summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa (follow)
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* Use key for the EC_KEY everywheretb2023-07-041-39/+38
|
* Some more consistency in variable namestb2023-07-041-15/+15
|
* Normalize ECDSA_SIG to be sig everywheretb2023-07-041-11/+11
|
* Normalize on digest and digest_len rather than dgst dlen dgstlen, etc.tb2023-07-041-28/+34
|
* Rework ecdsa_prepare_digest()tb2023-07-041-35/+35
| | | | | | | | Make it take an EC_KEY instead of a group order in preparation for further cleanup. Rename m into e to match the standard better. Also buy some vowels for jsing. ok beck jsing
* Factor the computation of ECDSA s into a functiontb2023-07-041-69/+88
| | | | | | | | ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig() is already complicated enough. The math bit is entirely self contained and does not need to obfuscate control flow and logic. with feedback from and ok jsing
* sign_sig: drop ckinvtb2023-07-031-5/+7
| | | | | | | | The only reason ckinv exists is to be able to avoid a copy. This copy leaks some timing info, that will be mitigated in a subsequent step. It is an unused or at least uncommonly used codepath. ok jsing
* Rework the logic in ECDSA sign_sig()tb2023-07-031-24/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | If the caller supplied both kinv and r, we don't loop but rather throw an undocumented error code that no one uses, which is intended to tell the caller to run ECDSA_sign_setup() and try again. Use a boolean that indicates this situation so that the logic becomes a bit more transparent. ok jsing
* sign_sig: test on assignmenttb2023-07-031-5/+6
|
* sign_setup: split another check into twotb2023-07-031-2/+6
|
* Split range checks for ECDSA r and ECDSA stb2023-07-031-3/+8
| | | | requested by jsing
* Switch a couple of test from ucmp to cmptb2023-07-031-4/+4
| | | | | | | | This is confusing, as both sides involved should be unsigned. The ec code is undecided on whether the group order can be negative. It should never be, so lets see what happen with this slightly stricter check. discussed with jsing
* ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(): simplify range checkstb2023-07-031-6/+4
| | | | | | | The checks whether r and s lie in the interval [1, order) were a bit uglier than necessary. Clean this up. ok beck jsing
* List variables in a somewhat more sensible ordertb2023-07-031-4/+4
|
* In ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig() use BN_CTX more idiomaticallytb2023-07-031-8/+10
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Split a bunch of unrelated checkstb2023-07-031-3/+10
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Make ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig() single exittb2023-07-031-4/+4
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Switch ossl_ecdsa_verify() to timingsafe_memcmp()tb2023-07-031-2/+2
| | | | Requested by jsing
* Streamline ossl_ecdsa_verify()tb2023-07-031-7/+13
| | | | | | | Make it single exit and use API more idiomatically and some other cosmetics. ok beck jsing
* Switch ECDSA code to using EC_GROUP_get0_order()tb2023-07-031-25/+17
| | | | ok jsing
* Another empty line did not want to go intb2023-07-031-1/+2
|
* Trade a pair of extra braces for a missing empty linetb2023-07-031-3/+3
|
* Switch sign_sig() and sign_setup() to using BN_CTXtb2023-07-021-47/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | Both these functions use a BN_CTX internally to deal with the EC API that usually requires one. However, they don't actually make use of it. Get the BIGNUMs from the BN_CTX instead, which simplifies the cleanup. Also defer allocation of the ECDSA_SIG to the very end. Instead of using its internal r and s, use two local r and s variables and transfer those to the ECDSA_SIG on success. ok beck jsing
* Revert hunk accidentally committed in r1.39tb2023-07-021-11/+1
|
* Rework handling of the out_kinv and out_r pointerstb2023-07-021-8/+15
| | | | suggested by jsing
* Rename ctx_in into in_ctx, kinvp into out_kinv and rp into out_rtb2023-07-021-12/+13
|
* Rename a few variables from X to xtb2023-07-021-14/+14
|
* Simplify things by switching to bn_rand_interval()tb2023-07-021-22/+19
| | | | | | | | This avoids some silly dances in ECDSA signature generation by replacing them with a single API call. Also garbage collect the now unnecessary range. ok beck jsing
* ECDSA_size(): move order a few lines downtb2023-07-021-2/+2
|
* Invert method checks to avoid stupid line breakstb2023-07-021-22/+26
|
* Move ECDSA_size() to ecs_ossl.c to match what was done in ecdhtb2023-06-252-34/+34
|
* Move ECDH_OpenSSL() ECDSA_OpenSSL() to *_lib.ctb2023-06-252-15/+15
| | | | | | Now that they no longer use static methods, they can move where they belong. Also make the static method const, as it should have been all along.
* Remove {ecdh,ecdsa}_check() and {ECDH,ECDSA}_DATAtb2023-06-252-114/+2
| | | | | | | This is now unused code. Removing it will free us up to remove some other ugliness in the ec directory. ok jsing
* Remove method wrappers that use {ecdh,ecdsa}_check()tb2023-06-251-52/+10
| | | | | | | | Now that it is no longer possible to set a custom {ECDH,ECDSA}_METHOD, EC_KEY_METHOD can just call the relevant method directly without the need for this extra contortion. ok jsing
* ecdsa_do_sign(): remove useless ecdsa_check() calltb2023-06-251-4/+2
| | | | ok jsing
* Make ECDH and ECDSA ex_data handlers always failtb2023-06-251-13/+4
| | | | | | | | They will be removed in the next major bump. No port uses them. They use code that is in the way of upcoming surgery. Only libtls and smtpd used to use the ECDSA version. ok jsing
* Make {ECDH,ECDSA}_set_method() always failtb2023-06-251-15/+2
| | | | | | | | They will be removed in the next major bump. No port uses them. They use code that is in the way of upcoming surgery. Only libtls used the ECDSA version, but thankfully op cleaned that up. ok jsing
* Dedoxigenize ecdsa.htb2023-06-191-133/+5
| | | | | | | These functions are properly documented and upcoming surgery in here is going to be tricky enough without having to navigate around this noise. No code change.
* Move EC_KEY_{insert,set}_key_method_data() to internal-onlytb2023-04-251-2/+4
|
* Bring includes into canonical ordertb2023-04-181-2/+3
| | | | Requested by jsing
* Move some includes out of OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATEDtb2023-04-181-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Some headers were included conditionally on OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED in hopes that eventually the mess of everything includes everything will magically resolve itself. Of course everyone would end up building openssl with OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED over time... Right. Surprisingly, the ecosystem has come to rely on these implicit inclusions, so about two dozen ports would fail to build because of this. Patching this would be easy but really not worth the effort. ok jsing
* Remove files that definitely contain no code anymoretb2023-04-132-148/+0
| | | | (experts disagree whether they ever did)
* Fold ECDSA sign and verify mess into ecs_ossl.ctb2023-04-133-63/+68
| | | | discussed with jsing
* i2d_ECDSA_SIG() may return a negative value in case of error. Handlebluhm2023-03-301-5/+14
| | | | | this in ossl_ecdsa_sign() and propagate the return code. OK jsing@ tb@
* Replace the remaining BN_copy() with bn_copy()tb2023-03-271-3/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Convert BN_copy() with explicit comparison against NULL to bn_copy()tb2023-03-271-2/+2
| | | | ok jsing
* BN_free() is defined in <openssl/bn.h>tb2023-03-251-3/+5
| | | | | | This is currently pulled in via dsa.h and ecdsa.h, but only when OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is not defined. We should fix this in the public header, too - let's wait a bit with that.
* Call BN_free() instead of BN_clear_free().jsing2023-03-073-17/+17
| | | | | | | BN_clear_free() is a wrapper that calls BN_free() - call BN_free() directly instead. ok tb@
* Enforce a lower bound of of EC group order so 80 bits for ECDSAtb2023-03-041-2/+7
| | | | | | | | This makes sure that the elliptic curve is not completely stupid. This is conservative enough: the smallest named groups that we support have an order of 112 bits. ok beck jsing
* Cap the number of iterations in ECDSA signingtb2023-03-041-1/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | ECDSA is essentially the same thing as DSA, except that it is slightly less stupid. Signing specifies an infinite loop, which is only possible with arbitrary ECDSA domain parameters. Fortunately, most use of ECDSA in the wild is based on well-known groups, so it is known a priori that the loop is not infinite. Still, infinite loops are bad. A retry is unlikely, 32 retries have a probability of ~2^-8000. So it's pretty safe to error out. ok beck jsing
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-08-30 17:46:30 +0000