| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Use of this symbols proves the existence of a code path willingly using SSLv3,
even with OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 being defined, which hints that it needs fixing.
Discussed with the LibreSSL cabal during c2k15; ok deraadt@
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ok miod@
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ok bcook@ miod@
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reluctant ok miod@
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coverity ID's 21691 21698
ok miod@, "Fry it" jsing@
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ok miod@ jsing@
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ok miod@
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spelt malloc+memcpy, which is what is used in all except two places.
ok deraadt@ doug@
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tweak + ok miod@ jsing@
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This commit matches the OpenSSL removal in commit
3c33c6f6b10864355553961e638514a6d1bb00f6.
ok deraadt@
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compile time, which we do not do and are unlikely to ever do. Additionally,
there are two runtime configurable alternatives that exist.
ok bcook@ doug@
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in four different places.
ok doug@ guenther@
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spotted by miod. ok miod.
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by a similar BoringSSL change, but raising the limit to 1024 bits.
ok jsing@ markus@ guenther@ deraadt@
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ssl3_get_cipher_by_value() in other parts of the code where it simplifies
things.
ok doug@
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ephemeral keys exist for SSL_kDHE and SSL_kECDHE.
This would have prevented CVE-2014-3572.
ok doug@
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This API was intended to be an internal only, however like many things in
OpenSSL, it is exposed externally and parts of the software ecosystem are
now using it since there is no real alternative within the public API.
ok doug@, tedu@ and reluctantly miod@
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suite uses ephemeral keys. This avoids an issue where an ECHDE cipher suite can
effectively be downgraded to ECDH, if the server omits the ServerKeyExchange
message and has provided a certificate with an ECC public key.
Issue reported to OpenSSL by Karthikeyan Bhargavan.
Based on OpenSSL.
Fixes CVE-2014-3572.
ok beck@
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A few EVP_DigestInit_ex() calls were left alone since reporting an
error would change the public API.
Changed internal ssl3_cbc_digest_record() to return a value due to the above
change. It will also now set md_out_size=0 on failure.
This is based on part of BoringSSL's commit to fix malloc crashes:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/69a01608f33ab6fe2c3485d94aef1fe9eacf5364
ok miod@
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the new handshake functions.
ok miod@
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mazes in libssl. NPN is being replaced by ALPN, however it is still going
to be around for a while yet.
ok miod@
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calls malloc(). Instead of silently continuing on failure, check the return
value of BIO_new() and propagate failure back to the caller for appropriate
handling.
ok bcook@
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the two ciphersuites that use it. GOST94 public/private keys have been
long obsoleted and libcrypto does not have support for them anyway.
Discussed with Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov.
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the associated peer_rsa_tmp goop.
This was only needed for export cipher handling and intentional RFC
violations. The export cipher suites have already been removed and
previous cleanup means that we will never send ServerKeyExchange messages
from the server side for RSA.
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ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(), rather than checking it in the key
exchange algorithm specific code.
ok beck@ miod@
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Based on boringssl commit: 1df112448b41c3568477f3fcd3b8fc820ce80066
ok miod@ jsing@
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This causes a libssl major version bump as this affects the layout of some
internal-but-unfortunately-made-visible structs.
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arc4random provides high quality pseudo-random numbers, hence there is no
need to differentiate between "strong" and "pseudo". Furthermore, the
arc4random_buf() function is guaranteed to succeed, which avoids the need
to check for and handle failure, simplifying the code.
It is worth noting that a number of the replaced RAND_bytes() and
RAND_pseudo_bytes() calls were missing return value checks and these
functions can fail for a number of reasons (at least in OpenSSL -
thankfully they were converted to wrappers around arc4random_buf() some
time ago in LibreSSL).
ok beck@ deraadt@ miod@
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Based on OpenSSL.
ok miod@
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nor do we plan on supporting them.
ok guenther@
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ssl3_get_cipher_by_id().
ok bcook@
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of writing "2". Add a define for the SSL3_CIPHER_VALUE_SIZE (rather than
using a less-readable hardcoded constant everywhere) and replace the
ssl3_put_char_by_bytes(NULL, NULL) calls with it.
ok bcook@ miod@
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unravelling the maze of function pointers and callbacks by directly
calling ssl3_{get,put}_cipher_by_char() and removing the
ssl_{get,put}_cipher_by_char macros.
Prompted by similar changes in boringssl.
ok guenther.
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https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=17160033765480453be0a41335fa6b833691c049
ok bcook
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1.78; reported by Ilja Van Sprundel.
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Based on changes to OpenSSL trunk.
ok beck@ miod@
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ok jsing@
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conditionals.
ok miod@
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ok beck@ miod@
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bounds check, after reading the 2-, 3- or 4-byte size of the next chunk to
process. But the size fields themselves are not checked for being entirely
contained in the buffer.
Since reading past your bounds is bad practice, and may not possible if you
are using a secure memory allocator, we need to add the necessary bounds check,
at the expense of some readability.
As a bonus, a wrong size GOST session key will now trigger an error instead of
a printf to stderr and it being handled as if it had the correct size.
Creating this diff made my eyes bleed (in the real sense); reviewing it
made guenther@'s and beck@'s eyes bleed too (in the literal sense).
ok guenther@ beck@
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the CCS_OK flag. From OpenSSL trunk.
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keys have been correctly set up so it is ok to accept CCS from the server.
Without renegotiation can sometimes fail.
OpenSSL PR #3400 via OpenSSL trunk.
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baggage.
ok miod@ jsing@
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ciphers we no longer need the flags or code to support it.
ok beck@ miod@
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