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* Update RSA ASN.1 code to handle RSA-PSS.jsing2019-11-014-302/+389
| | | | | | From OpenSSL 1.1.1d. ok tb@
* Clean up RSA_new_method().jsing2019-11-011-40/+24
| | | | | | | | | | Use calloc() instead of malloc() for initialisation and remove explicit zero initialisation of members. This ensures that new members always get initialised. Also use a single error return path, simplifying code. ok tb@
* Add CMS controls for RSA.jsing2019-10-311-1/+8
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* Add support for RSA-PSS.jsing2019-10-315-65/+370
| | | | | | From OpenSSL 1.1.1d. ok inoguchi@
* Move RSA min modulus to a define and increase from 256 to 512 bits.jsing2019-10-312-4/+6
| | | | | | From OpenSSL 1.1.1d. ok inoguchi@
* Fix indent and indent before labels.jsing2019-10-311-5/+5
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* Use braces where a statement has both multi-line and single-line blocks.jsing2019-10-311-8/+13
| | | | | | Makes code more robust and reduces differences with OpenSSL. ok inoguchi@
* Add additional validation of key size, message digest size and publicjsing2019-10-311-3/+17
| | | | | | | | exponent. From OpenSSL 1.1.1d. ok inoguchi@
* Clean up some code.jsing2019-10-311-11/+13
| | | | | | | Assign and test, explicitly test against NULL and use calloc() rather than malloc. ok inoguchi@
* Avoid potentially leaking pub_exp in pkey_rsa_copy().jsing2019-10-311-4/+4
| | | | ok inoguchi@
* Add two controls that were missed in the previous commit.jsing2019-10-291-1/+13
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* Update RSA OAEP code.jsing2019-10-292-21/+124
| | | | | | | This syncs the RSA OAEP code with OpenSSL 1.1.1d, correctly handling OAEP padding and providing various OAEP related controls. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Free maskHash when RSA_PSS_PARAMS is freed.jsing2019-10-251-3/+23
| | | | ok tb@
* Provide RSA_OAEP_PARAMS along with ASN.1 encoding/decoding.jsing2019-10-242-2/+97
| | | | | | | | For now these are internal only. From OpenSSL 1.1.1d. ok inoguchi@
* Add RSA_PSS_PARAMS pointer to RSA struct.jsing2019-10-241-1/+8
| | | | | | This will be used by upcoming RSA-PSS code. ok tb@
* Add maskHash field to RSA_PSS_PARAMS.jsing2019-10-241-1/+4
| | | | | | | This will be soon used as an optimisation and reduces the differences between OpenSSL. ok tb@
* Provide RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl().jsing2019-10-242-2/+19
| | | | | | | | | This is a wrapper around EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() which requires the key to be either RSA or RSA-PSS. From OpenSSL 1.1.1d. ok tb@
* Sync RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1().jsing2019-10-171-64/+111
| | | | | | | | | Update RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1() with code from OpenSSL 1.1.1d (with some improvements/corrections to comments). This brings in code to make the padding check constant time. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Use EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE instead of SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH and remove OPENSSL_NO_SHA*jsing2019-10-091-7/+2
| | | | | | conditionals, now that this code handles arbitrary message digests. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Provide internal RSA_padding_{add,check}_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1() functions.jsing2019-10-042-10/+90
| | | | | | | | These are internal only for now and will be made public at a later date. The RSA_padding_{add,check}_PKCS1_OAEP() functions become wrappers around the *_mgf1() variant. ok tb@ inoguchi@ (as part of a larger diff)
* Move towards making RSA OAEP functions handle arbitrary message digests.jsing2019-10-031-53/+59
| | | | | | Based on OpenSSL 1.1.1. ok tb@, inoguchi@ (on an earlier/larger diff)
* Provide EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md() macro and implement thejsing2019-09-091-1/+5
| | | | | | | | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD control for DSA, EC and RSA. This is used by the upcoming RSA CMS code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* provide getters and setters for the RSA_METHOD interfacegilles2019-06-052-2/+220
| | | | ok tb@, jsing@, sthen@
* Add some accessor functions:djm2018-09-122-2/+22
| | | | | | RSA_meth_get_finish() RSA_meth_set1_name() EVP_CIPHER_CTX_(get|set)_iv() feedback and ok jsing@ tb@
* use timing-safe compares for checking results in signature verificationdjm2018-09-054-9/+10
| | | | | | (there are no known attacks, this is just inexpensive prudence) feedback and ok tb@ jsing@
* Add consts to EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private()tb2018-08-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | Requires adding a const to the priv_decode() member of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and adjusting all *_priv_decode() functions. All this is already documented this way. tested in a bulk build by sthen ok jsing
* whitespace fixtb2018-08-191-2/+2
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* Don't leak db on error in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP().tb2018-08-191-7/+7
| | | | | | CID #183499. input & ok jsing, ok mestre on first version
* In RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP, dbmask needs to be freed on failure.bcook2018-08-051-3/+7
| | | | ok tb@
* Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in RFC 8017.tb2018-07-231-120/+148
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on an OpenSSL commit by David Benjamin. Alex Gaynor and Paul Kehrer from the pyca/cryptography Python library reported that more than 200 "expected to fail" signatures among Project Wycheproof's test vectors validated on LibreSSL. This patch makes them all fail. ok jsing commit 608a026494c1e7a14f6d6cfcc5e4994fe2728836 Author: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Date: Sat Aug 20 13:35:17 2016 -0400 Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified. RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474
* make ENGINE_finish() succeed on NULL and simplify callers as intb2018-04-141-12/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | OpenSSL commit 7c96dbcdab9 by Rich Salz. This cleans up the caller side quite a bit and reduces the number of lines enclosed in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE. codesearch.debian.net shows that almost nothing checks the return value of ENGINE_finish(). While there, replace a few nearby 'if (!ptr)' with 'if (ptr == NULL)'. ok jsing, tested by & ok inoguchi
* Provide RSA_meth_{dup,free,new,set_{finish,priv_{dec,enc}}}()tb2018-03-172-1/+96
| | | | | | | Note that these functions return NULL in out-of-memory situations, but contrary to OpenSSL's versions they do not set an error. ok jsing
* Provide RSA_{clear,set,test}_flasg()tb2018-02-202-2/+23
| | | | ok jsing
* Provide RSA_{g,s}et0_crt_params()tb2018-02-182-2/+40
| | | | ok jsing
* Use usual order of RSA_{g,s}et0_key().tb2018-02-182-13/+14
| | | | ok jsing
* Provide RSA_{g,s}et0_factors()tb2018-02-182-2/+31
| | | | ok jsing
* Provide RSA_bits()tb2018-02-182-2/+9
| | | | ok jsing
* Provide further parts of the OpenSSL 1.1 API: {DH,DSA}_get0_{key,pqg}(),tb2018-02-172-2/+39
| | | | | | EVP_PKEY_get0_{DH,DSA,RSA}(), RSA_{g,s}et0_key(). ok jsing
* Bring back the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING define.jsing2017-08-301-1/+2
| | | | Several pieces of software expect this to be available unconditionally.
* Remove RSA_padding_add_SSLv23()/RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() and relatedjsing2017-08-284-166/+3
| | | | | | code. We removed SSLv2/SSLv3 a long time ago... Discussed with doug@
* use freezero() instead of memset/explicit_bzero + free. Substantiallyderaadt2017-05-023-35/+13
| | | | | | | | | | reduces conditional logic (-218, +82). MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH cache alignment calculation bn/bn_exp.c wasn'tt quite right. Two other tricky bits with ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF and BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA where the condition cannot be collapsed completely. Passes regress. ok beck
* revert previous accidental commitbeck2017-04-283-21/+33
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* *** empty log message ***beck2017-04-283-33/+21
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* Send the function codes from the error functions to the bit bucket,beck2017-01-2917-275/+148
| | | | | | as was done earlier in libssl. Thanks inoguchi@ for noticing libssl had more reacharounds into this. ok jsing@ inoguchi@
* Construct a BN_gcd_nonct, based on BN_mod_inverse_no_branch, as suggestedbeck2017-01-252-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | by Alejandro Cabrera <aldaya@gmail.com> to avoid the possibility of a sidechannel timing attack during RSA private key generation. Modify BN_gcd to become not visible under LIBRESSL_INTERNAL and force the use of the _ct or _nonct versions of the function only within the library. ok jsing@
* Add ct and nonct versions of BN_mod_inverse for internal usebeck2017-01-213-7/+9
| | | | ok jsing@
* Split out BN_div and BN_mod into ct and nonct versions for Internal use.beck2017-01-213-12/+16
| | | | ok jsing@
* Make explicit _ct and _nonct versions of bn_mod_exp funcitons thatbeck2017-01-211-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | matter for constant time, and make the public interface only used external to the library. This moves us to a model where the important things are constant time versions unless you ask for them not to be, rather than the opposite. I'll continue with this method by method. Add regress tests for same. ok jsing@
* Expand ASN1_ITEM_rptr macros - no change in generated assembly.jsing2016-12-302-6/+6
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* Explicitly export a list of symbols from libcrypto.jsing2016-12-211-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the "internal" BN functions from bn.h to bn_lcl.h and stop exporting the bn_* symbols. These are documented as only being intended for internal use, so why they were placed in a public header is beyond me... This hides 363 previously exported symbols, most of which exist in headers that are not installed and were never intended to be public. This also removes a few crusty old things that should have died long ago (like _ossl_old_des_read_pw). But don't worry... there are still 3451 symbols exported from the library. With input and testing from inoguchi@. ok beck@ inoguchi@
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