| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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SSL3_BUFFER, SSL3_RECORD and DTLS1_RECORD_DATA are currently still in
public headers, even though their usage is internal. This moves to
using _INTERNAL suffixed versions that are in internal headers, which
then allows us to change them without any potential public API fallout.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This provides a cleaner, simpler and more readable API, with code that uses
a BUF_MEM instead of a BIO.
ok beck@ ("hurry up") and tb@.
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In January 2017, we changed large amounts of libssl's data structures to
be non-visible/internal, however intentionally left things that the
software ecosystem was needing to use. The four or so applications that
reached into libssl for record layer related state now implement
alternative code. As such, make these data structures internal.
ok tb@
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These flags enabled experimental behaviour in the write path, which nothing
uses. Removing this code greatly simplifies ssl3_write().
ok beck@ inoguchi@ sthen@ tb@
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Based on a diff from doug@, similar diff from inoguchi@
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known to be used by ports.
ok beck@
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This change adds an internal opaque struct for each of the significant
publically visible structs. The opaque struct is then allocated and
attached to the publically visible struct when the appropriate *_new()
function is called, then cleared and freed as necessary.
This will allow for changes to be made to the internals of libssl, without
requiring a major bump each time the publically visible structs are
modified.
ok beck@
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defines - do not rely on another heading making those available for us.
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Testing of an earlier revision by naddy@.
ok beck@
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Libtls is riding this crank.
ok miod@ bcook@
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This was a hack to work around problems on IE 6 with SSLv3.
ok miod@ bcook@
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For a few old releases, ECDHE-ECDSA was broken on OS X. This option
cannot differentiate between working and broken OS X so it disabled
ECDHE-ECDSA support on all OS X >= 10.6. 10.8-10.8.3 were the faulty
releases but these are no longer relevant. Tested on OS X 10.10 by jsing.
ok jsing@
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OpenSSL doesn't remember which clients were impacted and the
functionality has been broken in their stable releases for 2 years.
Based on OpenSSL commit a8e4ac6a2fe67c19672ecf0c6aeafa15801ce3a5.
ok jsing@
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Another relic due to the old US crypto policy.
From OpenSSL commit 63eab8a620944a990ab3985620966ccd9f48d681 and
95275599399e277e71d064790a1f828a99fc661a.
ok jsing@ miod@
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This allows for clients that willingly choose to perform a downgrade and
attempt to establish a second connection at a lower protocol after the
previous attempt unexpectedly failed, to be notified and have the second
connection aborted, if the server does in fact support a higher protocol.
TLS has perfectly good version negotiation and client-side fallback is
dangerous. Despite this, in order to maintain maximum compatability with
broken web servers, most mainstream browsers implement this. Furthermore,
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV only works if both the client and server support it and
there is effectively no way to tell if this is the case, unless you control
both ends.
Unfortunately, various auditors and vulnerability scanners (including
certain online assessment websites) consider the presence of a not yet
standardised feature to be important for security, even if the clients do
not perform client-side downgrade or the server only supports current TLS
protocols.
Diff is loosely based on OpenSSL with some inspiration from BoringSSL.
Discussed with beck@ and miod@.
ok bcook@
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however it is not likely to be removed any time soon.
ok beck@ miod@
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OpenBSD does not have SCTP support and it sees little use in the wild.
OPENSSL_NO_SCTP is already specified via opensslfeatures.h, hence this
is a code removal only and symbols should remain unchanged.
ok beck@ miod@ tedu@
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Remove support for conditional payload alignment, since we would never
want to turn it off. Also, consistently use size_t for calculating the
alignment.
ok miod@
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messages. This will allow for removal of repeated/duplicated code.
Additionally, DTLS was written by wholesale copying of the SSL/TLS code,
with some DTLS specifics being added to the duplicated code. Since these
SSL handshake message functions know how to handle both SSL/TLS and DTLS,
upon conversion the duplicate versions will become identical (or close to),
at which point the DTLS versions can be removed and the SSL/TLS versions
used for both protocols.
Partially based on similar changes in OpenSSL.
ok miod@
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Based on OpenSSL and BoringSSL.
ok bcook@
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This causes a libssl major version bump as this affects the layout of some
internal-but-unfortunately-made-visible structs.
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The only use for these is via SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA (which is effectively
a standards violation) and for RSA sign-only, should only be possible if
you are using an export cipher and have an RSA private key that is more
than 512 bits in size (however we no longer support export ciphers).
ok bcook@ miod@
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of writing "2". Add a define for the SSL3_CIPHER_VALUE_SIZE (rather than
using a less-readable hardcoded constant everywhere) and replace the
ssl3_put_char_by_bytes(NULL, NULL) calls with it.
ok bcook@ miod@
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completely decompressed.
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those that use EVP_AEAD instead ov EVP_CIPHER. This means being able to
change cipher state with an EVP_AEAD and being able to encrypt/decrypt
TLS using the EVP_AEAD. This has no change on existing
non-SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD ciphers.
Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
Rides the recent libssl bump.
Tested by sthen@
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7 years ago and never made it into an RFC. That code wasn't compiled in
anyway unless one would define the actual on-the-wire extension id bytes;
crank libssl major.
With help and enlightenment from Brendan MacDonell.
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magic numbers around.
ok deraadt@
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Without this an early ChangeCipherSpec message would result in session
keys being generated, along with the Finished hash for the handshake,
using an empty master secret.
For a detailed analysis see:
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/05/earlyccs.html
This is a fix for CVE-2014-0224, from OpenSSL.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by KIKUCHI Masashi. Unfortunately the
recent OpenSSL commit was the first we were made aware of the issue.
ok deraadt@ sthen@
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OPENSSL_NO_EC.
ok tedu@
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OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT.
ok tedu@
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a not quite appropriate data structure. ok jsing
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ok deraadt jsing
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readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using
tr and md5.
There is still a huge amount of inconsistency within these headers.
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openssl 0.9.8l; crank minor version; ok djm@ deraadt@; initially from jsg@
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*warning* this bumps shared lib minors for libssl and libcrypto from 2.1 to 2.2
if you are using the ssl26 packages for ssh and other things to work you will
need to get new ones (see ~beck/libsslsnap/<arch>) on cvs or ~beck/src-patent.tar.gz on cvs
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functionality for shared libs.
Note that routines such as sslv2_init and friends that use RSA will
not work due to lack of RSA in this library.
Needs documentation and help from ports for easy upgrade to full
functionality where legally possible.
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