| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Move SSL_new/SSL_free up into benchmark() to restrict the responsibility
for the SSL object to a single scope. Make doConnection() return an int,
openssl-style. Some miscellaneous cleanup, too.
Discussed with tb, jsing, and jca. Basic idea from jsing, lots of patch
input from tb.
ok deraadt on an earlier version
ok tb jsing
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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more precisely which options require which other options, add many
missing incompatibilities, mention the default for -e, and some
macro cleanup.
OK jmc@ tb@
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ok tb@
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ok tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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from r1.45 and thereby avoid a use-after-free spotted by schwarze.
ok schwarze
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From Nan at chinadtrace dot org. Thanks!
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Prompted by a remark by jsing
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the terminating NUL. EVP_read_pw_string_min() got this wrong, leading to
a one-byte buffer overrun in all callers of EVP_read_pw_string().
Found by mestre running 'openssl passwd' with MALLOC_OPTIONS including C.
Fix this by doing some basic sanity checking in EVP_read_pw_string_min().
Cap the len argument at BUFSIZ and ensure that min < len as well as
0 <= min and 1 <= len. The last two checks are important as these
numbers may end up in reallocarray().
ok bcook (on previous version), jsing, mestre
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ok bcook@ beck@ tb@
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Move all of the benchmark code -- loop initialization, the loops, and
the report printing -- into a new function, benchmark(). Eliminates
lots of duplicate code.
Regressions to 1.20 caught by tb@ and inoguchi@. Tweaked by tb@.
ok tb@, jsing@
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Everything can go through the EVP_Verify* code path.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Everything can go through the single EVP_Sign* code path.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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EVP_Verify*.
ok tb@
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different unveils. Joint work with beck and florian.
Let us know if you hit any corner cases.
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Skip the ecdsa_webcrypto_test.json vectors for the time being, as these
likely need some extra glue.
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This will make it easier to extend.
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sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find already does it, removing ambiguity later in the function.
ok tb@
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Found by Coverity.
Feedback and ok tb@
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ok tb@
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Simplify parameter checks since this is only called from one place.
Found by Coverity, CID 183502.
ok beck@
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From Ross L. Richardson
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libcrypto. Initially this just covers RSA signatures, but can be extended
to cover other cryptographic algorithms.
This regress requires the go and wycheproof-testvector packages to be
installed, with the regress being skipped otherwise.
Discussed with beck@ and tb@
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from Cameron Palmer
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improve readability and ease of maintenance.
Positive feedback jmc
Detailed suggestion & ok schwarze
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tls_peer_ocsp_result_msg() in the documentation.
input & ok jsing
Reads fine to jmc and makes sense to schwarze
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ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(). The new BN_swap_ct() API is an
improved version of the public BN_consttime_swap() function: it allows
error checking, doesn't assert(), and has fewer assumptions on the input.
This diff eliminates the last use of BN_consttime_swap() in our tree.
ok inoguchi, jsing
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Since bignums use ints for the same purpose, this still uses an int
internally after an overflow check.
Suggested by and discussed with jsing.
ok inoguchi, jsing
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changes made in OpenSSL by Davide Galassi and others, so that one can
actually follow what is going on. There is no performance impact from
this change as the code still does essentially the same thing. There's
a ton of work still to be done to make the BN code less terrible.
ok jsing, kn
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Based on an OpenSSL commit by David Benjamin.
Alex Gaynor and Paul Kehrer from the pyca/cryptography Python library
reported that more than 200 "expected to fail" signatures among Project
Wycheproof's test vectors validated on LibreSSL. This patch makes them
all fail.
ok jsing
commit 608a026494c1e7a14f6d6cfcc5e4994fe2728836
Author: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Date: Sat Aug 20 13:35:17 2016 -0400
Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified.
RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode
the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key
operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal.
OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding
round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient
laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html
Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme,
this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This
avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy
ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations
which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature
producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and
accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a
responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical.
In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and
security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not
here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so
this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL
releases.
See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00
As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this
version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces
digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath
wasn't quite doing this right.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1474
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ok beck
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ok tb@
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from Nicola Tuveri (who spotted the omission of ecp_nist.c from the PR).
discussed with jsing
tested by jsg
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breakage.
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