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* tags as requested by miod and teduderaadt2014-06-121-1/+1
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* http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=2016265dfbab162e ↵deraadt2014-06-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | c30718b5e7480add42598158 Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random perfectly, so do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and replaced with "only do it badly if a flag is set". New flags (SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old scheme of "use time_t for first 4 bytes of the random buffer". Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen] Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing support & definition of them. The buflen < 4 check is also interesting, because no entropy would be returned. No callers passed such small buffers. ok miod sthen
* TLS would not be entirely functional without extensions, so unifdefjsing2014-05-311-19/+0
| | | | | | OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT. ok tedu@
* remove some #if 0 code. we don't need any more reminders that we're usingtedu2014-05-301-5/+0
| | | | a not quite appropriate data structure. ok jsing
* unidef DH, ECDH, and ECDSA. there's no purpose to a libssl without them.tedu2014-05-291-16/+0
| | | | ok deraadt jsing
* More KNF.jsing2014-05-281-3/+2
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* DeIMPLEMENT libssl. Expand the IMPLEMENT_* macros since it is far morejsing2014-05-241-3/+38
| | | | | | | | readable and one less layer of abstraction. Use C99 initialisers for clarity, grepability and to protect from future field reordering/removal. ok miod@ (tedu@ also thought it was a wonderful idea, beck@ also agreed, but ran away squealing since it reminded him of the VOP layer...)
* Remove SRP and Kerberos support from libssl. These are complex protocolstedu2014-05-051-3/+0
| | | | | all on their own and we can't effectively maintain them without using them, which we don't. If the need arises, the code can be resurrected.
* Make libssl and libcrypto compile with -Werrorbeck2014-04-231-1/+1
| | | | ok miod@
* more malloc/realloc/calloc cleanups; ok beck kettenisderaadt2014-04-211-2/+1
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* More KNF and style consistency tweaksguenther2014-04-191-4/+3
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* always build in RSA and DSA. ok deraadt miodtedu2014-04-171-8/+0
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* fix a potential double freejsg2014-04-171-2/+2
| | | | ok miod@
* Change library to use intrinsic memory allocation functions instead ofbeck2014-04-171-6/+6
| | | | | | | | OPENSSL_foo wrappers. This changes: OPENSSL_malloc->malloc OPENSSL_free->free OPENSSL_relloc->realloc OPENSSL_freeFunc->free
* strncpy(d, s, strlen(s)) is a special kind of stupid. even when it's right,tedu2014-04-161-4/+8
| | | | | it looks wrong. replace with auditable code and eliminate many strlen calls to improve efficiency. (wait, did somebody say FASTER?) ok beck
* make OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBLEED the default and only option. ok deraadt miodtedu2014-04-141-12/+0
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* So the OpenSSL codebase does "get the time, add it as a random seed"deraadt2014-04-141-2/+0
| | | | | | | in a bunch of places inside the TLS engine, to try to keep entropy high. I wonder if their moto is "If you can't solve a problem, at least try to do it badly". ok miod
* First pass at applying KNF to the OpenSSL code, which almost makes itjsing2014-04-141-797/+726
| | | | | readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using tr and md5.
* Do not include "e_os.h" anymore. Simply pull in the necessary headers.mpi2014-04-131-1/+1
| | | | ok miod@, deraadt@
* Merge conflicts; remove MacOS, Netware, OS/2, VMS and Windows build machinery.miod2014-04-131-9/+20
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* resolve conflictsdjm2012-10-131-19/+167
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* OpenSSL 1.0.0f: mergedjm2012-01-051-1/+1
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* openssl-1.0.0e: resolve conflictsdjm2011-11-031-7/+19
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* resolve conflicts, fix local changesdjm2010-10-011-68/+472
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* update to openssl-0.9.8i; tested by several, especially krw@djm2009-01-051-3/+3
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* import of OpenSSL 0.9.8hdjm2008-09-061-0/+1147