summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/lib/libcrypto (follow)
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
...
* KNFtb2021-02-111-4/+7
|
* Add OID for draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeedsjob2021-02-032-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds describes a mechanism to authenticate RFC 8805 Geofeed data files through the RPKI. OpenSSL counterpart https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14050 OK tb@ jsing@
* Add a bunch of RPKI OIDsjob2021-02-022-1/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | RFC6482 - A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) RFC6484 - Certificate Policy (CP) for the RPKI RFC6493 - The RPKI Ghostbusters Record RFC8182 - The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) RFC8360 - RPKI Validation Reconsidered draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta - A profile for RTAs Also in OpenSSL: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d3372c2f35495d0c61ab09daf7fba3ecbbb595aa OK sthen@ tb@ jsing@
* Set chain on xsc on chain build failure.jsing2021-01-091-1/+3
| | | | | | | | Prior to calling the callback, ensure that the current (invalid and likely incomplete) chain is set on the xsc. Some things (like auto chain) depend on this functionality. ok beck@
* Bail out early after finding an single chain if we are have been called frombeck2021-01-091-1/+9
| | | | | | | | x509_vfy and have an xsc. There's no point in finding more chains since that API can not return them, and all we do is trigger buggy callbacks in calling software. ok jsing@
* search the intermediates only after searching the root certs, clarifybeck2021-01-081-11/+15
| | | | | | | this in the comments. helps avoid annoying situations with the legacy callback ok jsing@
* Handle X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE in new verifier.jsing2021-01-051-1/+4
| | | | | | Yet another mostly meaningless error value... Noted by and ok tb@
* Gracefully handle root certificates being both trusted and untrusted.jsing2021-01-052-4/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a certificate (namely a root) is specified as both a trusted and untrusted certificate, the new verifier will find multiple chains - the first being back to the trusted root certificate and a second via the root that is untrusted, followed by the trusted root certificate. This situation can be triggered by a server that (unnecessarily) includes the root certificate in its certificate list. While this validates correctly (using the first chain), it means that we encounter a failure while building the second chain due to the root certificate already being in the chain. When this occurs we call the verify callback indicating a bad certificate. Some sensitive software (including bacula and icinga), treat this single bad chain callback as terminal, even though we successfully verify the certificate. Avoid this problem by simply dumping the chain if we encounter a situation where the certificate is already in the chain and also a trusted root - we'll have already picked up the trusted root as a shorter path. Issue with icinga2 initially reported by Theodore Wynnychenko. Fix tested by sthen@ for both bacula and icinga2. ok tb@
* double word fix; from martin vahlensieckjmc2021-01-052-6/+6
|
* Remove two reduntat memset calls.tb2020-12-162-5/+2
| | | | pointed out by jsing
* Avoid potential use of uninitialized in ASN1_time_parsetb2020-12-161-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | When parsing an UTCTime into a struct tm that wasn't cleared by the caller, the years would be added to the already present value, which could give an incorrect result. This is an issue in ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(), which is practically unused. Fix this by always zeroing the passed struct tm. Issue reported by Olivier Taïbi, thanks! ok jsing
* Fix some KNF issuestb2020-12-161-7/+8
|
* LibreSSL 3.3.1libressl-v3.3.1bcook2020-12-081-3/+3
|
* Fix a NULL dereference in GENERAL_NAME_cmp()tb2020-12-086-11/+94
| | | | | | | | | | | | Comparing two GENERAL_NAME structures containing an EDIPARTYNAME can lead to a crash. This enables a denial of service attack for an attacker who can control both sides of the comparison. Issue reported to OpenSSL on Nov 9 by David Benjamin. OpenSSL shared the information with us on Dec 1st. Fix from Matt Caswell (OpenSSL) with a few small tweaks. ok jsing
* Move point-on-curve check to set_affine_coordinatestb2020-12-044-18/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Bad API design makes it possible to set an EC_KEY public key to a point not on the curve. As a consequence, it was possible to have bogus ECDSA signatures validated. In practice, all software uses either EC_POINT_oct2point*() to unmarshal public keys or issues a call to EC_KEY_check_key() after setting it. This way, a point on curve check is performed and the problem is mitigated. In OpenSSL commit 1e2012b7ff4a5f12273446b281775faa5c8a1858, Emilia Kasper moved the point-on-curve check from EC_POINT_oct2point to EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_*, which results in more checking. In addition to this commit, we also check in the currently unused codepath of a user set callback for setting compressed coordinates, just in case this will be used at some point in the future. The documentation of EC_KEY_check_key() is very vague on what it checks and when checks are needed. It could certainly be improved a lot. It's also strange that EC_KEY_set_key() performs no checks, while EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates() implicitly calls EC_KEY_check_key(). It's a mess. Issue found and reported by Guido Vranken who also tested an earlier version of this fix. ok jsing
* grammar fixes from Varik "The Genuine Article!!!" Valefor;jmc2020-12-032-6/+6
|
* Avoid undefined behavior due to memcpy(NULL, NULL, 0)tb2020-11-251-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | This happens if name->der_len == 0. Since we already have a length check, we can malloc and memcpy inside the conditional. This also makes the code easier to read. agreement from millert ok jsing
* Plug leak in x509_verify_chain_dup()tb2020-11-181-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x509_verify_chain_new() allocates a few members of a certificate chain: an empty stack of certificates, a list of errors encountered while validating the chain, and a list of name constraints. The function to copy a chain would allocate a new chain using x509_verify_chain_new() and then clobber its members by copies of the old chain. Fix this by replacing x509_verify_chain_new() with calloc(). Found by review while investigating the report by Hanno Zysik who found the same leak using valgrind. This is a cleaner version of my initial fix from jsing. ok jsing
* Plug a big memory leak in the new validatortb2020-11-181-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The legacy validator would only call x509_vfy_check_policy() once at the very end after cobbling together a chain. Therefore it didn't matter that X509_policy_check() always allocates a new tree on top of the one that might have been passed in. This is in stark contrast to other, similar APIs in this code base. The new validator calls this function several times over while building its chains. This adds up to a sizable leak in the new validator. Reported with a reproducer by Hanno Zysik on github, who also bisected this to the commit enabling the new validator. Narrowed down to x509_vfy_check_policy() by jsing. We simultaenously came up with a functionally identical fix. ok jsing
* zap ugly empty line before closing bracetb2020-11-181-2/+1
|
* Move freeing of the verify context to its natural place instead oftb2020-11-181-2/+2
| | | | | | a few lines after. stylistic nit from jsing
* KNF (whitespace)tb2020-11-184-13/+13
|
* bump to 3.3.0bcook2020-11-181-3/+3
|
* Use X509_V_OK instead of 0.jsing2020-11-161-4/+3
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Add back an X509_STORE_CTX error code assignment.jsing2020-11-161-2/+3
| | | | | | | | This was inadvertently removed in r1.19. Spotted by tb@ ok beck@ tb@
* Return the specific failure for a "self signed certificate" in the chainbeck2020-11-151-1/+14
| | | | | | | | | in order to be compatible with the openssl error craziness in the legacy verifier case. This will fix a regress problem noticed by znc ok tb@
* Handle additional certificate error cases in new X.509 verifier.jsing2020-11-112-12/+79
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the old verifier, the verify callback can always return 1 instructing the verifier to simply continue regardless of a certificate verification failure (e.g. the certificate is expired or revoked). This would result in a chain being built, however the first error encountered would be persisted, which allows the caller to build the chain, have the verification process succeed, yet upon inspecting the error code note that the chain is not valid for some reason. Mimic this behaviour by keeping track of certificate errors while building chains - when we finish verification, find the certificate error closest to the leaf certificate and expose that via the X509_STORE_CTX. There are various corner cases that we also have to handle, like the fact that we keep an certificate error until we find the issuer, at which point we have to clear it. Issue reported by Ilya Shipitcin due to failing haproxy regression tests. With much discussion and input from beck@ and tb@! ok beck@ tb@
* Update getentropy on Windows to use Cryptography Next Generation (CNG).bcook2020-11-111-18/+9
| | | | | wincrypt is deprecated and no longer works with newer Windows environments, such as in Windows Store apps.
* Fix bad indent.jsing2020-11-031-7/+6
|
* Hook X509_STORE_CTX get_issuer() callback from new X509 verifier.jsing2020-11-031-3/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | If we fail to find a parent certificate from either the supplied roots or intermediates and we have a X509_STORE_CTX, call its get_issuer() callback to see if it can supply a suitable certificate. This makes things like certificates by directory (aka by_dir) work correctly. Issue noted by Uwe Werler <uwe@werler.is> ok beck@ tb@
* typo: ASN1_parse_time -> ASN1_time_parsetb2020-11-021-3/+3
|
* Add a safety net to ensure that we set an error on the store context.tb2020-10-261-1/+3
| | | | Suggested by and discussed with beck
* If x509_verify() fails, ensure that the error is also set on the storetb2020-10-261-10/+15
| | | | | | | context. This is what is returned in SSL_get_verify_result(). Spotted and initial diff from jeremy; discussed with jsing ok beck
* Make sure that x509_vfy_check_id() failure also sets ctx->error, not onlytb2020-10-261-3/+8
| | | | | | ctx->xsc->error. Will be needed in an upcoming diff. from beck
* Stop documenting some functions as macros.tb2020-10-213-19/+7
| | | | | | | In x509.h r1.70 (2018/08/24) I turned some macros into actual functions to follow what OpenSSL is doing since 1.1.0. The documentation still claims that they are implemented as macros. Update a doc sync commit hash while there.
* make fixed-sized fixed-value mib[] arrays be constderaadt2020-10-122-8/+4
| | | | ok guenther tb millert
* Fix leak or double free with OCSP_request_add0_id()tb2020-10-091-8/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On success, OCSP_request_add0_id() transfers ownership of cid to either 'one' or 'req' depending on whether the latter is NULL or not. On failure, the caller can't tell whether OCSP_ONEREQ_new() failed (in which case cid needs to be freed) or whether it was a failure to allocate memory in sk_insert() (in which case cid must not be freed). The caller is thus faced with the choice of leaving either a leak or a potential double free. Fix this by transferring ownership only at the end of the function. Found while reviewing an upcoming diff by beck. ok jsing
* Ensure leaf is set up on X509_STORE_CTX before verification.jsing2020-09-261-9/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously the leaf certificate was only being set up on the X509_STORE_CTX after two verification steps were performed, however at least one of those steps could result in the verification callback being triggered and existing code breaking. Issue noticed by Raf Czlonka when attempting to connect to talk.google.com using profanity (which does not set SNI and ends up receiving an invalid certificate). ok beck@ deraadt@ tb@
* jumping into the x509 fray with a bunch of whitespace repairderaadt2020-09-261-6/+6
|
* bump to LibreSSL 3.2.2 ahead of lockbcook2020-09-251-3/+3
| | | | ok tb@
* KNF for a few comments and indent a labeltb2020-09-251-8/+12
|
* Remove some dangling elses for consistency with the rest of the filetb2020-09-251-25/+19
|
* Simplify UI_new_method()tb2020-09-251-10/+4
| | | | | Use calloc() instead of malloc() and setting all members manually to 0. Avoid unnecessary else branch.
* Move variable declaration to the top of UI_set_result and ditchtb2020-09-251-19/+16
| | | | | | a pointless local scope. suggested by jsing
* The default branch of a switch somehow got moved inside of a pointlesstb2020-09-251-3/+3
| | | | | | | | local scope of a case branch. Move it into the proper location. No binary change on amd64. "sure" jsing
* Simplify call to ERR_print_errors_cb()tb2020-09-251-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | There is no reason for print_error()'s third argument to be a UI *. It may just as well be a void * to match what ERR_print_errors_cb() expects. This avoids casting the function pointer. Also, there's no need for a (void *) cast. ok jsing
* Error out if ok_chars and cancel_chars overlaptb2020-09-241-2/+4
| | | | | | | It is a bit silly to push an error on the stack without erroring out, so error out if the ok_chars and cancel_chars overlap. ok jsing
* Fix a number of leaks in the UI_dup_* functionstb2020-09-241-143/+99
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If any of general_allocate_{prompt,string,boolean}() fail, the UI_dup_* functions may leak the strings they strduped beforehand. Instead, use strdup inside these functions, so we can free as necessary. This makes the UI_add_* and UI_dup_* simple wrappers around general_allocate_{string,boolean}() that differ only in passing a Boolean that indicates whether or not to use strdup. Make a general cleanup pass over these functions, simplify the logic and make it overall a bit easier to follow. While there, use strcspn() instead of a handrolled variant. The only changes in behavior are that ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE is now pushed onto the stack a bit more often and that UI_dup_input_string() now returns -1 on failure to dup prompt like all the other UI_dup_* functions. This is not a problem since the manual already documents that errors are signaled with <= 0. The only consumer of this function according to Debian's codesearch is libp11, I sent them a PR to fix their (already broken) error handling. Addresses about 10 errors thrown by the LLVM static analyzer in ui/. ok jsing
* Push ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE onto the error stacktb2020-09-241-3/+3
| | | | | | | If sk_UI_STRING_new_null() fails, this must be due to a memory error, so signal this to the user. ok jsing
* Make free_strings() NULL safetb2020-09-241-1/+3
| | | | ok jsing
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-19 11:23:36 +0000