portable/issues/577
https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/pull/114
ok bcook@ jsing@ tb@
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Suggested by Evan Silberman, confirmed by jmc@
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document it and deprecate "openssl s_server -named_curve".
While here, fix the error in the synopsis for "openssl s_client -groups"
and use unified argument naming and similar wording like
in SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(3).
OK jsing@
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This ensures that we remain in a valid handshake state in the TLSv1.3
server. Ideally we would not switch to NEGOTIATED until after record
protection has been enabled, but we'll revisit this later.
Issue noted by inoguchi@
ok tb@
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Suggested by eric@, input from deraadt@, ok deraadt@ eric@
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The previous wording implied this option does nothing, which is wrong.
This option does affect the way gethostbyname(3) works on OpenBSD
(return IPv6 addresses if available). On some systems, it also
introduces IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, a "feature" that we don't
support.
ok deraadt@ eric@
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the main list of words to make it more readable, even though it
remains long.
Avoid using deprecated aliases in explanations what other words mean.
Stop documenting aDSS because it is *both* a deprecated alias *and*
no longer matches anything at all.
General direction discussed with jsing@ some time ago.
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the TLSv1.3 cipher suites are made available, too;
related to ssl_ciph.c rev. 1.115
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The state machine currently handles the HelloRetryRequest case by using
WITH_HRR - in other words, we're explicitly indicating when we transition
to the alternate path. The problem here is that we do not know if we're
going to receive a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest until we process
the message. This means that the ServerHello processing code has to handle
both types of messages.
The state machine and associated processing code becomes cleaner if we flip
this around so that we assume we are going to receive a HelloRetryRequest
and upon discovering that it is not, trigger WITHOUT_HRR and hand off to
the ServerHello processing function. In particular, this makes the logic
much more straight forward on the server side, when adding support for HRR.
With feedback from tb@
ok tb@
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Previously we would only select an X25519 key share from the client,
ignoring any others. Change this so that we will select the first of the
key shares that matches one of our supported groups.
ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
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Move all of the TLSv1.3 constants to the top of tls13_lib.c. Also mark
these all as const so that they end up in .rodata rather than .data.
ok tb@
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This allows supported EC groups to be configured, which will also control
which TLSv1.3 key shares we'll accept. While here, deprecate the rather
useless -named_curve option, which is effectively the same as -groups with
a single group. Also stop setting a single default group of P-256 via
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh() - use the library defaults instead.
ok beck@ inoguchi@
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ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
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SSL_get_server_tmp_key() provides the peer ephemeral public key used
for key exchange. In the case of TLSv1.3 this is essentially the peer
public key from the key share used for TLSv1.3 key exchange, hence make it
availaable via SSL_get_server_tmp_key().
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Use a boolean value rather than using a counter, as suggested by tb@
during the previous review.
ok tb@
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The key share code previously only allowed for key shares to be generated
using one of the groups in our default list (X25519, secp256r1, secp384r1).
Relax this and allow key shares using any of the groups in our NID list.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Revise the previous so that we only include TLSv1.3 cipher suites if the
cipher rule string resulted in at least one active cipher suite. This more
closely matches OpenSSL behaviour.
Noted and fix tested by schwarze@
ok beck@ tb@
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Generate a client key share using our preferred group, rather than always
using X25519. This means that the key share group can be controlled via
SSL{_CTX,}_set1_groups() and SSL{_CTX,}_set1_groups_list().
ok beck@
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based on code from musl and now similar to our strstr().
OK tb@ millert@
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optimizes one statement in two-way string compare.
OK tb@ millert@
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* mention TLSv1.3
* remove DSS, DES(56), RC4(64), and IDEA(128), which are no longer supported
* remove ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old and STREEBOG512 which don't exist in LibreSSL
* correct the instruction for printing the complete list
OK jsing@
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cipher suites" to the DES entry and use the same wording for DSS;
OK jsing@
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in LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH. That's going to change repeatedly and
the extra maintenance effort for keeping it up to date is a waste
because people can trivially run "openssl ciphers -v LOW" to look
it up. Besides, updating it will usually be forgotten; the LOW
entry was already wrong.
Suggested by jsing@.
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TLSv1 control word, and explain how TLSv1.3 cipher suites can be
configured in LibreSSL and in OpenSSL. While here, also mention
how users can inspect the DEFAULT list of cipher suites.
Stimulus, feedback and OK from jsing@.
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bytes in case ASN1_INTEGER_get() failed. This happens more often since
asn1/a_int.c -r1.34. Matches OpenSSL behavior.
Issue in openssl x509 -text output reported by sthen
ok jsing sthen
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included in the output from `openssl ciphers`.
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OpenSSL has always taken the approach of enabling almost everything by
default. As a result, if you wanted to run a secure TLS client/server
you had to specify your own "secure" cipher string, rather than being
able to trust the defaults as being sensible and secure. The problem
is that with the introduction of TLSv1.3, most of these "secure" cipher
strings result in the new TLSv1.3 cipher suites being excluded.
The "work around" for this issue in OpenSSL was to add a new TLSv1.3
API (SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(), SSL_set_ciphersuites()) and have separate
knobs for the pre-TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.3 cipher suites. This of course means
that every application now needs to call two APIs, but it does mean that
applications that only call SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list()/SSL_set_cipher_list()
cannot remove TLSv1.3 cipher suites and prevent TLSv1.3 from working.
We've taken a different approach and have allowed TLSv1.3 cipher suites
to be manipulated via the existing SSL_set_cipher_list() API. However,
in order to avoid problems with hardcoded cipher strings, change this
behaviour so that we always include TLSv1.3 cipher suites unless the
cipher string has a specific reference to the TLSv1.3 protocol or a
TLSv1.3 cipher suite.
This means that:
$ openssl ciphers -v TLSv1.2:!TLSv1.3
still gives TLSv1.2 only cipher suites and:
$ openssl ciphers -v AEAD-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256
only lists a single TLSv1.3 cipher, however:
$ openssl ciphers -v ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
now includes both TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 and all TLSv1.3
cipher suites (which also matches OpenSSL's openssl(1) behaviour).
Issue encountered by kn@ with mumble.
ok tb@
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