summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/lib/libcrypto/ec (follow)
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* Default to using named curve parameter encodingtb2021-09-122-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The pre-OpenSSL 1.1.0 default was to use explicit curve parameter encoding. Most applications want to use named curve parameter encoding and have to opt into this explicitly. Stephen Henson changed this default in OpenSSL commit 86f300d3 6 years ago and provided a new OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE define to opt back into the old default. According to Debian's codesearch, no application currently does this, which indicates that we currently have a bad default. In the future it is more likely that applications expect the new default, so we follow OpenSSL to avoid problems. Prompted by schwarze who noted that OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE is missing. ok beck inoguchi jsing
* Expose EC_GROUP_order_bits() in <openssl/ec.h>tb2021-09-101-3/+1
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Prepare to provide EC_GROUP_order_bits()tb2021-09-0811-18/+45
| | | | ok jsing
* Remove some dead code that was missed in an earlier cleanup andtb2021-08-311-4/+3
| | | | | | | | fix a stale comment. Found by mortimer with clang 13's -Wunused-but-set-variable. ok beck
* Expose EC_POINT_{get,set}_affine_coordinates(3) andtb2021-05-101-7/+8
| | | | | | EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates(3) ok jsing
* Expose EC_GROUP_{get,set}_curve(3)tb2021-05-101-3/+2
| | | | ok jsing
* Fix corner case for compressed points on binary curvestb2021-05-031-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | Per X9.62 4.4.1.b., the compressed representation of a point with zero x coordinate on a binary curve must have y_bit unset. Error out in that case of ec_GF2m_set_compressed_coordinates() instead of ignoring y_bit. ok jsing
* Fix indent of EC_METHODs as requested by jsing.tb2021-04-206-192/+192
| | | | While there zap trailing whitespace from a KNF approximation gone wrong.
* Compare pointer against NULL and fix a KNF issue.tb2021-04-201-3/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Prepare to provide EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinatestb2021-04-205-57/+41
| | | | ok jsing
* Compare function pointers against NULL, not 0.tb2021-04-201-3/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Provide EC_POINT_{g,s}et_Jprojective_coordinates for internal usetb2021-04-2010-77/+97
| | | | ok jsing
* Simplify code after adding EC_POINT_{s,g}et_affine_coordinates()tb2021-04-201-25/+6
| | | | ok jsing
* Compare function pointers against NULL, not 0.tb2021-04-201-3/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Prepare to provide EC_POINT_{g,s}et_affine_coordinatestb2021-04-2013-71/+72
| | | | | | Similar to part of OpenSSL commit 8e3cced75fb5fee5da59ebef9605d403a999391b ok jsing
* Simplify after EC_POINT_get_curve() additiontb2021-04-202-30/+8
| | | | ok jsing
* Compare function pointers against NULL, not 0.tb2021-04-201-3/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Prepare to provide EC_GROUP_{get,set}_curve(3)tb2021-04-206-41/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | There are numerous functions in ec/ that exist with _GF2m and _GFp variants for no good reason. The code of both variants is the same. The EC_METHODs contain a pointer to the appropriate version. This commit hides the _GF2m and _GFp variants from internal use and provides versions that work for both curve types. These will be made public in an upcoming library bump. Similar to part of OpenSSL commit 8e3cced75fb5fee5da59ebef9605d403a999391b ok jsing
* Avoid division by zero in hybrid point encodingtb2021-04-191-17/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In hybrid and compressed point encodings, the form octet contains a bit of information allowing to calculate y from x. For a point on a binary curve, this bit is zero if x is zero, otherwise it must match the rightmost bit of of the field element y / x. The existing code only considers the second possibility. It could thus fail with a division by zero error as found by Guido Vranken's cryptofuzz. This commit adds a few explanatory comments to oct2point and fixes some KNF issues. The only actual code change is in the last hunk which adds a BN_is_zero(x) check to avoid the division by zero. ok jsing
* Move point-on-curve check to set_affine_coordinatestb2020-12-044-18/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Bad API design makes it possible to set an EC_KEY public key to a point not on the curve. As a consequence, it was possible to have bogus ECDSA signatures validated. In practice, all software uses either EC_POINT_oct2point*() to unmarshal public keys or issues a call to EC_KEY_check_key() after setting it. This way, a point on curve check is performed and the problem is mitigated. In OpenSSL commit 1e2012b7ff4a5f12273446b281775faa5c8a1858, Emilia Kasper moved the point-on-curve check from EC_POINT_oct2point to EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_*, which results in more checking. In addition to this commit, we also check in the currently unused codepath of a user set callback for setting compressed coordinates, just in case this will be used at some point in the future. The documentation of EC_KEY_check_key() is very vague on what it checks and when checks are needed. It could certainly be improved a lot. It's also strange that EC_KEY_set_key() performs no checks, while EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates() implicitly calls EC_KEY_check_key(). It's a mess. Issue found and reported by Guido Vranken who also tested an earlier version of this fix. ok jsing
* Add support for additional GOST curves.jsing2020-06-051-5/+163
| | | | | | | | | | | | | These GOST curves are defined in RFC 7836 and draft-deremin-rfc4491-bis. Add aliases for 256-bit GOST curves (see draft-smyshlyaev-tls12-gost-suites) and rename the 512-bit curve ids to follow names defined in tc26 OID registry. Diff from Dmitry Baryshkov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com> Sponsored by ROSA Linux. ok inoguchi@
* If a NULL or zero cofactor is passed to EC_GROUP_set_generator(),tb2019-09-293-11/+113
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | try to compute it using Hasse's bound. This works as long as the cofactor is small enough. Port of Brumley's fix for CVE-2019-1547 in OpenSSL 1.1.1 (old license) tests & ok inoguchi input & ok jsing commit 30c22fa8b1d840036b8e203585738df62a03cec8 Author: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Date: Thu Sep 5 21:25:37 2019 +0300 [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present. This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more SCA-robust code. This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form, where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent. It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed programatically with explicit parameters, then calling EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero). The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock timing attacks. CVE-2019-1547 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9781)
* Plug memory leak in error paths. Found while comparing this filetb2019-09-091-5/+5
| | | | | | with OpenSSL 1.1.1's version which contains a similar fix. ok jsing
* Provide EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md() macro and implement thejsing2019-09-091-1/+5
| | | | | | | | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD control for DSA, EC and RSA. This is used by the upcoming RSA CMS code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Move #include <openssl/cms.h> to more appropriate location (since it isjsing2019-09-091-3/+2
| | | | now being installed).
* Add CMS ECC support.jsing2019-09-081-2/+370
| | | | | | | | This brings in EC code from OpenSSL 1.1.1b, with style(9) and whitespace cleanups. All of this code is currently under OPENSSL_NO_CMS hence is a no-op. ok inoguchi@
* Add various macros and controls for EC_PKEY_CTX.jsing2019-09-063-27/+314
| | | | | | | | | These are needed for the upcoming EC CMS support (nothing else appears to use them). This largely syncs our ec_pmeth.c with OpenSSL 1.1.1b. With input from inoguchi@ and tb@. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Initialize EC_KEY_METHOD before use.bcook2019-05-101-2/+2
| | | | | | Fixes COV-186146 ok tb, beck
* $OpenBSD$tb2019-01-191-0/+1
|
* Partial port of EC_KEY_METHOD from OpenSSL 1.1.tb2019-01-192-9/+9
| | | | | | | Pass const method to EC_KEY_METHOD_get_*() to get rid of an XXX. from markus
* Partial port of EC_KEY_METHOD from OpenSSL 1.1.tb2019-01-194-29/+125
| | | | | | This commit adds missing API for ECDH/ECDSA_verify. from markus
* Partial port of EC_KEY_METHOD from OpenSSL 1.1.tb2019-01-194-23/+401
| | | | | | | This commit adds init/free, support for signing, setting and getting the method, engine support as well as extra data. from markus
* Port OpenSSL commit 99540ec79491f59ed8b46b4edf130e17dc907f52 -- mitigationtb2018-11-151-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | for a timing vullnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735). Note that the blinding that we introduced back in June for ECDSA and DSA should mitigate this and related issues. This simply adds an additional layer of protection. discussed with jsing
* Avoid dereferencing eckey before checking it for NULL.tb2018-11-091-5/+6
| | | | | | CID 184282 ok beck jsing mestre
* unrevert the use of bn_rand_interval().tb2018-11-063-12/+9
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Unset Z_is_zero after applying coordinate blinding andtb2018-11-061-3/+4
| | | | | | re-enable coordinate blinding. ok jsing
* disable EC_POINT coordinate blinding due to failures in ECDHE and TLStb2018-11-061-1/+3
|
* revert use of bn_rand_interval due to failures with ECDHE and TLStb2018-11-062-7/+10
|
* Make use of bn_rand_interval() where appropriate.tb2018-11-052-10/+7
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Eliminate a few "} else" branches, a few unneeded NULL checks beforetb2018-11-051-16/+12
| | | | | | freeing and indent nearby labels. ok beck jsing
* Implement coordinate blinding for EC_POINT.tb2018-11-0510-18/+110
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on OpenSSL commit 875ba8b21ecc65ad9a6bdc66971e50 by Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan and Nicola Tuveri. ok beck jsing commit 875ba8b21ecc65ad9a6bdc66971e50461660fcbb Author: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Date: Sat Jun 16 17:07:40 2018 +0300 Implement coordinate blinding for EC_POINT This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method, EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method. This commit is derived from the patch https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley. Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way, it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an algorithm state) unpredictable. For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the aforementioned curves. For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6526)
* Tweak comment.tb2018-09-011-5/+2
|
* Add consts to EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private()tb2018-08-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | Requires adding a const to the priv_decode() member of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and adjusting all *_priv_decode() functions. All this is already documented this way. tested in a bulk build by sthen ok jsing
* After removing support for broken PKCS#8 formats (it was high time),tb2018-08-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | we can add const to PKCS8_pkey_get0(). In order for this to work, we need to sprinkle a few consts here and there. tested in a bulk by sthen ok jsing
* Use BN_swap_ct() instead of BN_consttime_swap() intb2018-07-231-5/+10
| | | | | | | | | ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(). The new BN_swap_ct() API is an improved version of the public BN_consttime_swap() function: it allows error checking, doesn't assert(), and has fewer assumptions on the input. This diff eliminates the last use of BN_consttime_swap() in our tree. ok inoguchi, jsing
* Recommit Billy Brumley's ECC constant time patch with a fix for sparc64tb2018-07-166-47/+341
| | | | | | | from Nicola Tuveri (who spotted the omission of ecp_nist.c from the PR). discussed with jsing tested by jsg
* recommit label indentation part of the backout; clearly unrelated to thetb2018-07-1519-91/+93
| | | | breakage.
* back out ecc constant time changesjsg2018-07-1520-426/+133
| | | | | | | | after the constant time commits various regress tests started failing on sparc64 ssh t9, libcrypto ec ecdh ecdsa and trying to ssh out resulted in 'invalid elliptic curve value' ok tb@
* Indent labels by a space so they don't obliterate function names in diffs.tb2018-07-1019-91/+93
|
* ECC constant time scalar multiplication support. First step in overhaulingtb2018-07-105-46/+337
| | | | | | | | | | | the EC module. From Billy Brumley and his team, via https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/pull/94 With tweaks from jsing and me. ok jsing
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-02 23:24:15 +0000