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* Fix arbitrary memory read in GENERAL_NAME_cmp()libressl-v3.5.4bluhm2023-02-071-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The ASN.1 template for GENERAL_NAME and its corresponding C structure disagree on the type of the x400Address member. This results in an ASN.1 string to be considered as an ASN.1 type, which allows an attacker to read (essentially) arbitrary memory. Fix this by forcing comparison as strings. While the underlying type confusion has been present since time immemorial, this particular bug came with the EdiPartyName fix (6.8/008_asn1.patch.sig). Reported by David Benjamin, fix suggested by jsing. Release date for this was set to be January 31. Unilaterally pushed back to February 7 by OpenSSL by way of announcement of many completely unrelated embargoed issues, some of which they had been sitting on since July 2020. from tb@; OK beck@ jsing@ this is errata/7.1/022_x509.patch.sig
* Fix d2i_ASN1_OBJECT()libressl-v3.5.3tb2022-05-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | Due to a confusion of two CBS, the API would incorrectly advance the *der_in pointer, resulting in a DER parse failure. Issue reported by Aram Sargsyan ok jsing This is patches/7.1/004_asn1.patch.sig
* Set ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA flag with t2i_ASN1_OBJECT_internalinoguchi2022-04-101-1/+2
| | | | | | | 'flags' should have ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA bit to free 'data' by ASN1_OBJECT_free as c2i_ASN1_OBJECT_cbs does. ok jsing@ tb@
* Avoid infinite loop on parsing DSA private keystb2022-04-071-3/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | DSA private keys with ill-chosen g could cause an infinite loop on deserializing. Add a few sanity checks that ensure that g is according to the FIPS 186-4: check 1 < g < p and g^q == 1 (mod p). This is enough to ascertain that g is a generator of a multiplicative group of order q once we know that q is prime (which is checked a bit later). Issue reported with reproducers by Hanno Boeck. Additional variants and analysis by David Benjamin. ok beck jsing
* Avoid infinite loop for custom curves of order 1tb2022-04-072-4/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | If a private key encoded with EC parameters happens to have order 1 and is used for ECDSA signatures, this causes an infinite loop since a random integer x in the interval [0,1) will be 0, so do ... while (x == 0); will loop indefinitely. Found and reported with a reproducer by Hanno Boeck. Helpful comments and analysis from David Benjamin. ok beck jsing
* man pages: fix some typos found while looking for other issuesnaddy2022-03-311-2/+2
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* man pages: add missing commas between subordinate and main clausesnaddy2022-03-3130-103/+103
| | | | | | | jmc@ dislikes a comma before "then" in a conditional, so leave those untouched. ok jmc@
* Fix leak in ASN1_TIME_adj_internal()tb2022-03-311-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | p is allocated by asprintf() in one of the *_from_tm() functions, so it needs to be freed as in the other error path below. CID 346194 ok jsing
* Simplify priv_key handling in d2i_ECPrivateKey()tb2022-03-311-8/+3
| | | | | | | | | d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY() can handle the allocation of priv_key internally, no need to do this up front and reach it through the dangerous reuse mechanism. There's also no point in freeing a variable we know to be NULL. ok jsing
* Avoid segfaults in EVP_PKEY_CTX_free()tb2022-03-302-4/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | It is possible to call pmeth->cleanup() with an EVP_PKEY_CTX whose data is NULL. If pmeth->init() in int_ctx_new() fails, EVP_PKEY_CTX_free() is called with such a context. This in turn calls pmeth->cleanup(), and thus these cleanup functions must be careful not to use NULL data. Most of them are, but one of GOST's functions and HMAC's aren't. Reported for HMAC by Masaru Masada https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/issues/129 ok bcook jsing
* pkey_hmac_init(): use calloc()tb2022-03-301-7/+3
| | | | | | | Instead of using malloc() and setting most struct members to 0, simply use calloc(). ok bcook jsing
* Given asn1/a_object.c rev. 1.45 by jsing@, stop talking about BUGSschwarze2022-03-291-22/+21
| | | | | | | we no longer have, focus on what our implementation now does, but keep short warnings in how far other implementations might be more fragile. Some improvements to wordings and clarity while here. OK tb@
* man pages: add missing commas in enumerationsnaddy2022-03-292-6/+6
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* Bound cofactor in EC_GROUP_set_generator()tb2022-03-291-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of bounding only bounding the group order, also bound the cofactor using Hasse's theorem. This could probably be made a lot tighter since all curves of cryptographic interest have small cofactors, but for now this is good enough. A timeout found by oss-fuzz creates a "group" with insane parameters over a 40-bit field: the order is 14464, and the cofactor has 4196223 bits (which is obviously impossible by Hasse's theorem). These led to running an expensive loop in ec_GFp_simple_mul_ct() millions of times. Fixes oss-fuzz #46056 Diagnosed and fix joint with jsing ok inoguchi jsing (previous version)
* Do not zero cofactor on ec_guess_cofactor() successtb2022-03-291-2/+6
| | | | | | | The cofactor we tried to calculate should only be zeroed if we failed to compute it. ok inoguchi jsing
* Zap trailing whitespacetb2022-03-291-46/+46
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* Remove extra 'or'claudio2022-03-281-3/+2
| | | | OK tb@
* name constraints: be more careful with NULstb2022-03-262-12/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | An IA5STRING is a Pascal string that can have embedded NULs and is not NUL terminated (except that for legacy reasons it happens to be). Instead of taking the strlen(), use the already known ASN.1 length and use strndup() instead of strdup() to generate NUL terminated strings after some existing code has checked that there are no embedded NULs. In v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex() use %.*s to print the bytes. This is not optimal and might be switched to using strvis() later. ok beck inoguchi jsing
* Convert c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() and d2i_ASN1_OBJECT to CBS.jsing2022-03-261-81/+92
| | | | | | | | | Along the way, rather than having yet another piece of code that parses OID arcs, reuse oid_parse_arc(). Always allocate a new ASN1_OBJECT rather than doing a crazy dance with ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC and trying to free parts of an ASN1_OBJECT if one is passed in. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Provide asn1_get_primitive()jsing2022-03-262-2/+35
| | | | | | | | This takes a CBS, gets the ASN.1 identifier and length, ensures the resulting identifier is a valid primitive, then returns the tag number and the content as a CBS. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* use the new CPU_ID_AA64ISAR0 sysctl to determine CPU features on arm64robert2022-03-251-5/+55
| | | | ok tb@, deraadt@, kettenis@
* Start disentangling armv7 and aarch64 codetb2022-03-238-6/+154
| | | | | | | | | arm_arch.h and armcap.c are shared between armv7 and aarch64 which results in an inscrutable #ifdef maze. Move copies of these files into arch/{arm,aarch64}/ with appropriate names and some trivial minor adjustments. ok deraadt inoguchi kettenis
* Move/group i2d_ASN1_OBJECT() and d2i_ASN1_OBJECT().jsing2022-03-201-53/+53
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* Provide t2i_ASN1_OBJECT_internal() and use it for OBJ_txt2obj()jsing2022-03-193-32/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | The current OBJ_txt2obj() implementation converts the text to ASN.1 object content octets, builds a full DER encoding from it, then feeds the entire thing back through the DER to ASN.1 object conversion. Rather than doing this crazy dance, provide an t2i_ASN1_OBJECT_internal() function that converts the text to ASN.1 object content octets, then creates a new ASN1_OBJECT and attaches the content octets to it. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rewrite ascii/text to ASN.1 object conversion.jsing2022-03-191-121/+167
| | | | | | | | Rewrite the ascii/text to ASN.1 object conversion code using CBB/CBS, while also addressing some of the bizarre behaviour (such as allowing mixed separators and treating '..' as a zero value). ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rework ASN1_STRING_set()jsing2022-03-171-14/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | Rework ASN1_STRING_set() so that we always clear and free an existing allocation, prior to storing the new data. This fixes a number of issues, including a failure to zero data if the existing allocation was too small. This also fixes other bugs such as leaving the allocation uninitialised if NULL is passed for data. Require -1 where strlen() is expected and improve length and overflow checks. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Make gcc 4 happier about x509_addr.ctb2022-03-161-6/+8
| | | | | | | | | | gcc 4 on sparc64 issues a few 'warning: value computed is not used'. There are two cases: sk_set_cmp_function() returns the old comparison function of the stack which we don't care about. The one warning about an sk_delete() is about a return value that we know already and which we will free a few lines down. ok inoguchi miod
* LibreSSL 3.5.2bcook2022-03-151-3/+3
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* Initialise *out_name at the start of i2t_ASN1_OBJECT_name().jsing2022-03-151-1/+3
| | | | ok tb@
* Fix infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()tb2022-03-151-14/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A bug in the implementation of the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm can lead to an infinite loop. This loop can be hit in various ways, in particular on decompressing an elliptic curve public key via EC_POINT_oct2point() - to do this, one must solve y^2 = x^3 + ax + b for y, given x. If a certificate uses explicit encoding for elliptic curve parameters, this operation needs to be done during certificate verification, leading to a DoS. In particular, everything dealing with untrusted certificates is affected, notably TLS servers explicitly configured to request client certificates (httpd, smtpd, various VPN implementations, ...). Ordinary TLS servers do not consume untrusted certificates. The problem is that we cannot assume that x^3 + ax + b is actually a square on untrusted input and neither can we assume that the modulus p is a prime. Ensuring that p is a prime is too expensive (it would likely itself lead to a DoS). To avoid the infinite loop, fix the logic to be more resilient and explicitly limit the number of iterations that can be done. The bug is such that the infinite loop can also be hit for primes = 3 (mod 4) but fortunately that case is optimized earlier. It's also worth noting that there is a size bound on the field size enforced via OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS (= 661), which help mitigate further DoS vectors in presence of this fix. Reported by Tavis Ormandy and David Benjamin, Google Patch based on the fixes by David Benjamin and Tomas Mraz, OpenSSL ok beck inoguchi
* Allow constraints of the form @domain.comtb2022-03-141-10/+17
| | | | | | | | | | Some things issue and expect that we support a non-standard extension of accepting any email address from a host by prefixing an email name constraint with @. This used to be the case with the old code as well. Pointed out and based on a diff by Alex Wilson. ok jsing
* Rework ownership handling in x509_constraints_validate()tb2022-03-143-39/+49
| | | | | | | | | | Instead of having the caller allocate and pass in a new x509_constraints_name struct, handle allocation inside x509_constraints_validate(). Also make the error optional. All this is done to simplify the call sites and to make it more obvious that there are no leaks. ok jsing
* Factor out ASN1_STRING clearing code.jsing2022-03-141-4/+15
| | | | | | | This fixes a bug in ASN1_STRING_set0() where it does not respect the ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF flag and potentially frees memory that we do not own. ok inguchi@ tb@
* First pass clean up of ASN1_STRING code.jsing2022-03-141-74/+87
| | | | | | | Use consistent variable names (astr/src) rather than 'a', 'bs', 'str', 'v' or 'x', add some whitespace and remove some unneeded parentheses. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Relax the check of x509_constraints_dirname()libressl-v3.5.1tb2022-03-131-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | The dirname constraint must be a prefix in DER format, so relax the check from requiring equal-length strings to allow shorter names also. From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Add x509_constraints_validate() to x509_internal.htb2022-03-131-1/+3
| | | | | | From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Check name constraints using the proper APItb2022-03-131-4/+21
| | | | | | | | The previous versions were too strict and disallowed leading dots. From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* style tweaktb2022-03-131-2/+2
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* Add missing error check after strdup()tb2022-03-131-2/+5
| | | | | | From Alex Wilson ok jsing
* Remove free_cont from asn1_d2i_ex_primitive()/asn1_ex_c2i().jsing2022-03-132-50/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | The constructed ASN.1 handling in asn1_d2i_ex_primitive() and asn1_ex_c2i() currently has code to potentially avoid a malloc/memcpy - this is a less common code path and it introduces a bunch of complexity for minimal gain. In particular, we're manually adding a trailing NUL when ASN1_STRING_set() would already do that for us, plus we currently manually free() the data on an ASN1_STRING, rather than using freezero(). ok inoguchi@ tb@
* unsusual -> unusualjsg2022-03-101-3/+3
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* bump for LibreSSL 3.5.1bcook2022-03-071-3/+3
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* Pull a len == 0 check up before malloc(len) to avoid implementationtb2022-03-031-5/+5
| | | | | | defined behavior. ok deraadt inoguchi
* Do not write out terminating NUL in i2a_ASN1_OBJECT()tb2022-03-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | The conversion to CBB made us write out an extra NUL since we no longer use the return value of i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() (which returns strlen(data)) but rather the size of the CBB (which includes a terminal NUL) to write out data. Issue found by anton via an openssl-ruby test failure. ok jsing
* Unwrap a linetb2022-03-021-3/+2
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* whitespacetb2022-03-021-2/+2
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* Rewrite ASN1_OBJECT content to ascii/text conversion.jsing2022-03-023-101/+186
| | | | | | | | | | Rewrite the ASN1_OBJECT content to ascii/text conversion code using CBB and CBS. Currently there is a strange split with i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() calling OBJ_obj2txt() which implements the conversion, while OBJ_txt2obj() calls back into the misnamed a2d_ASN1_OBJECT() function. Move the conversion code into asn1/a_object.c and have OBJ_txt2obj() call that instead. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Get rid of SHA1 for comparing CRL's - use SHA512 just like we do for certs.beck2022-02-243-9/+7
| | | | ok tb@
* Remove accidentally committed debug code.tb2022-02-241-3/+1
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* Minor tweakstb2022-02-241-7/+8
| | | | i is a silly name for BN_num_bits(dsa->q); move a comment for readability.
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