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ECC and OCSP can be used with DTLS, so remove bogus checks that currently
prevent it. These are long lasting remnants from the original OpenSSL code.
ok tb@
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DTLS is largely broken/useless without read ahead being enabled, so enforce
it for DTLS. This behaviour matches both our documentation and OpenSSL.
ok tb@
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Replace the current copy of dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record() with a call
to it instead.
ok tb@
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The mess that is ssl_get_algorithm2() only exists to upgrade the handshake
MAC of a pre-TLSv1.2 cipher suite to SHA256 when used with TLSv1.2. We can
readily do this in ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(), which is far more readable.
ok tb@
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For some reason various TLSv1.2 cipher suites were added with the default
handshake MAC and PRF, rather than the SHA256 handshake MAC and PRF. This
gets patched up in ssl3_get_algorithm2(), hence goes unnoticed.
ok tb@
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Also check for explicit version numbers, rather than just the major version
value.
ok tb@
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This allows us to drop the server messages that we intend on dropping.
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The exporter depends on having a master secret. If the handshake is
not completed, it is neither guaranteed that a shared ciphersuite was
selected (in which case tls1_PRF() will currently NULL deref) or that
a master secret was set up (in which case the exporter will succeed
with a predictable value). Neither outcome is desirable, so error out
early instead of entering the sausage factory unprepared. This aligns
the legacy exporter with the TLSv1.3 exporter in that regard.
with/ok jsing
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https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds describes
a mechanism to authenticate RFC 8805 Geofeed data files through the RPKI.
OpenSSL counterpart https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14050
OK tb@ jsing@
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RFC6482 - A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
RFC6484 - Certificate Policy (CP) for the RPKI
RFC6493 - The RPKI Ghostbusters Record
RFC8182 - The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)
RFC8360 - RPKI Validation Reconsidered
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta - A profile for RTAs
Also in OpenSSL: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d3372c2f35495d0c61ab09daf7fba3ecbbb595aa
OK sthen@ tb@ jsing@
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ok eric jsing
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Now that AEAD is handled internally, we should no longer be assigning
aead_ctx directly, as this will result in a leak. Missed during the
previous change.
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ok tb@
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