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path: root/src/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c (follow)
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* Remove arc4random_stir() and arc4random_addrandom(), which none shouldderaadt2013-10-211-26/+1
| | | | | | be using directly. Well, a few rare people cloned it upstream and it will take a bit of time for them to learn. ok various
* replace rc4 with ChaCha20; inspired by Nick Mathewson's work on libottery;markus2013-10-011-98/+106
| | | | feedback and ok djm@
* spacingderaadt2013-06-111-3/+2
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* Change arc4random_uniform() to calculate ``2**32 % upper_bound'' asmatthew2012-06-241-12/+3
| | | | | | | | | | ``-upper_bound % upper_bound''. Simplifies the code and makes it the same on both ILP32 and LP64 architectures, and also slightly faster on LP64 architectures by using a 32-bit remainder instead of a 64-bit remainder. Pointed out by Jorden Verwer on tech@ ok deraadt; no objections from djm or otto
* remove comment that hasn't been true for quite a while now;otto2010-12-221-6/+1
| | | | ok deraadt@ djm@
* No point in refreshing the pid from inside arc4_stir() when thatguenther2009-12-151-6/+15
| | | | | | | | | doesn't test it, so factor out the two places that test it into a routine and do the refreshing there. With this, arch4random_buf() doesn't trigger superfluous calls to getpid() when filling large buffers. ok deraadt@, "looks nicer indeed" otto@
* zap __arc4_getbyte(), it was only used by the old malloc; ok millert@otto2008-10-031-14/+1
| | | | kurt@
* fix math screwup that reintroduced a bias for upper_bounds in rangedjm2008-06-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | (2^30,2^31). Nothing in the tree yet requests random numbers bounded by this range. report jakob!deraadt; ok deraadt@
* diff from djm@ committed at his request:otto2008-03-161-1/+63
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | introduce two new APIs for requesting strong random numbers: arc4random_buf() - fill an arbitrary memory range with random numbers arc4random_uniform() - return a uniformly distributed random number below a specified upper bound, avoiding the bias that comes from a naive "arc4random() % upper_bound" construction. these mirror similarly-named functions in the kernel; lots of discussion deraadt@ mcbride@
* - make arc4random*() functions thread safe. Use a custom spinlock functionkurt2008-01-011-41/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | instead of the generic pthread macros since free(3) uses __arc4_getbyte() when freeing small sized allocations and the generic pthread macros call malloc(3). - eliminate passing pointers to a static variable with global scope (rs) for additional code clarity and reduction. - shlib minor bumps for libc and libpthread due to new functions. From andreas@ with some bits from me. okay tedu@ marc@ w/some spot checking from millert@
* provide an libc internal interface to get random bytes, to be used by mallocotto2007-02-121-3/+12
| | | | to get random data without calling getpid(), ok millert@ deraadt@
* Use sysctl(KERN_ARND) to get n bytes, instead of just 4 at a timeotto2005-11-301-9/+2
| | | | | | | and remove fallback code. If somebody is dumb enough to make the sysctl fail using systrace, he deserves what he gets. Saves 7 syscalls on process startup. looks good miod@ ok deraadt@ tedu@
* Change email address for author, at his request.kjell2005-06-061-2/+2
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* Change license to standard OpenBSD boilerplate, with permissionkjell2005-06-061-6/+15
| | | | from original author (David Mazieres)
* use the new fat random sysctl to get initial state. (fallback to looping).tedu2005-06-041-12/+14
| | | | stir after eating 400000 words. ok + input deraadt
* kill spaceshshoexer2004-11-021-3/+3
| | | | ok djm@
* Discard first 256 bytes of keystream, as per recommendation indjm2003-11-261-1/+10
| | | | | "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4", Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir. ok itojun@
* just use sysctl for stirring. thread safe and can't fail.tedu2003-08-161-23/+10
| | | | ok deraadt and co.
* ansification; checked by pvalderaadt2003-06-111-18/+9
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* re-stir if pid changes; markus & mederaadt2003-02-141-3/+5
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* License clarification from David Mazieres, ok deraadt@pvalchev2001-06-051-3/+2
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* Set j = i after arc4random key schedule to be more like arc4 stream cipher;deraadt1999-09-281-1/+2
| | | | from conversations between various people
* if /dev/arandom is not available for seeding, use data from sysctlprovos1999-06-291-5/+22
| | | | kern.arandom.
* $OpenBSD$niklas1998-03-221-1/+1
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* Clean up some -Wall flowers.millert1997-07-091-2/+3
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* arc4random() number generator, for use with things like RPC xid's.dm1996-12-281-0/+175
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