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* Handle additional certificate error cases in new X.509 verifier.jsing2020-11-112-12/+79
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the old verifier, the verify callback can always return 1 instructing the verifier to simply continue regardless of a certificate verification failure (e.g. the certificate is expired or revoked). This would result in a chain being built, however the first error encountered would be persisted, which allows the caller to build the chain, have the verification process succeed, yet upon inspecting the error code note that the chain is not valid for some reason. Mimic this behaviour by keeping track of certificate errors while building chains - when we finish verification, find the certificate error closest to the leaf certificate and expose that via the X509_STORE_CTX. There are various corner cases that we also have to handle, like the fact that we keep an certificate error until we find the issuer, at which point we have to clear it. Issue reported by Ilya Shipitcin due to failing haproxy regression tests. With much discussion and input from beck@ and tb@! ok beck@ tb@
* Fix bad indent.jsing2020-11-031-7/+6
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* Hook X509_STORE_CTX get_issuer() callback from new X509 verifier.jsing2020-11-031-3/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | If we fail to find a parent certificate from either the supplied roots or intermediates and we have a X509_STORE_CTX, call its get_issuer() callback to see if it can supply a suitable certificate. This makes things like certificates by directory (aka by_dir) work correctly. Issue noted by Uwe Werler <uwe@werler.is> ok beck@ tb@
* Add a safety net to ensure that we set an error on the store context.tb2020-10-261-1/+3
| | | | Suggested by and discussed with beck
* If x509_verify() fails, ensure that the error is also set on the storetb2020-10-261-10/+15
| | | | | | | context. This is what is returned in SSL_get_verify_result(). Spotted and initial diff from jeremy; discussed with jsing ok beck
* Make sure that x509_vfy_check_id() failure also sets ctx->error, not onlytb2020-10-261-3/+8
| | | | | | ctx->xsc->error. Will be needed in an upcoming diff. from beck
* Ensure leaf is set up on X509_STORE_CTX before verification.jsing2020-09-261-9/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously the leaf certificate was only being set up on the X509_STORE_CTX after two verification steps were performed, however at least one of those steps could result in the verification callback being triggered and existing code breaking. Issue noticed by Raf Czlonka when attempting to connect to talk.google.com using profanity (which does not set SNI and ends up receiving an invalid certificate). ok beck@ deraadt@ tb@
* jumping into the x509 fray with a bunch of whitespace repairderaadt2020-09-261-6/+6
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* Ensure chain is set on the X509_STORE_CTX before triggering callback.jsing2020-09-231-12/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | Various software expects the previous behaviour where the certificate chain is available on the X509_STORE_CTX when the verify callback is triggered. Issue hit by bket@ with lastpass-cli which has built in certificate pinning that is checked via the verify callback. Fix confirmed by bket@. ok beck@
* Fix some line wrapping and other whitespace issues.tb2020-09-211-45/+34
| | | | No change in the generated assembly on amd64.
* Move freeing and zeroing up to right after the while loop.tb2020-09-211-5/+5
| | | | Requested by jsing
* Avoid memleak caused by shadowingtb2020-09-201-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | The outer scope in x509_constraints_extract_names() contains a vname variable which will be freed on error, but an inner scope contains another vname that won't be freed, e.g., if x509_constraints_names_add fails. Found by llvm scan-build. ok beck
* KNF/whitespace nitstb2020-09-202-6/+7
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* Correct a 1 byte read overflow in x509_contraints_uri and addbeck2020-09-201-4/+9
| | | | | | | | regress to catch it in the future. found by Guido Vranken's cryptofuzzer ok tb@
* Fix a memory leak in x509_constraints_extract_namestb2020-09-201-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If the default path of the switch is taken, vname will not be added to the names list and will leak when it is set to NULL. Simplify the logic by eliminating the add Boolean. Instead, free and zero vname in the default case and continue the while loop directly. At the bottom of the switch, add vname to the names list unconditionally zero it out since it's now owned by names. Found by Guido Vranken's cryptofuzzer ok beck
* remove superfluous NULL checkbeck2020-09-191-2/+2
| | | | ok tb@
* Fix potential overflow in CN subject line parsing, thanks tobeck2020-09-181-4/+5
| | | | | | | | ASN1_STRING - the gift that keeps on giving. Found by Guido Vranken's cryptofuzzer. ok tb@
* revert my putting this on a diet. sadly the NAME_CONSTRAINTS_checkbeck2020-09-161-7/+1
| | | | symbol is exposed api and we probably need to deprecate it thoughtfully.
* noop NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check stubinoguchi2020-09-161-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | On OSX and Windows platform portable build fails since it can't find NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check. It is still remain in x509v3.h and Symbols.list but '#if 0'ed from x509_ncons.c. In this situation, some platforms appears to get error. Add noop NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check stub to solve this issue. ok beck@
* Make check in x509_verify_ctx_set_max_signatures() consistent with others.jsing2020-09-161-4/+2
| | | | ok beck@
* Dedup code in x509_verify_ctx_new_from_xsc().jsing2020-09-161-14/+7
| | | | | | | Rather than duplicating code, have x509_verify_ctx_new_from_xsc() call x509_verify_ctx_new(), then handle the xsc specific parts. ok beck@
* set error_depth and current_cert to make more legacy callbacks that don't checkbeck2020-09-151-1/+3
| | | | | | happy ok tb@
* Deduplicate the time validation code between the legacy and newbeck2020-09-153-27/+8
| | | | | | verification code. ok jsing@
* ifdef out code that is no longer used in here. once we are certainbeck2020-09-151-2/+5
| | | | | | of staying with the new name constraint code this will be deleted ok jsing@
* Set error if we are given an NULL ctx in x509_verify, and set errorbeck2020-09-141-5/+3
| | | | | | | | to X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM instead of UNSPECIFIED in chain_append when allocation fails. noticed by ingo@ ok tb@
* nuke a stray spacetb2020-09-141-2/+2
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* Fix potential leak when tmpext fails to be added tobeck2020-09-141-2/+6
| | | | | | | the extension list. found by llvm static analyzer ok tb@
* remove unneeded variable "type".beck2020-09-141-6/+5
| | | | | Yak for my shaving pleasure found by llvm static analyzer ok tb@
* Don't leak names on successbeck2020-09-141-1/+2
| | | | | found by llvm static analyzer. ok tb@
* remove unneded variable "time1"beck2020-09-141-6/+6
| | | | | noticed by llvm static analyzer ok tb@
* remove unneded variable "time"beck2020-09-141-3/+2
| | | | | noticed by llvm static analyzer ok tb@
* fix bug introduced on review where refactor made it possible tobeck2020-09-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | eat a NULL. found by clang static analyzer ok tb@
* re-enable new x509 chain verifier as the defaultbeck2020-09-141-3/+1
| | | | ok tb@
* Correctly fix double free introduced on review.beck2020-09-142-3/+3
| | | | | | | the roots for a ctx are only freed in the free function, not in the clear function, so that a ctx can be re-used with the same roots. ok tb@
* Fix double free - review moved the pop_free of roots to x509_verify_ctx_freebeck2020-09-141-2/+1
| | | | so we don't need to pop free the roots separately
* revert previous, need to fix a problembeck2020-09-141-1/+3
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* Enable the use of the new x509 chain validator by default.beck2020-09-141-3/+1
| | | | ok jsing@ tb@
* Add new x509 certificate chain validator in x509_verify.cbeck2020-09-139-57/+1188
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The new validator finds multiple validated chains to handle the modern PKI cases which may frequently have multiple paths via different intermediates to different roots. It is loosely based on golang's x509 validator This includes integration so that the new validator can be used via X509_verify_cert() as well as a new api x509_verify() which will return multiple chains (similar to go). The new validator is not enabled by default with this commit, this will be changed in a follow on commit. The new public API is not yet exposed, and will be finalized and exposed with a man page and a library minor bump later. ok tb@ inoguchi@ jsing@
* Change over to use the new x509 name constraints verification.beck2020-09-121-28/+7
| | | | ok jsing@
* Add x509_constraints.c - a new implementation of x509 name constraints, withbeck2020-09-112-0/+1270
| | | | | | | regression tests. The use of the new name constraints is not yet activated in x509_vfy.c and will be activated in a follow on commit ok jsing@
* Add issuer cache, to be used by upcoming changes to validation code.beck2020-09-112-0/+214
| | | | ok tb@ jsing@
* Remove remaining error *_str_functs[]jsing2020-06-051-66/+2
| | | | | | | | | A number of years ago we dropped the concept of having function names in errors, since it is not that useful and very quickly gets out of sync when refactoring. It would seem that some new ones got imported and some missed the last clean up. ok tb@ beck@ "kill it with fire"
* One error file per directory is plenty.jsing2020-06-052-227/+155
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* Collapse the x509v3 directory into x509.jsing2020-06-0437-0/+13636
| | | | | | | This avoids the need to grep across directories to find functions and prepares for further rototilling and chainsawing. Discussed with tb@ (who also tested the release build)
* When building a chain look for non-expired certificates first.jsing2020-05-311-8/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, when building a certificate chain we look up an issuer and if it is the only issuer certificate available we still use it even if it has expired. When X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST is not in use, untrusted certificates are processed first and if one of these happens to be expired it will be used to build the chain, even if there is another non-expired option in the trusted store. Rework this code so that we first look for a non-expired untrusted certificate. If one does not exist then we take a look in the trusted store to see if we would be able to build the chain and only if there is not, do we then look for an expired untrusted certificate. This makes certificate validation possible for various sites that are serving expired AddTrust certificates. Issue reported by Christian Heimes via GitHub. ok beck@ tb@
* add stdlib.h for reallocarraybcook2019-05-231-1/+2
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* Fix a number of ASN1_INTEGER vs ASN1_STRING mixups coming from thetb2019-03-131-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | mechanical M_ASN1 macro expansion. The ASN1_INTEGER_cmp function takes signs into account while ASN1_STRING_cmp doesn't. The mixups mostly involve serialNumbers, which, in principle, should be positive. However, it is unclear whether that is checked or enforced anywhere in the code, so these are probably bugs. Patch from Holger Mikolon ok jsing
* Typo in comment.tb2019-03-061-2/+2
| | | | From Holger Mikolon
* Add const to EVP_PKCS82PKEY().tb2018-08-241-2/+2
| | | | | tested in a bulk by sthen ok jsing
* After removing support for broken PKCS#8 formats (it was high time),tb2018-08-241-8/+5
| | | | | | | | we can add const to PKCS8_pkey_get0(). In order for this to work, we need to sprinkle a few consts here and there. tested in a bulk by sthen ok jsing
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