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* White space KNF, no code change:schwarze2022-11-071-15/+12
| | | | | | | - line breaking and indentation in three struct declarations - removal of trailing whitespace Found while working on /usr/src/regress/lib/libcrypto/man/check_complete.pl . OK tb@
* Store errors that result from leaf certificate verification.jsing2022-10-171-8/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the case that a verification callback is installed that tells the verifier to continue when a certificate is invalid (e.g. expired), any error resulting from the leaf certificate verification is not stored and made available post verification, resulting in an incorrect error being returned. Also perform leaf certificate verification prior to adding the chain, which avoids a potential memory leak (as noted by tb@). Issue reported by Ilya Shipitsin, who encountered haproxy regress failures. ok tb@
* Prepare to provide OPENSSL_cleanup.jsing2022-09-031-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | OPENSSL_cleanup() cleans up and deallocates memory in use by the library. There are a couple of use cases for this, primarily related to memory leak testing. This will not be called automatically in LibreSSL, which means that OpenSSL's OPENSSL_NO_INIT_ATEXIT is implied. If code wants to clean up then they need to explicitly call this themselves. ok tb@
* Switch loop bounds from size_t to int in check_hosts()tb2022-08-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | sk_num() can return a negative value, in which case the upper bound is SIZE_MAX, which results in a very long for loop. CID 153997 ok jsing
* Allow empty attribute sets in CSRstb2022-08-181-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | While each attribute must contain at least one extension, it is not required that a CSR have attributes at all. Instead of signalling an error by returning NULL if no extensions are found, return an empty stack of extensions. Via OpenSSL 1f02ca2d ok jsing
* Add missing RCS tag and zap a trailing spacetb2022-08-151-2/+2
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* Remove overly aggressive trust check in legacy verifier that breaksbeck2022-08-051-15/+4
| | | | | | | | p5-IO-Socket-SSL regress and regress/sbin/iked/live Still passes the mutt regress that this was intended to fix. ok tb@
* Untangle two logic chains in x509_asid.c into something more readable.tb2022-07-301-9/+22
| | | | ok jsing
* Plug leak in X509V3_add1_i2d()tb2022-07-241-2/+3
| | | | | | | | Do not leak the extension that was deleted from the stack. via OpenSSL c3efe5c9. ok jsing
* Remove mkerr.pl remnants from LibreSSLkn2022-07-123-17/+3
| | | | | | | This script is not used at all and files are edited by hand instead. Thus remove misleading comments incl. the obsolete script/config. Feedback OK jsing tb
* Expose new API in headers.tb2022-07-071-5/+1
| | | | | | | These are mostly security-level related, but there are also ASN1_TIME and ASN_INTEGER functions here, as well as some missing accessors. ok jsing
* Add missing X509_V_ERR_ strings using the ones from OpenSSL.tb2022-07-051-1/+17
| | | | | | | The well-known masters of consistency of course use strings that don't match the names of the errors. ok jsing
* Prepare to provide X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time()tb2022-07-042-2/+9
| | | | ok jsing sthen
* Take away bogus error assignment before callback call.beck2022-06-281-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Keep the depth which was needed. This went an error too far, and broke openssl-ruby's callback and error code sensitivity in it's tests. With this removed, both my newly committed regress to verify the same error codes and depths in the callback, and openssl-ruby's tests pass again. ok tb@
* Fix the legacy verifier callback behaviour for untrusted certs.beck2022-06-281-17/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The verifier callback is used by mutt to do a form of certificate pinning where the callback gets fired and depending on a cert saved to a file will decide to accept an untrusted cert. This corrects two problems that affected this. The callback was not getting the correct depth and chain for the error where mutt would save the certificate in the first place, and then the callback was not getting fired to allow it to override the failing certificate validation. thanks to Avon Robertson <avon.r@xtra.co.nz> for the report and sthen@ for analysis. "The callback is not an API, it's a gordian knot - tb@" ok jsing@
* Correct misleading comment for URI parsingbeck2022-06-271-4/+10
| | | | ok jsing@
* Add function to free all of the issuer cache.beck2022-06-271-13/+39
| | | | ok jsing@
* Allow security_level to mestastasize into the verifiertb2022-06-274-4/+156
| | | | | | | | The tentacles are everywhere. This checks that all certs in a chain have keys and signature algorithms matching the requirements of the security_level configured in the verify parameters. ok beck jsing
* Prepare to provide X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level()tb2022-06-273-2/+12
| | | | | | | | For some unknown reason this needed a different name than security_level, both internally and in the public API. Obviously it is exactly the same garbage. ok beck jsing
* Fix URI name constraints, allow for URI's with no host part.beck2022-06-261-3/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | Such uri's must be parsed and allowed, but then should fail if a name constraint is present. Adds regress testing for this same case. fixes https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/issues/131 ok tb@
* whitespacetb2022-06-261-2/+2
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* Move leaf certificate checks to the last thing after chain validation.beck2022-06-251-19/+32
| | | | | | | | While seemingly illogical and not what is done in Go's validator, this mimics OpenSSL's behavior so that callback overrides for the expiry of a certificate will not "sticky" override a failure to build a chain. ok jsing@
* Remove an unnecessary XXX comment. The suggested check is part oftb2022-05-251-5/+1
| | | | extract_min_max().
* Don't pass uninitialized pointer to ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8()tb2022-05-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Exposed by recent rewrite of ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(). CID 352831 ok jsing
* Rewrite make_addressRange() using CBStb2022-05-171-37/+104
| | | | | | | | | | Factor the trimming of the end and the counting of unused bits into helper functions and reuse an ASN.1 bit string API to set the unused bits and the ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_SET. With a couple of explanatory comments it becomes much clearer what the code is actually doing and why. ok jsing
* Simplify make_addressPrefix()tb2022-05-171-21/+23
| | | | | | | | | In order to set the BIT STRING containing an address prefix, use existing helper functions from the ASN.1 code instead of redoing everything by hand. Make the function single exit and rename a few variables to make it clearer what is being done. ok jsing
* Small readability tweak suggested by jsingtb2022-05-121-1/+3
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* Rewrite and fix X509v3_asid_subset()tb2022-05-121-12/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | X509v3_asid_subset() assumes that both asnum and rdi are present while they are both marked OPTIONAL in RFC 3779, 3.2.3. It will crash if either one is missing. In RPKI land RDI is a MUST NOT use (e.g, RFC 6487, 4.8.11), so this API is currently useless (and seemingly unused). Pick apart an ugly logical pipeline and implement this check in a readable fashion. ok jsing
* X509_check_ca() has 5 return values but still can't failtb2022-05-101-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The values 0, 1, 3, 4, 5 all have some meaning, none of which is failure. If caching of X509v3 extensions fails, returning X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, i.e., 1 is a bad idea since that means the cert is a CA with appropriate basic constraints. Revert to OpenSSL behavior which is to ignore failure to cache extensions at the risk of reporting lies. Since no return value can indicate failure, we can't fix this in X509_check_ca() itself. Application code will have to call (and check) the magic X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) to ensure extensions are cached, then X509_check_ca() can't lie. ok jsing
* Simplify X509_ATTRIBUTE ASN.1 encoding.jsing2022-05-092-23/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | For some unknown historical reason, X509_ATTRIBUTE allows for a single ASN.1 value or an ASN.1 SET OF, rather than requiring an ASN.1 SET OF. Simplify encoding and remove support for single values - this is similar to OpenSSL e20b57270dec. This removes the last use of COMBINE in the ASN.1 decoder. ok tb@
* Clarify comments at the start of {asid,addr}_validate_path_internal()tb2022-04-212-7/+7
| | | | Requested by jsing
* Avoid expensive RFC 3779 checks during cert verificationtb2022-04-213-16/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X509v3_{addr,asid}_is_canonical() check that the ipAddrBlocks and autonomousSysIds extension conform to RFC 3779. These checks are not cheap. Certs containing non-conformant extensions should not be considered valid, so mark them with EXFLAG_INVALID while caching the extension information in x509v3_cache_extensions(). This way the expensive check while walking the chains during X509_verify_cert() is replaced with a cheap check of the extension flags. This avoids a lot of superfluous work when validating numerous certs with similar chains against the same roots as is done in rpki-client. Issue noticed and fix suggested by claudio ok claudio inoguchi jsing
* Fix X509_get_extension_flags()tb2022-04-211-2/+2
| | | | | | Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID is set on X509_get_purpose() failure. ok inoguchi jsing
* KNF for a brace and zap trailing blank linetb2022-04-121-3/+3
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* name constraints: be more careful with NULstb2022-03-262-12/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | An IA5STRING is a Pascal string that can have embedded NULs and is not NUL terminated (except that for legacy reasons it happens to be). Instead of taking the strlen(), use the already known ASN.1 length and use strndup() instead of strdup() to generate NUL terminated strings after some existing code has checked that there are no embedded NULs. In v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex() use %.*s to print the bytes. This is not optimal and might be switched to using strvis() later. ok beck inoguchi jsing
* Make gcc 4 happier about x509_addr.ctb2022-03-161-6/+8
| | | | | | | | | | gcc 4 on sparc64 issues a few 'warning: value computed is not used'. There are two cases: sk_set_cmp_function() returns the old comparison function of the stack which we don't care about. The one warning about an sk_delete() is about a return value that we know already and which we will free a few lines down. ok inoguchi miod
* Allow constraints of the form @domain.comtb2022-03-141-10/+17
| | | | | | | | | | Some things issue and expect that we support a non-standard extension of accepting any email address from a host by prefixing an email name constraint with @. This used to be the case with the old code as well. Pointed out and based on a diff by Alex Wilson. ok jsing
* Rework ownership handling in x509_constraints_validate()tb2022-03-143-39/+49
| | | | | | | | | | Instead of having the caller allocate and pass in a new x509_constraints_name struct, handle allocation inside x509_constraints_validate(). Also make the error optional. All this is done to simplify the call sites and to make it more obvious that there are no leaks. ok jsing
* Relax the check of x509_constraints_dirname()libressl-v3.5.1tb2022-03-131-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | The dirname constraint must be a prefix in DER format, so relax the check from requiring equal-length strings to allow shorter names also. From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Add x509_constraints_validate() to x509_internal.htb2022-03-131-1/+3
| | | | | | From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Check name constraints using the proper APItb2022-03-131-4/+21
| | | | | | | | The previous versions were too strict and disallowed leading dots. From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* style tweaktb2022-03-131-2/+2
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* Add missing error check after strdup()tb2022-03-131-2/+5
| | | | | | From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Pull a len == 0 check up before malloc(len) to avoid implementationtb2022-03-031-5/+5
| | | | | | defined behavior. ok deraadt inoguchi
* Unwrap a linetb2022-03-021-3/+2
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* Get rid of SHA1 for comparing CRL's - use SHA512 just like we do for certs.beck2022-02-242-5/+5
| | | | ok tb@
* Fix length check of IP addresses for name constraintstb2022-02-111-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | An IP address in a name constraint is actually an IP address concatenated with a netmask, so it is twice as long as usual. This fixes a third bug introduced in r1.3 and reported by Volker Schlecht ok jsing
* Add missing error check for a2i_GENERAL_NAME()tb2022-02-111-1/+3
| | | | | | Fixes a segfault reported by Volker Schlecht. ok jsing
* Fix a double free in v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS()tb2022-02-111-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | a2i_GENERAL_NAME() modifies and returns the out argument that was passed in unless out == NULL, in which case it returns something freshly allocated. Thus, in v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex() we must only free ret if out == NULL so v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS() can free correctly. Issue reported by Volker Schlecht ok jsing
* Remove a strange inheritance check from addr_validate_path_internal()tb2022-02-041-4/+1
| | | | | | | | The trust anchor can't inherit, but the code says that it can inherit just not if the leaf tries to inherit from that. This makes no sense and doesn't match what is done on the asid side. ok jsing
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