| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This allows an SSL server to enable DHE ciphers with a single setting,
which results in an DH key being generated based on the server key length.
Partly based on OpenSSL.
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correct name for EECDH). The EDH and EECDH aliases remain for backwards
compatibility.
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This allows an SSL server to enable ECDHE ciphers with a single setting,
which results in an EC key being generated using the first preference
shared curve.
Based on OpenSSL with inspiration from boringssl.
ok miod@
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read the PEM-encoded certificate chain from memory instead of a file.
This idea is derived from an older implementation in relayd that was
needed to use the function with a privep'ed process in a chroot. Now
it is time to get it into LibreSSL to make the API more privsep-
friendly and to make it available for other programs and the ressl
library.
ok jsing@ miod@
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Based on OpenSSL.
ok miod@
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is off by default (instead of being enabled unconditionally).
The TLS padding extension was added as a workaround for a bug in F5 SSL
terminators, however appears to trigger bugs in IronPort SMTP appliances.
Now the SSL client gets to choose which of these devices it wants to
trigger bugs in...
Ported from OpenSSL.
Discussed with many.
ok miod@
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unravelling the maze of function pointers and callbacks by directly
calling ssl3_{get,put}_cipher_by_char() and removing the
ssl_{get,put}_cipher_by_char macros.
Prompted by similar changes in boringssl.
ok guenther.
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constructs (a switch statement) and returns the appropriate string defined
by SSL_TXT_* for the given version, including support for DTLSv1 and
DTLSv1-bad. Use this function in SSL_get_version() and SSL_SESSION_print().
ok beck@
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baggage.
ok miod@ jsing@
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ok tedu@
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completely decompressed.
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ciphers we no longer need the flags or code to support it.
ok beck@ miod@
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Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
Tested by and ok sthen@
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those that use EVP_AEAD instead ov EVP_CIPHER. This means being able to
change cipher state with an EVP_AEAD and being able to encrypt/decrypt
TLS using the EVP_AEAD. This has no change on existing
non-SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD ciphers.
Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
Rides the recent libssl bump.
Tested by sthen@
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Read and write contexts are also added to the SSL_CTX, along with
supporting code.
Based on Adam Langley's chromium diffs.
Rides the recent SSL library bump.
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7 years ago and never made it into an RFC. That code wasn't compiled in
anyway unless one would define the actual on-the-wire extension id bytes;
crank libssl major.
With help and enlightenment from Brendan MacDonell.
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switching cipher states using an EVP_CIPHER. This will facilitate the
addition of cipher state changes for EVP_AEAD. No functional change.
Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
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c30718b5e7480add42598158
Don't know the full story, but it looks like a "can't do random
perfectly, so do it god awful" problem was found in 2013, and
replaced with "only do it badly if a flag is set". New flags
(SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME and SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME)
were added [Ben Laurie?] to support the old scheme of "use time_t
for first 4 bytes of the random buffer".
Nothing uses these flags [ecosystem scan by sthen]
Fully discourage use of these flags in the future by removing
support & definition of them. The buflen < 4 check is also interesting,
because no entropy would be returned. No callers passed such small
buffers.
ok miod sthen
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OPENSSL_NO_EC.
ok tedu@
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OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT.
ok tedu@
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a not quite appropriate data structure. ok jsing
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ok to firebomb from tedu@
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from Alexander Schrijver
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that does not.
"fire bomb" tedu@
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ok deraadt jsing
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compression associated with the SSL session. Based on one of Adam Langley's
chromium diffs, factor out the compression handling code into a separate
ssl_cipher_get_comp() function.
Rewrite the compression handling code to avoid pointless duplication and so
that failures are actually returned to and detectable by the caller.
ok miod@
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pulled in elsewhere, even though it is makes use of the OPENSSL_NO_*
defines. While here, remove kssl.h since it is a no-op.
ok beck@ miod@
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empty define) and an OPENSSL_EXTERN (which is defined as, well... extern).
The use of OPENSSL_EXTERN is already inconsistent since the lines above
and below just use plain old "extern". Expand the two uses of these macros
and stop including e_os2.h in libssl.
ok miod@
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all on their own and we can't effectively maintain them without using them,
which we don't. If the need arises, the code can be resurrected.
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ok beck@
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but disabling attack mitigations is not safe. 0.9.6d contained a
workaround for an attack against CBC modes. 0.9.6e disabled it by default
because "some" implementations couldn't handle empty fragments. 12 years
have passed. Does anybody still care? Let's find out.
ok miod
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Gebruiker Schoot.
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were), after stumbling upon code (mis)using them in the wild.
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``debug'' code from a 15+ years old bugfix and the SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_*
constants have had a value of zero since ages. No production code should use
them.
ok beck@
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APIs that pass times as longs will have to change at some point...
Bump major on both libcrypto and libssl.
ok tedu@
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a better malloc. ok beck deraadt
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in the process, always include ssl3 and tls1, we don't need config options
for them. when the time comes to expire ssl3, it will be with an ax.
checked by miod
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readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using
tr and md5.
There is still a huge amount of inconsistency within these headers.
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ok deraadt@
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