| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This adds code to perform key derivation and set the traffic keys once the
ServerHello message has been sent, enabling encrypted records.
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This means that we actually try to process and use signature algorithms.
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Mkaes `openssl ciphers -v` print au and kx values for TLSv1.3 cipher
suites.
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
new retry conditions from the record layer all the way up to the
callers. Instead we catch them at the top of the record layer
and retry the operations, unless we actually got a retry indicated
from actual IO operations.
ok jsing@ tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Correct the parsing of the client hello support versions extension. This
has one or more values, rather than just the single selected version.
Allocate an SSL_SESSION - this is unused currently, but is needed as
soon as we start parsing extensions.
Also, pull the cipher suites list off correctly - this is u16 prefixed,
not u8.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
according to RFC8446.
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
ssl_get_message is essentially a switch between ssl3_get_message and
dtls1_get_message, both only used by the legacy stack. Instead, use
SSL_IS_DTLS() in ssl3_get_message to call the DTLS function when
necessary.
ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Currently, TLSv1.3 cipher suites are filtered out by the fact that
they have authentication and key exchange algorithms that are not
being set in ssl_set_cert_masks(). Fix this so that ssl3_choose_cipher()
works for TLSv1.3, however we also now need to ensure that we filter out
TLSv1.3 for non-TLSv1.3 and only select TLSv1.3 for TLSv1.3.
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
downgrading from TLS 1.3. If we are, set the last 8 bytes of the
server_random value to the required values as per RFC 8446 section
4.1.3 indicating that we deliberately meant to downgrade.
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
set by a 1.3 server when it downgrades to tls 1.2 or 1.1 as per
RFC 8446 section 4.1.3
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
the same from the server.
ok jsing@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Makes `openssl s_client -peekaboo` work with TLSv1.3.
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
CA certs it couldn't find otherwise. This may lead to a pledge rpath
violation reported by Kor, son of Rynar. Unfortunately, providing certs
inside a directory is common in linuxes, so we need to keep this
functionality for portable.
Check if /etc/ssl/cert.pem and /etc/ssl/cert exist and pledge
accordingly. Add unveils to restrict this program further on a
default OpenBSD install. Fix -C to look only inside the provided
root bundle.
Input from jsing and sthen, tests by sthen and Kor
ok beck, jsing, sthen (after much back and forth)
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
advances the record layer, it only reports internal state.
ok jsing@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
SSL_pending implementation is correct.
annoying jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This will allow the TLSv1.3 stack to provide its own implementation. Nuke
a completely bogus comment from SSL_pending() whilst here.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
we sent or received a fatal alert.
Pull the fatal_alert check up into tls13_legacy_error(). Also, if sending
an alert resulted in EOF, do not propagate this back since we do not want
to signal EOF to the caller (rather we want to indicate failure).
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This avoids the need for each send handler to call
tls13_handshake_msg_start() and tls13_handshake_msg_finish().
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This currently only has enough code to handle fallback to the legacy TLS
stack for TLSv1.2 or earlier, however allows for further development and
testing.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This avoids every receive handler from having to get the handshake message
content itself. Additionally, pull the trailing data check up so that each
receive handler does not have to implement it. This makes the code more
readable and reduces duplication.
ok beck@ tb@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
ok tb@
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck jsing
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This also makes it available to clients that use libtls, including ftp(1)
and nc(1).
Note that this does not expose additional defines via public headers, which
means that any code conditioning on defines like TLS1_3_VERSION or
SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 will not enable or use TLSv1.3. This approach is
necessary since too many pieces of software assume that if TLS1_3_VERSION
is available, other OpenSSL 1.1 API will also be available, which is not
necessarily the case.
ok beck@ tb@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
been installed prior to building.
Requested by and ok tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok tedu
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
reverts previous attempt which would have broken ports
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This will as yet not do anything, until we turn it on in the
lower level libraries.
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Finished message has been received, a change cipher spec may be received
and must be ignored. Add a flag to the record layer struct and set it at
the appropriate moments during the handshake so that we will ignore it.
ok jsing
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
peeks data before reading, compares to subsequent read.
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The legacy version field is capped at TLSv1.2, however it may be lower than
this if we are only choosing to use TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1.
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
in the ClientHello where it may be set to TLS1_VERSION. Use
the minimal supported version to decide whether we choose to do
so or not. Use a sent hook to set it back TLS1_2_VERSION right
after the ClientHello message is on the wire.
ok beck jsing
|
|
|
|
| |
Missed in an earlier commit.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We currently don't support sending a modified clienthello
ok jsing@ tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When falling back to the legacy TLS client, in the case where a server has
sent a TLS record that contains more than one handshake message, we also
need to stash the unprocessed record data for later processing. Otherwise
we end up with missing handshake data.
ok beck@ tb@
|