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* Remove X509_TRUST extensibilitytb2024-01-071-102/+10
| | | | | | | | This is pretty much identical to the X509_PURPOSE case: remove the stack used for extending and overriding the trust table and make X509_TRUST_add() always fail. Simplify some other bits accordingly. ok jsing
* Remove X509_CRL_METHOD internalstb2024-01-061-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Another complication of dubious value that nobody's ever used. crl_init(), crl_free() and the meth_data are dead weight, as are their accessors. Inline def_crl_verify() in X509_CRL_verify() so that the latter becomes the trivial wrapper of ASN1_item_verify() that one would expect it to be. It is quite unclear what kind of customization would make sense here... def_crl_lookup() is renamed into crl_lookup() and its two callers, X509_CRL_lookup_by_{serial,cert}(), are moved below it so that we don't need a prototype. ok jsing
* Remove X509_PURPOSE extensibilitytb2024-01-061-112/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Another bit of global state without lock protection. The by now familiar complications of a stack to make this user configurable, which, of course, no one ever did. The table is not currently const, and the API exposes its entries directly, so anyone can modify it. This fits very well with the safety guarantees of Rust's 'static lifetime, which is how rust-openssl exposes it (for no good reason). Remove the stack and make the X509_PURPOSE_add() API always fail. Simplify the other bits accordingly. In addition, this API inflicts the charming difference between purpose identifiers and purpose indexes (the former minus one) onto the user. Neither of the two obvious solutions to avoid this trap seems to have crossed the implementer's mind. ok jsing
* KNF nittb2023-12-311-2/+2
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* Sort the NIDs by nametb2023-12-311-8/+8
| | | | requested by jsing
* Replace the sorted extensions lookup with a switchtb2023-12-311-58/+23
| | | | | | | | | If all you have is OBJ_bsearch_(), everything looks like a nail. This changes a binary search over a list of 12 elements with a lookup via a switch. switch suggested by claudio ok jsing
* Make x509_issuer_cache_free_oldest() statictb2023-12-301-2/+2
| | | | | This is an internal function and you can't hold the required mutex to call it anyway since that's internal, too.
* One more missing void was hiding heretb2023-12-301-2/+2
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* Some BoringSSL devs spent too much time with C++tb2023-12-302-4/+4
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* Use a void pointer rather than char for method_datatb2023-12-292-9/+7
| | | | | This way we don't need to cast from BY_DIR * to char * and back in its only consumer, the lovely by_dir.
* Remove the unused init flag of X509_LOOKUPtb2023-12-291-2/+1
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* X509_LOOKUP_shutdown() became a noop.tb2023-12-271-2/+1
| | | | | | | That we are still calling this (NB without error check because heritage), made coverity unhappy. CID 471705
* Remove unused X509_LOOKUP_METHODstb2023-12-255-43/+12
| | | | | | | | None of these function pointers were ever set. Now that the structure is opaque they won't ever be, so time for them to hit the bitbucket. Infinite extensibility of the toolkit results in complications, bugs, and dead code. ok jsing
* Prefix get_trusted_issuer() with x509_vfy_tb2023-12-231-4/+3
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* Rename check_hosts()tb2023-12-221-3/+3
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* Replace check_trust() with its x509_vfy_ prefixed wrappertb2023-12-221-11/+4
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* Replace check_chain_extensions() with its x509_vfy_ wrappertb2023-12-221-8/+2
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* Replace check_id() with its x509_vfy_check_id() wrappertb2023-12-221-9/+4
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* Remove a bunch of function pointers from X509_STORE_CTXtb2023-12-222-42/+18
| | | | | | | | | These are only ever set to one particular function which is either local to this file or part of the public API and we never added the public API to set them to something else. Prefix the local functions touched in this commit with x509_vfy_. More cleanup to follow. ok joshua jsing
* Remove cleanup() and get_crl() from X509_STORE_CTXtb2023-12-222-15/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Remove unused function pointers from X509_STOREtb2023-12-222-55/+11
| | | | | | | | | The struct underlying the X509_STORE type is opaque ars and nothing uses the accessors that OpenSSL added blindly for these. Therefore we didn't add them in the first place. So this rips out several dozens of lines of dead code. ok beck joshua jsing
* Fix sk_deep_copy() implementationtb2023-12-141-32/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sk_deep_copy() is bad code. It is less bad than the upstream code, but still bad: it passes strdup() through a void pointer and assigns it to a function pointer of different type before calling the latter. That's not kosher in more than one way. There is no need for such gymnastics. If we need a deep copy for a type, we should implement it as appropriate for that type. Also, we should not expect and even less so allow holes in a STACK_OF(). The only way the vpm->hosts can be populated is by way of this deep_copy function or x509_param_set_hosts_internal(), which pushes only after a non-NULL check. Invariants: they're useful. ok jsing
* Clean up and de-spaghettize by_file_callbackbeck2023-11-301-21/+15
| | | | | | | I had to read this for other purposes and it exceeded my muppetry tolerance. ok tb@
* Move the callers X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() down a bittb2023-11-271-15/+15
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* Make X509_certificate_type() less badtb2023-11-131-24/+29
| | | | | | | This converts to proper single exit and undoes a number of unnecessarily silly muppet antics. ok beck
* Garbage collect an incoherent export crypto checktb2023-11-131-4/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Contrast "#define EVP_PKT_EXP 0x1000 /* <= 512 bit key */" with the diff: - /* /8 because it's 1024 bits we look for, not bytes */ - if (EVP_PKEY_size(pk) <= 1024 / 8) - ret |= EVP_PKT_EXP; EVP_PKT_EXP will be nuked at the next opportunity. discussed with jsing
* Use a sensible variable name (i.e. nid) instead of i for a NIDtb2023-11-131-5/+6
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* Use X509_get_signature_nid() instead of inlining ittb2023-11-131-2/+2
| | | | ok beck jsing
* X509_certificate_type() needs to know about RSA-PSStb2023-11-131-1/+4
| | | | | | | This doesn't do much right now, but is part of the tangle that is adding RSA-PSS support. ok beck jsing
* Eliminate the timegm(3) dependency in libcryptotb2023-11-134-19/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | timegm(3) is not available on some operating systems we support in portable. We currently use musl's implementation, for which gcc-13 decided to emit warnings (which seem incorrect in general and are irrelevant in this case anyway). Instead of patching this up and diverge from upstream, we can avoid reports about compiler warnings by simply not depending on this function. Rework the caching of notBefore and notAfter by replacing timegm(3) with asn1_time_tm_to_time_t(3). Also make this API properly error checkable since at the time x509v3_cache_extensions(3) is called, nothing is known about the cert, in particular not whether it isn't malformed one way or the other. suggested by and ok beck
* Fix a few bugs in X509v3_asid_add*()tb2023-11-111-38/+96
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These 'builder' functions, usually used together, can result in corrupt ASIdentifiers on failure. In general, no caller should ever try to recover from OpenSSL API failure. There are simply too many traps. We can still make an effort to leave the objects in unmodified state on failure. This is tricky because ownership transfer happens. Unfortunately a really clean version of this seems impossible, maybe a future iteration will bring improvements... The nasty bit here is that the caller of X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range() can't know from the return value whether ownership of min and max was transferred or not. An inspection of (*choice)->u.range is required. If a caller frees min and max after sk_ASIdOrRange_push() failed, there is a double free. All these complications could have been avoided if the API interface had simply used uint32_t instead of ASN1_INTEGERs. The entire RFC 3779 API was clearly written without proper review. I don't know if there ever was an actual consumer before rpki-client. If it existed, nobody with the requisite skill set looked at it in depth. ok beck for the general direction with a lot of input and ok jsing
* Fix a few bizarre line wraps in x509.htb2023-11-021-8/+5
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* Add X509_ALGOR_set0_by_nid()tb2023-11-011-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | X509_ALGOR_set0() is annoyingly unergonomic since it takes an ASN1_OBJECT rather than a nid. This means that almost all callers call OBJ_obj2nid() and they often do this inline without error checking so that the resulting X509_ALGOR object is corrupted and may lead to incorrect encodings. Provide an internal alternative X509_ALGOR_set0_by_nid() that takes a nid instead of an ASN1_OBJECT and performs proper error checking. This will be used to convert callers of X509_ALGOR_set0() in the library. ok jsing
* Fix an error exit in X509v3_addr_validate_path()tb2023-10-291-3/+6
| | | | | | | | If the topmost cert is invalid, this should result in a validation failure. Do the same dance as elsewhere permitting the verify callback to intercept the error but ensuring that we throw an error. ok jsing
* Hide X509_ALGOR_set_md() for LIBRESSL_INTERNALtb2023-10-261-1/+3
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* Add internal version of X509_ALGOR_set_md()tb2023-10-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X509_ALGOR_set_md() is a void function that cannot easily be error checked. The caller has to jump through hoops to make sure this function doesn't fail. Prepare replacing this internally with X509_ALGOR_set_evp_md(), which allows error checking. There is one slight change of behavior: if the EVP_MD object passed in does not have an OID known to the library, then this new API fails. It is unclear what the library should do with such an object and people who use EVP_MD_meth_new() need to know what they are doing anyway and they are better off teaching the lib about the OID if they're going to be messing with certs. Oh, and the prototype is in x509_local.h because the rest of this API is in x509.h despite being implemented in asn1/. ok jsing
* Allow IP addresses to be specified in a URI.beck2023-09-292-15/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | Our checking here was a bit too aggressive, and did not permit an IP address in a URI. IP's in a URI are allowed for things like CRLdp's AIA, SAN URI's etc.). The check for this was also slightly flawed as we would permit an IP if memory allocation failed while checking for an IP. Correct both issues. ok tb@
* RFC 3779: stop pretending we support AFIs other than IPv4 and IPv6tb2023-09-271-19/+28
| | | | | | | This code is a complete bug fest and using it with any other AFI is downright dangerous. Such don't arise in this context in practice. ok claudio jsing
* Back out superfluous initializationjob2023-09-111-5/+4
| | | | requested by jsing@
* Initialize afi & safi to zerojob2023-09-061-4/+5
| | | | OK tb@
* Avoid use-of-uninitialized in i2r_IPAddrBlocks()tb2023-09-061-1/+8
| | | | | | | Reported by Viktor Szakats in https://github.com/libressl/portable/issues/910 ok job
* Fix leaks in copy_issuer()tb2023-08-301-8/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The stack of subject alternative names from the issuer is parsed using X509V3_EXT_d2i(), so it must be freed with sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(). It's not worth doing complicated ownership handling when the individual alternative names can be copied with GENERAL_NAME_dup(). Previously, ialt and its remaining members would be leaked when the call to sk_GENERAL_NAME_push() failed halfway through. This is only reachable via the issuer:copy x509v3.cnf(5) directive. ok jsing
* Check X509_digest() return in x509v3_cache_extensions()tb2023-08-181-2/+3
| | | | | | | | On failure invalidate the cert with EXFLAG_INVALID. It's unlikely that a cert would make it through to the end of this function without setting the flag, but it's bad style anyway. ok jsing
* Stop including ecdsa.h and ecdh.h internallytb2023-07-281-7/+1
| | | | | | | | These headers are now reduced to #include <openssl/ec.h> and are provided for compatiblity only. There's no point in using them. At the same time garbage collect the last uses of OPENSSL_NO_{ECDSA,ECDH} in our tree. ok jsing
* Convert some tables to C99 initializerstb2023-07-022-21/+114
| | | | ok & "happy pirate day" beck
* x509v3.h: unwrap a linetb2023-06-251-3/+2
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* Check for duplicate X.509v3 extension OIDstb2023-06-251-1/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Per RFC 5280, 4.2: A certificate MUST NOT include more than one instance of a particular extension. This implements such a check in x509v3_cache_extensions() by sorting the list of extensions and looking for duplicate neighbors. This sidesteps complications from extensions we do not know about and keeps algorithmic complexity reasonable. If the check fails, EXFLAG_INVALID is set on the certificate, which means that the verifier will not validate it. ok jsing
* Remove some redundant parenthesestb2023-06-231-17/+17
| | | | This file is already enough of an eyesore without them.
* Improve certificate version checks in x509v3_cache_extensions()tb2023-06-201-4/+11
| | | | | | | | | Only allow version v1-v3, disallow issuerUID and subjectUID in v1 certs and require that if X509v3 extensions are present that the cert be v3. Initial diff from job ok job jsing
* Teach the grotty X509_certificate_type() about Ed25519 certstb2023-06-151-1/+4
| | | | ok jsing
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