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ASN1_item_ex_d2i() is just a wrapper around the internal asn1_item_ex_d2i()
function, so call asn1_item_ex_d2i() directly.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Comparing two GENERAL_NAME structures containing an EDIPARTYNAME can lead
to a crash. This enables a denial of service attack for an attacker who can
control both sides of the comparison.
Issue reported to OpenSSL on Nov 9 by David Benjamin.
OpenSSL shared the information with us on Dec 1st.
Fix from Matt Caswell (OpenSSL) with a few small tweaks.
ok jsing
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If an ASN.1 item provides its own ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS functions, require
all functions to be provided (currently excluding prim_clear). This avoids
situations such as having a custom allocator that returns a specific struct
but then is then printed using the default primative print functions, which
interpret the memory as a different struct.
Found by oss-fuzz, fixes issue #13799.
ok beck@, tb@
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Fixes for CVE-2018-0739.
Copied from commit below, and modified for adaption to our code.
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9310d45087ae546e27e61ddf8f6367f29848220d
ok bcook@ beck@ jsing@
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as was done earlier in libssl. Thanks inoguchi@ for noticing
libssl had more reacharounds into this.
ok jsing@ inoguchi@
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assembly.
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CVE-2016-2108 from openssl.
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missing padding check in aesni functions
overflow in evp encode functions
use of invalid negative asn.1 types
ok beck
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case is ok.
ok bcook@
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ok djm@ jsing@
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These include:
CVE-2015-0209 - Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error
CVE-2015-0286 - Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp
CVE-2015-0287 - ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption
CVE-2015-0289 - PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences
Several other issues did not apply or were already fixed.
Refer to https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150319.txt
joint work with beck, doug, guenther, jsing, miod
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libcrypto/libssl, and nothing seems to use it in the wild, apart from embedded
copies of OpenSSL.
ok jsing@
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This avoids a lot of ugly gymnastics to do snprintfs before sending the
bag of strings to ERR, and eliminates at least one place in dso_dlfctn.c
where it was being called with the incorrect number of arguments and
using random things off the stack as addresses of strings.
ok krw@, jsing@
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initial storage came from, we can't free it. just memset in the sequence
case. probably ok beck
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http://marc.info/?l=openssl-users&m=138014120223264&w=2
Arguably a doc bug, but we argue not. If you parse a new cert into memory
occupied by a previously verified cert, the new cert will inherit that
state, bypassing future verification checks. To avoid this, we will always
start fresh with a new object.
grudging ok from guenther, after i threatened to make him read the code yet
again. "that ok was way more painful and tiring then it should have been"
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OPENSSL_foo wrappers. This changes:
OPENSSL_malloc->malloc
OPENSSL_free->free
OPENSSL_relloc->realloc
OPENSSL_freeFunc->free
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http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060928.txt for more
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see also http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=11471
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new minor for libcrypto (_X509_REQ_print_ex)
tested by miod@, pb@
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