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* ssl_cipher_process_rulestr: return early if a cipher command is invalidmillert2022-09-081-5/+2
| | | | | This is a safer fix for the bug where we might read outside rule_str buffer and is how BoringSSL fixed it. OK tb@
* ssl_cipher_process_rulestr: don't read outside rule_str buffermillert2022-09-071-2/+3
| | | | | | If rule_str ended in a "-", "l" was incremented one byte past the end of the buffer. This resulted in an out-of-bounds read when "l" is dereferenced at the end of the loop. OK tb@
* Make ssl_create_cipher_list() have a single exittb2022-09-041-23/+23
| | | | | | | | | | This simplifies memory management and makes it easier to see the leak that were introduced in the previous commit. Sprinkle a few malloc errors for consistency. CID 278396 with/ok jsing
* Check sk_SSL_CIPHER_push() return valuetb2022-09-011-4/+11
| | | | | | CID 24797 ok jsing
* Remove a commented-out sk_push that has been hanging around for > 20 yearstb2022-08-301-4/+1
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* Remove a confusing commenttb2022-06-291-7/+2
| | | | discussed with jsing
* Parse the @SECLEVEL=n annotation in cipher stringstb2022-06-291-8/+20
| | | | | | | To this end, hand the SSL_CERT through about 5 levels of indirection to set an integer on it. ok beck jsing
* Fix typo in commentbket2022-03-051-2/+2
| | | | OK tb@
* Bye bye S3I.jsing2022-02-051-3/+3
| | | | | | | | S3I has served us well, however now that libssl is fully opaque it is time to say goodbye. Aside from removing the calloc/free/memset, the rest is mechanical sed. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Transform a mangled comment into something intelligible.tb2021-11-231-2/+5
| | | | from beck
* Do a first pass clean up of SSL_METHOD.jsing2021-07-031-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | The num_ciphers, get_cipher_by_char and put_cipher_by_char function pointers use the same function for all methods - call ssl3_num_ciphers() directly, absorb ssl3_get_cipher_by_char() into SSL_CIPHER_find() and remove the unused ssl3_put_cipher_by_char() code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Explicitly include <openssl/opensslconf.h> in files using OPENSSL_NO_*jsing2021-05-161-1/+2
| | | | | | Where a file references to OPENSSL_NO_* conditions, ensure that we explicitly include <openssl/opensslconf.h> before any references, rather than relying on another header to pull this in.
* Provide SSL_CIPHER_find(3)tb2021-05-101-1/+7
| | | | ok jsing
* Rename new_cipher to cipher.jsing2021-03-241-3/+3
| | | | | | | | This is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct and is what we're currently negotiating, so there is really nothing more "new" about the cipher than there is the key block or other parts of the handshake data. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Absorb ssl3_get_algorithm2() into ssl_get_handshake_evp_md().jsing2021-02-071-2/+14
| | | | | | | | The mess that is ssl_get_algorithm2() only exists to upgrade the handshake MAC of a pre-TLSv1.2 cipher suite to SHA256 when used with TLSv1.2. We can readily do this in ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(), which is far more readable. ok tb@
* Implement SSL_{CTX_,}set_ciphersuites().jsing2020-09-131-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | | OpenSSL added a separate API for configuring TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. Provide this API, while retaining the current behaviour of being able to configure TLSv1.3 via the existing interface. Note that this is not currently exposed in the headers/exported symbols. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove cipher_list_by_id.jsing2020-09-111-14/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When parsing a cipher string, a cipher list is created, before being duplicated and sorted - the second copy being stored as cipher_list_by_id. This is done only so that a client can ensure that the cipher selected by a server is in the cipher list. This is pretty pointless given that most clients are short-lived and that we already had to iterate over the cipher list in order to build the client hello. Additionally, any update to the cipher list requires that cipher_list_by_id also be updated and kept in sync. Remove all of this and replace it with a simple linear scan - the overhead of duplicating and sorting the cipher list likely exceeds that of a simple linear scan over the cipher list (64 maximum, more typically ~9 or so). ok beck@ tb@
* Provide TLSv1.3 cipher suite aliases to match the names used in RFC 8446.jsing2020-04-191-2/+25
| | | | ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Fix wrapping/indentation.jsing2020-04-181-4/+3
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* Tweak previous active cipher suite code.jsing2020-04-181-6/+5
| | | | | | | Use a boolean value rather than using a counter, as suggested by tb@ during the previous review. ok tb@
* Only include TLSv1.3 cipher suites if there are active cipher suites.jsing2020-04-171-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | Revise the previous so that we only include TLSv1.3 cipher suites if the cipher rule string resulted in at least one active cipher suite. This more closely matches OpenSSL behaviour. Noted and fix tested by schwarze@ ok beck@ tb@
* Include TLSv1.3 cipher suites unless cipher string references TLSv1.3.jsing2020-04-091-6/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OpenSSL has always taken the approach of enabling almost everything by default. As a result, if you wanted to run a secure TLS client/server you had to specify your own "secure" cipher string, rather than being able to trust the defaults as being sensible and secure. The problem is that with the introduction of TLSv1.3, most of these "secure" cipher strings result in the new TLSv1.3 cipher suites being excluded. The "work around" for this issue in OpenSSL was to add a new TLSv1.3 API (SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(), SSL_set_ciphersuites()) and have separate knobs for the pre-TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.3 cipher suites. This of course means that every application now needs to call two APIs, but it does mean that applications that only call SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list()/SSL_set_cipher_list() cannot remove TLSv1.3 cipher suites and prevent TLSv1.3 from working. We've taken a different approach and have allowed TLSv1.3 cipher suites to be manipulated via the existing SSL_set_cipher_list() API. However, in order to avoid problems with hardcoded cipher strings, change this behaviour so that we always include TLSv1.3 cipher suites unless the cipher string has a specific reference to the TLSv1.3 protocol or a TLSv1.3 cipher suite. This means that: $ openssl ciphers -v TLSv1.2:!TLSv1.3 still gives TLSv1.2 only cipher suites and: $ openssl ciphers -v AEAD-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 only lists a single TLSv1.3 cipher, however: $ openssl ciphers -v ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 now includes both TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 and all TLSv1.3 cipher suites (which also matches OpenSSL's openssl(1) behaviour). Issue encountered by kn@ with mumble. ok tb@
* Tidy line wrapping and remove an extra blank line.jsing2020-04-091-4/+3
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* ssl_aes_is_accelerated() returns a boolean - treat it as such, rather thanjsing2020-04-091-2/+2
| | | | explicitly comparing against a value.
* Fix SSL_CIPHER_descriptioninoguchi2020-01-261-2/+2
| | | | ok jsing@
* Add strings for SSL_aTLS1_3 and SSL_kTLS1_3 to SSL_CIPHER_description().jsing2020-01-241-1/+7
| | | | | | | Mkaes `openssl ciphers -v` print au and kx values for TLSv1.3 cipher suites. ok beck@ tb@
* Clean up the cipher/digest table mess.jsing2019-04-041-174/+42
| | | | | | | | | | The original implementation allows for libcrypto to be compiled without a given algorithm and libssl then detects that ciphers or digests are unavailable so that it can disable the associated cipher suites. This is unnecessary since we do not compile out algorithms. ok beck@, tb@ (a while back)
* If ssl_cipher_apply_rule() is given a specific cipher suite, match on it.jsing2019-03-241-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Otherwise matching a specific cipher is performed by matching against its characteristics, which can result in multiple rather than a single match. Found by bluhm@'s regress tests. ok bluhm@ tb@
* Add TLSv1.3 cipher suites (with appropriate guards).jsing2018-11-071-3/+12
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Remove now unused code for EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER and EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE.jsing2018-09-081-6/+14
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* SSL_MAX_DIGEST is no longer needed.jsing2018-09-081-12/+9
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* Drop SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD flag.jsing2018-09-061-5/+3
| | | | | | | All of our algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD cipher suites use EVP_AEAD, so we can condition on that rather than having a separate redundant flag. ok tb@
* Stop using composite EVP_CIPHER AEADs.jsing2018-09-031-25/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | The composite AEADs are "stitched" mode ciphers, that are only supported on some architectures/CPUs and are designed to be faster than a separate EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD implementation. The three AEADs are used for less than ideal cipher suites (if you have hardware support that these use there are better cipher suite options), plus continuing to support AEADs via EVP_CIPHER is creating additional code complexity. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Stop handling AES-GCM via ssl_cipher_get_evp().jsing2018-09-031-20/+3
| | | | | | | All of the AES-GCM ciphersuites use the EVP_AEAD interface, so there is no need to support them via EVP_CIPHER. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up SSL_DES and SSL_IDEA remnants.jsing2018-09-031-41/+13
| | | | | | | All ciphersuites that used these encryption algorithms were removed some time ago. ok bcook@ inoguchi@ tb@
* OpenSSL started adding const to functions all over the place. Make alltb2018-04-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | our libssl functions match theirs wrt const, except for BIO_f_ssl(3) which will be fixed in a later step. this went through a i386 bulk by sthen ok jsing
* Provide SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(), SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(),jsing2018-03-171-1/+99
| | | | | SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(), SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid() and SSL_CIPHER_is_aead().
* Remove the original (pre-IETF) chacha20-poly1305 cipher suites.jsing2017-08-281-12/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Support for the IETF standardised chacha20-poly1305 cipher suites was added 16 months ago, which means they exist in both of the currently supported OpenBSD releases. Also prompted by Andreas Bartelt <obsd at bartula dot de>. ok beck@ doug@
* Remove the handshake digests and related code, replacing remaining usesjsing2017-03-101-21/+1
| | | | | | | with the handshake hash. For now tls1_digest_cached_records() is retained to release the handshake buffer. ok beck@ inoguchi@
* Provide a rolling handshake hash that commences as soon as the cipherjsing2017-03-051-1/+29
| | | | | | | | | | suite has been selected, and convert the final finish MAC to use this handshake hash. This is a first step towards cleaning up the current handshake buffer/digest code. ok beck@ inoguchi@
* Remove STREEBOG 512 as a TLS MAC since there are currently no cipher suitesjsing2017-02-211-22/+4
| | | | | | that make use of it. ok bcook@ inoguchi@
* Change SSLerror() back to taking two args, with the first one being an SSL *.beck2017-02-071-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | Make a table of "function codes" which maps the internal state of the SSL * to something like a useful name so in a typical error in the connection you know in what sort of place in the handshake things happened. (instead of by arcane function name). Add SSLerrorx() for when we don't have an SSL * ok jsing@ after us both being prodded by bluhm@ to make it not terrible
* Finish the fallout of the SSLerr->SSLerror cleanup to get rid of the uglybeck2017-01-261-5/+3
| | | | line wraps that resulted
* Send the error function codes to rot in the depths of hell where they belongbeck2017-01-261-6/+6
| | | | | | | We leave a single funciton code (0xFFF) to say "SSL_internal" so the public API will not break, and we replace all internal use of the two argument SSL_err() with the internal only SSL_error() that only takes a reason code. ok jsing@
* sk_SSL_CIPHER_free() checks for NULL so do not bother doing the same fromjsing2017-01-241-5/+3
| | | | the callers.
* Remove the single IDEA cipher suite. There is no good reason to supportjsing2016-11-061-6/+1
| | | | | | this. ok beck@ bcook@
* unifdef -m -UOPENSSL_NO_CHACHA -UOPENSSL_NO_POLY1305jsing2016-11-061-3/+1
| | | | ok beck@
* Remove support for fixed ECDH cipher suites - these is not widely supportedjsing2016-10-191-30/+2
| | | | | | | | | and more importantly they do not provide PFS (if you want to use ECDH, use ECDHE instead). With input from guenther@. ok deraadt@ guenther@
* Implement the IETF ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites.jsing2016-04-281-6/+16
| | | | | | | | | Rename the existing ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites with an "-OLD" suffix, effectively replaces the original Google implementation. We continue to support both the IETF and Google versions, however the existing names now refer to the ciphers from draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04. Feedback from doug@
* Rename EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305() to EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_old()jsing2016-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | and replace with EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_ietf(). The IETF version will become the standard version. Discussed with many.
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