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* If a NULL or zero cofactor is passed to EC_GROUP_set_generator(),tb2019-09-291-9/+109
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | try to compute it using Hasse's bound. This works as long as the cofactor is small enough. Port of Brumley's fix for CVE-2019-1547 in OpenSSL 1.1.1 (old license) tests & ok inoguchi input & ok jsing commit 30c22fa8b1d840036b8e203585738df62a03cec8 Author: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Date: Thu Sep 5 21:25:37 2019 +0300 [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present. This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more SCA-robust code. This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form, where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent. It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed programatically with explicit parameters, then calling EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero). The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock timing attacks. CVE-2019-1547 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9781)
* unrevert the use of bn_rand_interval().tb2018-11-061-2/+2
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Implement coordinate blinding for EC_POINT.tb2018-11-051-1/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on OpenSSL commit 875ba8b21ecc65ad9a6bdc66971e50 by Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan and Nicola Tuveri. ok beck jsing commit 875ba8b21ecc65ad9a6bdc66971e50461660fcbb Author: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Date: Sat Jun 16 17:07:40 2018 +0300 Implement coordinate blinding for EC_POINT This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method, EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method. This commit is derived from the patch https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley. Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way, it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an algorithm state) unpredictable. For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the aforementioned curves. For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6526)
* Recommit Billy Brumley's ECC constant time patch with a fix for sparc64tb2018-07-161-31/+68
| | | | | | | from Nicola Tuveri (who spotted the omission of ecp_nist.c from the PR). discussed with jsing tested by jsg
* recommit label indentation part of the backout; clearly unrelated to thetb2018-07-151-2/+2
| | | | breakage.
* back out ecc constant time changesjsg2018-07-151-69/+32
| | | | | | | | after the constant time commits various regress tests started failing on sparc64 ssh t9, libcrypto ec ecdh ecdsa and trying to ssh out resulted in 'invalid elliptic curve value' ok tb@
* Indent labels by a space so they don't obliterate function names in diffs.tb2018-07-101-2/+2
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* ECC constant time scalar multiplication support. First step in overhaulingtb2018-07-101-31/+68
| | | | | | | | | | | the EC module. From Billy Brumley and his team, via https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/pull/94 With tweaks from jsing and me. ok jsing
* use freezero() instead of memset/explicit_bzero + free. Substantiallyderaadt2017-05-021-9/+4
| | | | | | | | | | reduces conditional logic (-218, +82). MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH cache alignment calculation bn/bn_exp.c wasn'tt quite right. Two other tricky bits with ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF and BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA where the condition cannot be collapsed completely. Passes regress. ok beck
* Send the function codes from the error functions to the bit bucket,beck2017-01-291-49/+49
| | | | | | as was done earlier in libssl. Thanks inoguchi@ for noticing libssl had more reacharounds into this. ok jsing@ inoguchi@
* remove unused variablebeck2016-09-031-2/+1
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* Fix some very unnecessary convoultion.beck2016-09-031-16/+6
| | | | ok krw@
* Convert ECParameters_dup() from a macro that uses ASN1_dup_of() into anjsing2015-10-131-1/+17
| | | | | | actual function. This removes the last ASN1_dup_of usage from the tree. Feedback from doug@ and miod@
* Correct spelling of OPENSSL_cleanse.jsing2015-09-101-4/+4
| | | | ok miod@
* No need to check the return value of memcpy() if you actually checked thismiod2015-05-201-3/+2
| | | | pointer for NULL the line above; ok doug@
* Add missing BN_CTX_end() calls.doug2015-04-291-7/+3
| | | | | | | | After calling BN_CTX_start(), there must be a BN_CTX_end() before returning. There were missing BN_CTX_end() calls in error paths. One diff chunk was simply removing redundant code related to this. ok deraadt@
* BN_CTX_get() can fail - consistently check its return value.jsing2015-02-091-13/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are currently cases where the return from each call is checked, the return from only the last call is checked and cases where it is not checked at all (including code in bn, ec and engine). Checking the last return value is valid as once the function fails it will continue to return NULL. However, in order to be consistent check each call with the same idiom. This makes it easy to verify. Note there are still a handful of cases that do not follow the idiom - these will be handled separately. ok beck@ doug@
* if (x) FOO_free(x) -> FOO_free(x).miod2014-07-121-11/+6
| | | | | | | Improves readability, keeps the code smaller so that it is warmer in your cache. review & ok deraadt@
* Explicitly include <openssl/opensslconf.h> in every file that referencesjsing2014-07-101-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | an OPENSSL_NO_* define. This avoids relying on something else pulling it in for us, plus it fixes several cases where the #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_XYZ is never going to do anything, since OPENSSL_NO_XYZ will never defined, due to the fact that opensslconf.h has not been included. This also includes some miscellaneous sorting/tidying of headers.
* remove unused, private version strings except SSL_version_strbcook2014-07-091-4/+1
| | | | | | Also remove unused des_ver.h, which exports some of these strings, but is not installed. ok miod@ tedu@
* tags as requested by miod and teduderaadt2014-06-121-1/+1
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* no need for null check before free. from Brendan MacDonelltedu2014-05-301-6/+3
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* knf approximationtedu2014-05-061-469/+484
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* Change library to use intrinsic memory allocation functions instead ofbeck2014-04-171-20/+20
| | | | | | | | OPENSSL_foo wrappers. This changes: OPENSSL_malloc->malloc OPENSSL_free->free OPENSSL_relloc->realloc OPENSSL_freeFunc->free
* In EC_POINT_invert(), actually check the correct function pointer for NULLmiod2014-04-151-1/+1
| | | | | before attempting to invoke it; trivial one-liner in OpenSSL RT #2569 ignored for 2.5 years.
* Merge conflicts; remove MacOS, Netware, OS/2, VMS and Windows build machinery.miod2014-04-131-5/+5
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* resolve conflictsdjm2012-10-131-74/+6
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* resolve conflicts, fix local changesdjm2010-10-011-2/+2
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* resolve conflictsdjm2008-09-061-85/+593
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* merge 0.9.7b with local changes; crank majors for libssl/libcryptomarkus2003-05-121-3/+5
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* Merge OpenSSL 0.9.7-stable-20020605,beck2002-06-071-0/+8
| | | | correctly autogenerate obj_mac.h
* OpenSSL 0.9.7 stable 2002 05 08 mergebeck2002-05-151-0/+646
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