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* Replace the remaining ssl3_get_cipher_by_char() calls with n2s() andjsing2014-08-231-7/+15
| | | | | | ssl3_get_cipher_by_id(). ok bcook@
* Currently, ssl3_put_char_by_bytes(NULL, NULL) is just a long handed wayjsing2014-08-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | | of writing "2". Add a define for the SSL3_CIPHER_VALUE_SIZE (rather than using a less-readable hardcoded constant everywhere) and replace the ssl3_put_char_by_bytes(NULL, NULL) calls with it. ok bcook@ miod@
* Since we no longer need to support SSLv2-style cipher lists, startjsing2014-08-101-7/+5
| | | | | | | | | | unravelling the maze of function pointers and callbacks by directly calling ssl3_{get,put}_cipher_by_char() and removing the ssl_{get,put}_cipher_by_char macros. Prompted by similar changes in boringssl. ok guenther.
* merge CVE-2014-3510; Fix DTLS anonymous EC(DH) denial of servicederaadt2014-08-071-1/+9
| | | | | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=17160033765480453be0a41335fa6b833691c049 ok bcook
* Missing bounds check in ssl3_get_certificate_request(), was not spotted inmiod2014-07-171-1/+6
| | | | 1.78; reported by Ilja Van Sprundel.
* The correct name for EDH is DHE, likewise EECDH should be ECDHE.jsing2014-07-121-6/+6
| | | | | | Based on changes to OpenSSL trunk. ok beck@ miod@
* remove double brackets. fixes build with clang.jsg2014-07-121-2/+2
| | | | ok jsing@
* Remove extra parenthesis.jsing2014-07-121-2/+2
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* need_cert is now always true, so remove the variable and associatedjsing2014-07-121-33/+21
| | | | | | conditionals. ok miod@
* Remove remnants from PSK, KRB5 and SRP.jsing2014-07-121-18/+7
| | | | ok beck@ miod@
* As reported by David Ramos, most consumer of ssl_get_message() perform latemiod2014-07-111-11/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | bounds check, after reading the 2-, 3- or 4-byte size of the next chunk to process. But the size fields themselves are not checked for being entirely contained in the buffer. Since reading past your bounds is bad practice, and may not possible if you are using a secure memory allocator, we need to add the necessary bounds check, at the expense of some readability. As a bonus, a wrong size GOST session key will now trigger an error instead of a printf to stderr and it being handled as if it had the correct size. Creating this diff made my eyes bleed (in the real sense); reviewing it made guenther@'s and beck@'s eyes bleed too (in the literal sense). ok guenther@ beck@
* If the application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption, setmiod2014-07-111-2/+3
| | | | the CCS_OK flag. From OpenSSL trunk.
* Accept CCS again after `finished' has been sent by the client; at this pointmiod2014-07-111-5/+6
| | | | | | | keys have been correctly set up so it is ok to accept CCS from the server. Without renegotiation can sometimes fail. OpenSSL PR #3400 via OpenSSL trunk.
* Remove the PSK code. We don't need to drag around thisbeck2014-07-111-136/+1
| | | | | baggage. ok miod@ jsing@
* decompress libssl. ok beck jsingtedu2014-07-101-70/+2
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* tedu the SSL export cipher handling - since we do not have enabled exportjsing2014-07-091-31/+1
| | | | | | ciphers we no longer need the flags or code to support it. ok beck@ miod@
* always compare memcmp against 0, for clarity.tedu2014-06-211-2/+2
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* convert CRYPTO_memcmp to timingsafe_memcmp based on current policy favoringtedu2014-06-191-3/+3
| | | | | | libc interfaces over libcrypto interfaces. for now we also prefer timingsafe_memcmp over timingsafe_bcmp, even when the latter is acceptable. ok beck deraadt matthew miod
* tags as requested by miod and teduderaadt2014-06-121-1/+1
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* Stop setting the EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW - it has been ignored sincejsing2014-06-111-2/+0
| | | | | | OpenSSL 1.0.0. ok miod@ (a little while back)
* http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=2016265dfbab162e ↵deraadt2014-06-071-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | c30718b5e7480add42598158 Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random perfectly, so do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and replaced with "only do it badly if a flag is set". New flags (SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old scheme of "use time_t for first 4 bytes of the random buffer". Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen] Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing support & definition of them. The buflen < 4 check is also interesting, because no entropy would be returned. No callers passed such small buffers. ok miod sthen
* The DH_free, EC_KEY_free, EVP_PKEY_free and RSA_free functions all havejsing2014-06-071-13/+8
| | | | | implicit NULL checks, so there is no point ensuring that the pointer is non-NULL before calling them.
* Ensure that sess_cert is not NULL before trying to use it.jsing2014-06-051-0/+8
| | | | | | Fixes CVE-2014-3470, from OpenSSL. ok deraadt@
* ssl_sess_cert_new() can return NULL. Fix two cases where the return valuejsing2014-06-051-13/+12
| | | | | | | | | is unchecked, which would result in a later null pointer dereference. While here, RSA_free, DH_free and EC_KEY_free all have implicit NULL checks, so avoid repeating them here. ok beck@
* Be selective as to when ChangeCipherSpec messages will be accepted.jsing2014-06-051-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Without this an early ChangeCipherSpec message would result in session keys being generated, along with the Finished hash for the handshake, using an empty master secret. For a detailed analysis see: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/05/earlyccs.html This is a fix for CVE-2014-0224, from OpenSSL. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by KIKUCHI Masashi. Unfortunately the recent OpenSSL commit was the first we were made aware of the issue. ok deraadt@ sthen@
* More KNF.jsing2014-06-051-49/+32
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* without overthinking it, replace a few memcmp calls with CRYPTO_memcmptedu2014-06-041-2/+2
| | | | where it is feasible to do so. better safe than sorry.
* More manual OPENSSL_NO_EC and OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT cleanup.jsing2014-05-311-4/+4
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* TLS would not be entirely functional without extensions, so unifdefjsing2014-05-311-29/+0
| | | | | | OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT. ok tedu@
* remove some #if 0 code. we don't need any more reminders that we're usingtedu2014-05-301-6/+0
| | | | a not quite appropriate data structure. ok jsing
* Make use of SSL_IS_DTLS, SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV, SSL_USE_SIGALGS andjsing2014-05-301-11/+8
| | | | | | SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS. Largely based on OpenSSL head.
* no space before labeltedu2014-05-291-18/+18
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* line up else bettertedu2014-05-291-5/+2
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* unidef DH, ECDH, and ECDSA. there's no purpose to a libssl without them.tedu2014-05-291-40/+0
| | | | ok deraadt jsing
* EVP_MD_CTX_create() calls malloc and can return NULL. However, only one ofjsing2014-05-281-0/+5
| | | | | | | the calls in libssl actually checks the return value before using it. Add NULL checks for the remaining three calls. ok miod@
* There is no point in checking if a pointer is non-NULL before calling free,jsing2014-05-281-18/+9
| | | | | | | | since free already does this for us. Also remove some pointless NULL assignments, where the result from malloc(3) is immediately assigned to the same variable. ok miod@
* Remove TLS_DEBUG, SSL_DEBUG, CIPHER_DEBUG and OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG. Much ofjsing2014-05-251-8/+0
| | | | | | | this is sporadic, hacked up and can easily be put back in an improved form should we ever need it. ok miod@
* DeIMPLEMENT libssl. Expand the IMPLEMENT_* macros since it is far morejsing2014-05-241-3/+38
| | | | | | | | readable and one less layer of abstraction. Use C99 initialisers for clarity, grepability and to protect from future field reordering/removal. ok miod@ (tedu@ also thought it was a wonderful idea, beck@ also agreed, but ran away squealing since it reminded him of the VOP layer...)
* Stop including kssl_lcl.h and nuke it from orbit - it is a no-op now.jsing2014-05-221-1/+0
| | | | ok beck@ miod@
* KSSL is dead... nuke KSSL_DEBUG from orbit.jsing2014-05-201-7/+0
| | | | ok beck@ miod@
* Remove SRP and Kerberos support from libssl. These are complex protocolstedu2014-05-051-258/+0
| | | | | all on their own and we can't effectively maintain them without using them, which we don't. If the need arises, the code can be resurrected.
* Fix indentation.mcbride2014-04-241-211/+208
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* Make it compile again.jsing2014-04-241-1/+1
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* More KNF, things that couldn't be verified with md5(1), and some whitespacemcbride2014-04-241-45/+42
| | | | I missed on the first go around.
* KNFmcbride2014-04-241-636/+890
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* remove redundant asign. from David Hilltedu2014-04-241-1/+0
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* Unifdef -UPKCS1_CHECK and remove SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_[12], this is leftovermiod2014-04-231-6/+0
| | | | | | | | ``debug'' code from a 15+ years old bugfix and the SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_* constants have had a value of zero since ages. No production code should use them. ok beck@
* more malloc/realloc/calloc cleanups; ok beck kettenisderaadt2014-04-211-3/+1
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* More KNF and style consistency tweaksguenther2014-04-191-4/+3
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* whack a bunch of disabled code. ok beck lteotedu2014-04-171-17/+3
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