| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
Convert ssl3_send_client_verify_{sigalgs,gost}() to EVP_DigestSign() and
ssl3_get_cert_verify() to EVP_DigestVerify().
ok jsing
|
|
ok tb@
|
|
ok tb@
|
|
No binary change on amd64
|
|
|
|
This is very dead code: the openssl app was never compiled with -DZLIB
after January 1, 2015.
|
|
This has long been unused code and compilation with -DZLIB was broken
for a long time after BIO was made opaque.
ok jsing
|
|
Using one-shot EVP_DigestSign() and EVP_DigestVerify() is slightly shorter
and is needed for Ed25519 support.
ok jsing
|
|
until someone finds time and motivation to figure out how to use this.
|
|
must_be_ca can no longer be 0 after the proxy cert code got nuked,
so change this to an if. must_be_ca is now -1 for a leaf, or 1 for
a non leaf.
ok tb@
|
|
outdated list of error messages. Instead, refer to the master copy
of that list in X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3).
Suggested by and OK tb@, and beck@ also agrees with the idea.
|
|
unfortunately gcc3 does not have __builtin_clz().
ok miod@ otto@
|
|
Similar to X509_get0_notBefore(3) rev. 1.6.
Requested by and OK tb@.
|
|
of the X509_CRL_INFO object. It should have been called "thisUpdate"
like in RFC 5280 section 5.1 (and in its precursor RFC 2459). Then again,
RFC 2459 was only published in 1999, so maybe the terminology wasn't
firmly established yet when Young wrote his code several years earlier -
just guessing, neither we nor the OpenSSL folks appear to know the real
reasons...
Anyway, we have been stuck with the "lastUpdate" names in the API for
more than two decades now, so clarify in the documentation what they
refer to and what they really mean.
Requested by and OK tb@.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Suggestion from Małgorzata Olszówka, they noted:
"The original wording suggests that it is required to execute
CMS_get0_signers() after CMS_verify(), while it is CMS_get0_signers()
that requires prior successful invocation of CMS_verify()."
OK tb@
|
|
This traded local copies of CTASSERT() to the one in crypto_internal.h.
This change was backed out due to SHA-512 breakage on STRICT_ALIGNMENT
architectures still using Fred Flintstone's gcc without asm sha512.
Original commit message:
Use crypto_internal.h's CTASSERT()
Now that this macro is available in a header, let's use that version
rather than copies in several .c files.
discussed with jsing
|
|
|
|
Provide prototype that is hidden behind LIBRESSL_INTERNAL for portable
and or in result for future extensibility.
|
|
On free, chunks (the pieces of a pages used for smaller allocations)
are junked and then validated after they leave the delayed free
list. So after free, a chunk always contains junk bytes. This means
that if we start with the right contents for a new page of chunks,
we can *validate* instead of *write* junk bytes when (re)-using a
chunk.
With this, we can detect write-after-free when a chunk is recycled,
not justy when a chunk is in the delayed free list. We do a little
bit more work on initial allocation of a page of chunks and when
re-using (as we validate now even on junk level 1).
Also: some extra consistency checks for recallocaray(3) and fixes
in error messages to make them more consistent, with man page bits.
Plus regress additions.
|
|
This would detect the aliasing issue reported by Guido Vranken fixed
in bn_gcd.c r1.28. Most testcases are from BoringSSL's regress test.
|
|
The somewhat strange calculation m = a^{-1} (mod m) can return 0. This
breaks because of BN_nnmod() having delicate semantics of which variable
can be reused. BN_nnmod(a, a, m, ctx) works and the library relies on that.
Here, the code ends up doing BN_nnmod(m, a, m, ctx) and this doesn't work.
If the result of the initial BN_mod() is negative, then BN_nnmod() will
return 0.
Problem reported by Guido Vranken in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/21110
This code is well covered by regress, but it does not currently have
explicit test coverage. Such will be added soon.
ok beck jsing
|
|
|
|
It takes too much time and we now know that all covered ciphers can cope
with unaligned input and output on all tested architectures.
|
|
Default to having rv = -1 and explicitly goto done to set rv = 0.
This matches other code better.
ok jsing
|
|
X509_get_ext_d2i() (or rather X509V3_get_d2i()) can return NULL for
various reasons. If it fails because the extension wasn't found, it
sets *crit = -1. In any other case, e.g., the cert is bad or we ran
out of memory in X509V3_EXT_d2i(), crit is set to something else, so
we should actually error.
ok jsing
|
|
This doesn't actually overflow, but still is poor style.
Speaking of which: this is now the second time I get to fix something
reported by Nicky Mouha by way of a blog post. The first time was the
actual SHA-3 buffer overflow in Python where it is not entirely clear
who screwed up and how. Hopefully next time proper communication will
happen and work.
ok jsing
|
|
- move a sentence out of a Bd block
- add some .Pp for spacing
- avoid a double colon on a sentence and the usage of second person
- mark STORE_CTX with .Vt
- change one Vt -> Dv (done after this has been ok'd by beck)
ok beck@
|
|
This now tests what the comment says it does
|
|
And some comment requests, from jsing@
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
This is an un-revert with nits of the previously landed change
to do this which broke libtls. libtls has now been changed to
not use this function.
This change ensures that if something is returned it is "text"
(UTF-8) and a C string not containing a NUL byte. Historically
callers to this function assume the result is text and a C string
however the OpenSSL version simply hands them the bytes from an
ASN1_STRING and expects them to know bad things can happen which
they almost universally do not check for. Partly inspired by
goings on in boringssl.
ok jsing@ tb@
|
|
This takes much of the language that boring uses to document
the verify callback, and corrects the historical horror that
OpenSSL introduced years ago by suggesting people ignore expiry
dates using the callback instead of the verify flags.
nits by jsg@ and tb@
ok tb@
|
|
This results in bn_mul_comba4() and bn_mul_comba8() requiring ~30% less
instructions than they did previously.
|
|
|
|
|
|
No change in generated assembly.
|
|
No intended functional change.
|
|
|
|
|
|
No change to generated assembly.
|
|
This gives us more readable and safer code. There are two intentional
changes to behaviour - firstly, all three functions zero any BN that was
passed in, prior to doing any further processing. This means that a passed
BN is always in a known state, regardless of what happens later. Secondly,
BN_asc2bn() now fails on NULL input, rather than crashing. This brings its
behaviour inline with BN_dec2bn() and BN_hex2bn().
ok tb@
|
|
|
|
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID is kind of a bad interface that
we wish to make safer, and does not give us the visibility
we really want here to detect hostile things.
Instead call the lower level functions to do some better
checking that should be done by X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID,
but is not in the OpenSSL version. Specifically we will treat
the input as hostile and fail if:
1) The certificate contains more than one CN in the subject.
2) The CN does not decode as UTF-8
3) The CN is of invalid length (must be between 1 and 64 bytes)
4) The CN contains a 0 byte
4) matches the existing logic, 1 and 2, and 3 are new checks.
ok tb@
|
|
Back in the day when essentially every struct was open to all applications,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID provided a modicum of opacity. This indirection is now
no longer needed with X509_VERIFY_PARAM being opaque itself, so stop using
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID and merge it into X509_VERIFY_PARAM. This is a first
small step towards cleaning up the X509_VERIFY_PARAM mess.
ok jsing
|
|
m32_common.h is a typical OpenSSL macro horror show - copy the update,
transform and final functions from md32_common.h, manually expanding the
macros for SHA256. This will allow for further clean up to occur.
No change in generated assembly.
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
This makes it possible to still use minimal parts of md32_common.h, while
disabling the update and transform functions.
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
