summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'OPENBSD_7_4'.libressl-v3.8.4libressl-v3.8.3libressl-v3.8.2OPENBSD_7_4cvs2svn2023-10-030-0/+0
|
* Fix a typo and move a wordtb2023-10-031-5/+5
|
* Add some coverage for ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t() as welltb2023-10-021-1/+14
| | | | | ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_tim_t() could be done similarly, but then I have to mess with LIBRESSL_INTERNAL. Let's do this after unlock.
* Add regress coverage for ASN1_TIME_compare()tb2023-10-021-1/+78
|
* Minor asn1time tweakstb2023-10-021-26/+12
| | | | Sprinkle some (static) const and garbage collect an unused struct.
* Example code tweak: do not hardcode the size of arraytb2023-10-011-2/+2
|
* Fix a copy-paste bug in ASN1_TIME_compare()tb2023-10-011-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ASN1_TIME_compare() compares two times t1 and t2. Due to a copy-paste error, we would do ASN1_time_parse(t1->data, t2->length, &tm2, t2->type) Now if t1 is a UTCTime (length 13) and t2 is a GeneralizedTime (length 15), the worst that could happen is a 2-byte out-of-bounds read. Fortunately, t1 will already have parsed as a UTCTime, so it will have a Z where there should be the first digit of the seconds for a GeneralizedTime and we will error out. Now if both t1 and t2 have the same type, we will parse t1's data twice and we will return an incorrect comparison. This could have some security impact if anything relied on this function for security purposes. It is unused in our tree and unused in our ports tree ports and the only consumer I could find was some MongoDB things doing OCSP, so this won't be too bad. Then of course there's also the language bindings. Issue reported by Duncan Thomson at esri dot com via libressl-security ok beck deraadt
* Document EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return valuestb2023-10-011-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | We aligned with upstream behavior. Let's document it properly. Surprisingly, OpenSSL 1.1 half-assed the docs: two parts of the manual contradict each other. The part getting EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() right, incorrectly documents possible -1 return value to EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(). OpenSSL 3 documentation improvement efforts seem to have tried to address this issue with the result that the manual is now entirely wrong when it comes to the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() replacement. Par for the course.
* The colons separate the octets, not the digits; add missing link totb2023-10-011-4/+5
| | | | crypto(3)
* Improve a code comment in the EXAMPLES sectiontb2023-10-011-3/+3
|
* Refer to RFC 3779, 2.1.2 for encoding of rangestb2023-10-011-2/+7
| | | | Mention sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 in STANDARDS
* Point out that the result of IPAddressRange_new() is an invalid rangetb2023-10-011-3/+3
| | | | since it should be a prefix.
* encoding -> decoding for d2itb2023-10-011-3/+3
|
* Add an empty linetb2023-10-011-1/+2
|
* Reorder list of additional validation checks neededtb2023-09-301-9/+8
|
* Switch copyright year to 2023.tb2023-09-302-4/+4
| | | | | | | Apparently I should have used 2023 despite sharing versions of these files with several people under this license (and thus permitting them to redistribute and share with the public). It makes no sense to me, but shrug.
* Use addrblocks for .Fatb2023-09-301-2/+2
|
* avoid using the string "a" without markup as a placeholderschwarze2023-09-301-4/+9
| | | | | where that feels potentially confusing, and add one missing .Pp macro; no change of meaning
* consistently use "allow_inherit" for the argument nameschwarze2023-09-301-6/+6
| | | | and fix whitespace on one text line; no change of meaning
* drop one pair of needless parenthesesschwarze2023-09-301-5/+5
| | | | and polish one wording; no change of meaning
* remove a useless repetition of a function nameschwarze2023-09-301-6/+4
| | | | | that was also followed by a bogus argument, and fix one grammatical error; no change of meaning
* polish an awkward wordingschwarze2023-09-301-9/+7
| | | | | and capitalize "AFI" where is does not refer to the function argument; no change of meaning
* two instances of missing .Fa macrosschwarze2023-09-301-13/+15
| | | | and some missing escaping of HYPHEN-MINUS; no text change
* fix one copy and paste error: d2i_*() decode rather than encode;schwarze2023-09-301-7/+7
| | | | plus some minor markup and punctuation fixes
* garbage collect two stray words, no change of meaningschwarze2023-09-301-4/+4
|
* Allow IP addresses to be specified in a URI.beck2023-09-293-19/+70
| | | | | | | | | | | | Our checking here was a bit too aggressive, and did not permit an IP address in a URI. IP's in a URI are allowed for things like CRLdp's AIA, SAN URI's etc.). The check for this was also slightly flawed as we would permit an IP if memory allocation failed while checking for an IP. Correct both issues. ok tb@
* Some wording tweaks to make things a bit more precise.tb2023-09-291-6/+7
|
* Fix a wrong tag and work around an ugly linebreaktb2023-09-291-5/+6
|
* Document X509v3_{addr,asid}_validate_{path,resource_set}(3)tb2023-09-296-10/+217
| | | | | | | These were the last four RFC 3779 things that check_complete.pl x509v3 complained about. I will surely tweak and try to improve a few things in the coming days, but the pages should now be stable enough that review efforts will likely not be wasted. Any feedback appreciated.
* Appease coveritytb2023-09-291-2/+4
| | | | This is a static pointer, so it ain't ever NULL, but shrug
* Fix error messagetb2023-09-281-2/+2
|
* Don't leak ctx on failuretb2023-09-281-3/+2
|
* Document X509v3_{addr,asid}_subset.3 take two (missed cvs add)tb2023-09-281-0/+176
| | | | | | First RFC 3779 page without a BUG section. It could have one, but I'm in a lenient mood right now. Maybe it's just that this is bad but not quite as bad as EVP.
* Document X509v3_{addr,asid}_subset.3tb2023-09-287-30/+40
| | | | | | First RFC 3779 page without a BUG section. It could have one, but I'm in a lenient mood right now. Maybe it's just that this is bad but not quite as bad as EVP.
* Add more regress coverage for EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length()tb2023-09-281-1/+268
| | | | | | | Awesome: the IV length for GCM is only bounded by INT_MAX or malloc limits. In the absence of an overflowing issue tracker, I'm labeling this "good first issue", "help wanted" here.
* Check that EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() matches what was settb2023-09-281-1/+9
| | | | | | This really only covers AES-GCM. From beck
* Fix EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length()tb2023-09-284-9/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In today's episode of "curly nonsense from EVP land" we deal with a quite harmless oversight and a not too bad suboptimal fix, relatively speaking. At some point EVP_CIPHER_{CCM,GCM}_SET_IVLEN was added. It modified some object hanging off of EVP_CIPHER. However, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() wasn't taught about this and kept returning the hardcoded default value on the EVP_CIPHER. Once it transpired that a doc fix isn't going to cut it, this was fixed. And of course it's easy to fix: you only have to dive through about three layers of EVP, test and set a flag and handle a control in a couple methods. The upstream fix was done poorly and we begrudgingly have to match the API: the caller is expected to pass a raw pointer next to a 0 length along with EVP_CIPHER_GET_IV_LENGTH and the control handler goes *(int *)ptr = length in full YOLO mode. That's never going to be an issue because of course the caller will always pass a properly aligned pointer backing a sufficient amount of memory. Yes, unlikely to be a real issue, but it could have been done with proper semantics and checks without complicating the code. But why do I even bother to complain? We're used to this. Of note here is that there was some pushback painting other corners of a bikeshed until the reviewer gave up with a resigned That kind of changes the semantics and is one extra complexity level, but [shrug] ok... Anyway, the reason this matters now after so many years is that rust-openssl has an assert, notably added in a +758 -84 commit with the awesome message "Docs" that gets triggered by recent tests added to py-cryptography. Thanks to Alex Gaynor for reporting this. Let me take the opportunity to point out that pyca contributed to improve rust-openssl, in particular its libressl support, quite a bit. That's much appreciated and very noticeable. Regress coverage to follow in subsequent commits. Based on OpenSSL PR #9499 and issue #8330. ok beck jsing PS: A few macros were kept internal for now to avoid impact on the release cycle that is about to finish. They will be exposed after release.
* whitespacetb2023-09-281-3/+3
|
* We're not interested in the core dump, so prevent it. Also catchotto2023-09-271-3/+17
| | | | | SIGABRT, to avoid the "Abort trap" message, which confuses me sometimes until I realize it's the purpose of this test to abort.
* RFC 3779: stop pretending we support AFIs other than IPv4 and IPv6tb2023-09-271-19/+28
| | | | | | | This code is a complete bug fest and using it with any other AFI is downright dangerous. Such don't arise in this context in practice. ok claudio jsing
* Various small tweaks in the RFC 3779 docstb2023-09-276-58/+69
| | | | Mention a few more bugs and unify manpage descriptions
* Fix reference to x509v3.cnf(5) bistb2023-09-261-6/+6
|
* Fix reference to x509v3.cnf(5)tb2023-09-261-6/+6
|
* Document X509v3_{addr,asid}_inherits(3)tb2023-09-266-5/+140
| | | | Also note another bug in X509v3_asid_{canonize,is_canonical}(3).
* Document X509v3_addr_get_{afi,range}(3)tb2023-09-264-5/+142
|
* Document the guts of RFC 3779 IPAddrBlockstb2023-09-266-13/+534
| | | | Let's just say there's room for improvement...
* Missing variable name in prototypetb2023-09-261-2/+2
|
* Fix section title of X.690 reference (missing article)tb2023-09-261-3/+3
|
* Document some barely usable parts of the ASIdentifiers API.tb2023-09-263-18/+184
| | | | | Someone clearly didn't actually use much of the code they wrote and exposed and therefore didn't think it through properly.
* sorttb2023-09-251-2/+2
|
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-16 02:17:05 +0000