| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
... | |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Improved patch from Cesar Pereida. See
https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/pull/61 for more details.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
Mistake noted by Billy Brumley. Many thanks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
in constant time even if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set. This issue
was reported by Cesar Pereida (Aalto University), Billy Brumley
(Tampere University of Technology), and Yuval Yarom (The University of
Adelaide and NICTA). The fix was developed by Cesar Pereida.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
14 years ago these were changed in OpenSSL to be the same
as the _ex functions. We use the _ex functions only internally
to ensure it is obvious the ctx must be cleared.
ok bcook@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
and non-utf8 bytes escaped.
ok sthen@
|
|
|
|
| |
The outer while() loop is missing, so we only read up to chunk_max bytes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
hppa reverse-stack gives us a valuable test case, but most developers don't
have a 2nd one to proceed further with this.
ok kettenis
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
additionally, in EncodeUpdate, if the amount written would overflow,
return 0 instead to prevent bugs in the caller.
CVE-2016-2105 and CVE-2016-2106 from openssl.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
for both the mac and padding bytes.
CVE-2016-2107 from openssl
|
|
|
|
| |
CVE-2016-2108 from openssl.
|
|
|
|
| |
CVE-2016-2109 from openssl.
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
missing padding check in aesni functions
overflow in evp encode functions
use of invalid negative asn.1 types
ok beck
|
|
|
|
| |
additions and functionality changes.
|
|
|
|
|
| |
as reading passwords. allow ^C to break.
the pain was mine, the fix is miod's.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
and replace with EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_ietf(). The IETF version will
become the standard version.
Discussed with many.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_ietf().
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
correctly - logically complete that now by removing MLINKS from base;
authors need only to ensure there is an entry in NAME for any function/
util being added. MLINKS will still work, and remain for perl to ease
upgrades;
ok nicm (curses) bcook (ssl)
ok schwarze, who provided a lot of feedback and assistance
ok tb natano jung
|
|
|
|
|
| |
such that the MLINKS removal can be committed after this;
OK jmc@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
returning one (indicating success). Each function has only a single
usage, and both usages check the return value.
Merged from BoringSSL 0ce78a757d815c0dde9ed5884229f3a5b2cb3e9c:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/0ce78a757d815c0dde9ed5884229f3a5b2cb3e9c%5E!/#F0
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
"the" with the obviously intended word.
Started with a "the the" spotted by Mihal Mazurek.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
information
and they should not be a performance bottleneck
ok miod@ krw@
|
|
|
|
| |
Started by diff from Mical Mazurek.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Noted here, https://github.com/libressl-portable/portable/issues/161, we
document a non-existent constant in the examples for
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding.
ok deraadt@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Noticed by pascal-cuoq from Github:
https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/issues/56
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
void return types 'return no value'. This is obvious and therefore
unneccessary to mention.
We spare rewind(3)'s sentence because espie@ pointed out that it's a
warning - the function masks a potential error.
This commit also adds a sentence to X509_free clarifying that it's
NULL-safe. This bit was discussed with doug@.
ok martijn@, sentiment supported by schwarze@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
ok doug@
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
uses a macro with multiple-evaluations of arguments (different amount
than the previous version..), but doug/bcook's inline version makes
BIGNUM not opaque [problem spotted by naddy]
ok doug
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
inspired by guido vranken https://guidovranken.wordpress.com/2016/03/01/public-disclosure-malformed-private-keys-lead-to-heap-corruption-in-b2i_pvk_bio/
ok doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Need to make sure i * 4 won't overflow. Based on OpenSSL:
commit 99ba9fd02fd481eb971023a3a0a251a37eb87e4c
input + ok bcook@
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok deraadt@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Based on a few OpenSSL commits:
Remove ancient DSA workarounds
commit ab4a81f69ec88d06c9d8de15326b9296d7f498ed
Remove workaround for broken DSA implementations using negative integers
commit dfb10af92e9663ce4eefaa1d6b678817fa85344d
Typo in error name (EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR -> DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR)
commit f6fb7f1856d443185c23f1a5968c08b4269dd37d
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
- Add new root certificates present in Mozilla cert store from CA
organizations who are already in cert.pem (AddTrust, Comodo, DigiCert,
Entrust, GeoTrust, USERTrust).
- Replace Startcom's root with their updated sha256 version present in
Mozilla cert store. (They maintained serial# etc so this is still valid
for existing signed certificates).
- Add two root certificates from CA not previously present:
"C=US, O=Network Solutions L.L.C., CN=Network Solutions Certificate Authority"
"C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" (the latter used by yandex.ru)
We are still listing some certificates that have been removed from
Mozilla's store (1024-bit etc) however these cannot be removed until
cert validation is improved (we don't currently accept a certificate
as valid unless the CA is at the end of a chain).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
(CN if available, otherwise OU).
Add a comment identifying the org. Now to get an easy-to-read list
of certificates in the file you can use "grep ^[#=] cert.pem".
Prepared with https://spacehopper.org/format-pem.20160201. If you would
like to verify this commit to ensure that I didn't sneak in any other
changes, it will be easier to use the script rather than do it by hand.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
aren't really useful (the information can be obtained by feeding the cert
into "openssl x509 -in filename -text") and add a separator between certs
showing the CA's CN or OU (similar to the display format in web browsers).
Include both SHA1 and SHA256 fingerprints for all certificates.
ok beck@ zhuk@ jung@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Work around this particular case by reseeding whenever pid=1, but as guenther@
notes, directly calling clone(2), and then forking to match another pid,
provides other ways to bypass new process detection on Linux.
Hopefully at some point Linux implements something like MAP_INHERIT_ZERO, and
does not invent a corresponding mechanism to subvert it.
Noted by Sebastian Krahmer and the opmsg team.
See http://stealth.openwall.net/crypto/randup.c for a test program.
ok beck@
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Authority" (serial 3c:91:31:cb:1f:f6:d0:1b:0e:9a:b8:d0:44:bf:12:be) root
certificate from cert.pem. ok rpe@
Symantec/VeriSign say "Browsers/root store operators are encouraged to
remove/untrust this root from their root stores" and "hasn't been used to
generate new certificates in several years, and will now be repurposed to
provide transition support for some of our enterprise customers' legacy,
non-public applications" (https://www.symantec.com/page.jsp?id=roots,
http://www.scmagazine.com/google-will-remove-trust-of-symantecs-pca3-g1-certificate/article/459688/).
Also see
https://knowledge.symantec.com/support/ssl-certificates-support/index?page=content&id=ALERT1941
https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2015/12/proactive-measures-in-digital.html
|
|
|
|
| |
ok guenther@
|