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This was imported into OpenSSL from SSLeay. It was recently deleted
in OpenSSL commit 7a4dadc3a6a487db92619622b820eb4f7be512c9
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This is a hack for an old version of SSLeay which predates OpenSSL.
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ok doug@
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ability to pass or not pass a STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *, which is then either
zeroed or if NULL a new one is allocated, always allocate one and return it
directly.
Inspired by simliar changes in BoringSSL.
ok beck@ doug@
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in four different places.
ok doug@ guenther@
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certificates without requiring a CertificateVerify message.
From OpenSSL commit:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1421e0c584ae9120ca1b88098f13d6d2e90b83a3
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this.
ok miod@
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message handling routines.
ok miod@
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If you're still using a buggy version of Netscape from 2000, for HTTPS with
client certificates, it is probably a good time to find a new browser.
"kill it softly... with napalm and kisses" miod@
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This API was intended to be an internal only, however like many things in
OpenSSL, it is exposed externally and parts of the software ecosystem are
now using it since there is no real alternative within the public API.
ok doug@, tedu@ and reluctantly miod@
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afterwards. openssl has a more complicated fix, but it's less intrusive
for now to simply hoist the expensive part (fake key generation) up without
sweating a branch or two.
ok bcook jsing
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A few EVP_DigestInit_ex() calls were left alone since reporting an
error would change the public API.
Changed internal ssl3_cbc_digest_record() to return a value due to the above
change. It will also now set md_out_size=0 on failure.
This is based on part of BoringSSL's commit to fix malloc crashes:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/69a01608f33ab6fe2c3485d94aef1fe9eacf5364
ok miod@
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mazes in libssl. NPN is being replaced by ALPN, however it is still going
to be around for a while yet.
ok miod@
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calls malloc(). Instead of silently continuing on failure, check the return
value of BIO_new() and propagate failure back to the caller for appropriate
handling.
ok bcook@
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the two ciphersuites that use it. GOST94 public/private keys have been
long obsoleted and libcrypto does not have support for them anyway.
Discussed with Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov.
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This causes a libssl major version bump as this affects the layout of some
internal-but-unfortunately-made-visible structs.
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This allows an SSL server to enable DHE ciphers with a single setting,
which results in an DH key being generated based on the server key length.
Partly based on OpenSSL.
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The only use for these is via SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA (which is effectively
a standards violation) and for RSA sign-only, should only be possible if
you are using an export cipher and have an RSA private key that is more
than 512 bits in size (however we no longer support export ciphers).
ok bcook@ miod@
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arc4random provides high quality pseudo-random numbers, hence there is no
need to differentiate between "strong" and "pseudo". Furthermore, the
arc4random_buf() function is guaranteed to succeed, which avoids the need
to check for and handle failure, simplifying the code.
It is worth noting that a number of the replaced RAND_bytes() and
RAND_pseudo_bytes() calls were missing return value checks and these
functions can fail for a number of reasons (at least in OpenSSL -
thankfully they were converted to wrappers around arc4random_buf() some
time ago in LibreSSL).
ok beck@ deraadt@ miod@
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This allows an SSL server to enable ECDHE ciphers with a single setting,
which results in an EC key being generated using the first preference
shared curve.
Based on OpenSSL with inspiration from boringssl.
ok miod@
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ok miod@
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nor do we plan on supporting them.
ok guenther@
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ssl3_cipher_get_value() helper function, which returns the cipher suite
value for the given cipher.
ok miod@
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ssl3_get_cert_verify().
ok guenther@ jsing@
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unravelling the maze of function pointers and callbacks by directly
calling ssl3_{get,put}_cipher_by_char() and removing the
ssl_{get,put}_cipher_by_char macros.
Prompted by similar changes in boringssl.
ok guenther.
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for the key (expressed in RSA key bits, which makes *no sense* for ECDH) as
their second argument, not zero.
(jsing@ notes that the RSA callback is only invoked for 'export' ciphers,
which have been removed from LibreSSL, and for the SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
option, which is makes the application non-compliant. More fuel for the
tedu fire...)
jasper@ noted the breakage and bisected it down to the diff that broke this
ok jsing@ miod@
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Based on changes to OpenSSL trunk.
ok beck@ miod@
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ok beck@ miod@
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to interleave them within the conditions. Also fix wrapping and
indentation.
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bounds check, after reading the 2-, 3- or 4-byte size of the next chunk to
process. But the size fields themselves are not checked for being entirely
contained in the buffer.
Since reading past your bounds is bad practice, and may not possible if you
are using a secure memory allocator, we need to add the necessary bounds check,
at the expense of some readability.
As a bonus, a wrong size GOST session key will now trigger an error instead of
a printf to stderr and it being handled as if it had the correct size.
Creating this diff made my eyes bleed (in the real sense); reviewing it
made guenther@'s and beck@'s eyes bleed too (in the literal sense).
ok guenther@ beck@
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larger than 4096-bit RSA which the most paranoid of us are using; OpenSSL
PR #319 via OpenSSL trunk.
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regular ASN.1 parser rather than trying to handroll one and potentially
misbehave; OpenSSL PR #3335 via OpenSSL trunk.
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baggage.
ok miod@ jsing@
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ok tedu@ miod@
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places
ok jsing@
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ciphers we no longer need the flags or code to support it.
ok beck@ miod@
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reported by Brent Cook, original diff by logan
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libc interfaces over libcrypto interfaces. for now we also prefer
timingsafe_memcmp over timingsafe_bcmp, even when the latter is acceptable.
ok beck deraadt matthew miod
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OpenSSL 1.0.0.
ok miod@ (a little while back)
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c30718b5e7480add42598158
Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random
perfectly, so do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and
replaced with "only do it badly if a flag is set". New flags
(SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME)
were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old scheme of "use time_t
for first 4 bytes of the random buffer".
Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen]
Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing
support & definition of them. The buflen < 4 check is also interesting,
because no entropy would be returned. No callers passed such small
buffers.
ok miod sthen
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implicit NULL checks, so there is no point ensuring that the pointer is
non-NULL before calling them.
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Without this an early ChangeCipherSpec message would result in session
keys being generated, along with the Finished hash for the handshake,
using an empty master secret.
For a detailed analysis see:
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/05/earlyccs.html
This is a fix for CVE-2014-0224, from OpenSSL.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by KIKUCHI Masashi. Unfortunately the
recent OpenSSL commit was the first we were made aware of the issue.
ok deraadt@ sthen@
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where it is feasible to do so. better safe than sorry.
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OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT.
ok tedu@
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