| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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A bug in the implementation of the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm can lead to
an infinite loop. This loop can be hit in various ways, in particular on
decompressing an elliptic curve public key via EC_POINT_oct2point() - to
do this, one must solve y^2 = x^3 + ax + b for y, given x.
If a certificate uses explicit encoding for elliptic curve parameters,
this operation needs to be done during certificate verification, leading
to a DoS. In particular, everything dealing with untrusted certificates
is affected, notably TLS servers explicitly configured to request
client certificates (httpd, smtpd, various VPN implementations, ...).
Ordinary TLS servers do not consume untrusted certificates.
The problem is that we cannot assume that x^3 + ax + b is actually a
square on untrusted input and neither can we assume that the modulus
p is a prime. Ensuring that p is a prime is too expensive (it would
likely itself lead to a DoS). To avoid the infinite loop, fix the logic
to be more resilient and explicitly limit the number of iterations that
can be done. The bug is such that the infinite loop can also be hit for
primes = 3 (mod 4) but fortunately that case is optimized earlier.
It's also worth noting that there is a size bound on the field size
enforced via OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS (= 661), which help mitigate
further DoS vectors in presence of this fix.
Reported by Tavis Ormandy and David Benjamin, Google
Patch based on the fixes by David Benjamin and Tomas Mraz, OpenSSL
ok beck inoguchi
This is errata/7.0/016_bignum.patch.sig
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certificate chain. This would happen when the verification callback was
in use, instructing the verifier to continue unconditionally. This could
lead to incorrect decisions being made in software.
This is patches/common/006_x509.patch.sig
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and OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE
from OpenSSL commit 146ca72c Feb 19 14:35:43 2015 +0000
after tb@ changed the default from 0 to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE
in ec/ec_lib.c rev. 1.41,
which is the same default that OpenSSL uses since 1.1.0.
While merging, drop the description of the pre-1.1.0 behaviour.
It seems irrelevant to me because tb@ found no application in Debian
codesearch using OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE. A former devious default
that was probably never relied upon by anyone does not need to be
documented.
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as in all other palces. Check the EXFLAG_SET flag first and if not set
grab the CRYPTO_LOCK_X509 before calling x509v3_cache_extensions().
OK tb@ beck@
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The pre-OpenSSL 1.1.0 default was to use explicit curve parameter
encoding. Most applications want to use named curve parameter encoding
and have to opt into this explicitly.
Stephen Henson changed this default in OpenSSL commit 86f300d3 6 years
ago and provided a new OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE define to opt back into
the old default. According to Debian's codesearch, no application
currently does this, which indicates that we currently have a bad default.
In the future it is more likely that applications expect the new
default, so we follow OpenSSL to avoid problems.
Prompted by schwarze who noted that OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE is missing.
ok beck inoguchi jsing
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branch, which is still under a free license.
While here, also merge a few other improvements, mostly regarding
EC_GROUP_get_order(3) and EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(3); in particular,
some statements below RETURN VALUES were outright wrong.
This patch includes a few minor tweaks and an addition to HISTORY by me.
Feedback and OK tb@.
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OK tb@
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and BN_lebin2bn(3) from the OpenSSL 1.1.1 branch,
which is still under a free license.
While here, tweak a number of details for clarity.
OK tb@
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automatically initializes itself. OK tb@
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'may as well' deraadt
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ok beck inoguchi jsing
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BN_rand_range()
From OpenSSL 1.1.1l
ok beck jsing
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ok beck jsing
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ok beck inoguchi
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ok beck jsing
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ok beck jsing
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has decided to change a succeess to a failure and change the error code.
Fixes a regression in the openssl-ruby tests which expect to test this
functionality.
ok tb@
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ok jsing
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Free ec->key before reassigning it.
From OpenSSL 1.1.1, 58e1e397
ok inoguchi
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As found by jsg and patrick, this is needed for newer uboot and
will also be used in upcoming elliptic curve work.
This is from OpenSSL 1.1.1l with minor style tweaks.
ok beck inoguchi
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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No functional changes.
OK tb@
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OK tb@ jsing@ beck@
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(subordinate code paths are include guarded)
OK tb@
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when we succeed with a chain, and ensure we do not call the callback
twice when the caller doesn't expect it. A refactor of the end of
the legacy verify code in x509_vfy is probably overdue, but this
should be done based on a piece that works. the important bit here
is this allows the perl regression tests in tree to pass.
Changes the previously committed regress tests to test the success
case callbacks to be known to pass.
ok bluhm@ tb@
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OK @tb
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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The conversion tool didn't handle 'static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END'
OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK beck@ tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK jsing@
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Feedback from tb@
OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK tb@
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OK jsing@
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OK jsing@
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OK tb@ jsing@
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Identifiers
These extensions are defined in RFC 3779 and used in the RPKI (RFC 6482, RFC 8360).
Imported from OpenSSL 1.1.1j (aaf2fcb575cdf6491b98ab4829abf78a3dec8402b8b81efc8f23c00d443981bf)
This changeset is a no-op, as there are 10+ issues and at least 2 security issues.
Work will continue in-tree.
OK tb@, discussed with beck@
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ok tb@
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