| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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compression associated with the SSL session. Based on one of Adam Langley's
chromium diffs, factor out the compression handling code into a separate
ssl_cipher_get_comp() function.
Rewrite the compression handling code to avoid pointless duplication and so
that failures are actually returned to and detectable by the caller.
ok miod@
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arrays.
"kind of scary" deraadt@, ok guenther@
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ok beck@ miod@
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all on their own and we can't effectively maintain them without using them,
which we don't. If the need arises, the code can be resurrected.
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this instance is integer-overflowable, but we cannot keep hand-auditing
every instance (or apathetically ignoring these issues) when the simple
calloc idiom is better in the presence of a good calloc(). It is simply
unfeasible to always enter correct range checks before the aggregate
size calculation, just go find some 4000 lines of code, REPAIR THEM ALL,
then come back and tell me I am wrong.
This only works on systems where calloc() does the integer overflow
check, but if your system doesn't do this, you need to ask your vendor
WHY THEY ARE 10 YEARS BEHIND IN BEST PRACTICE? This is the kind of
problem that needs to be solved at the right layer.
malloc integer-overflow was implicated in the 2002 OpenSSH hole. OpenSSH
and much other code is now written to use calloc(), for instance OpenSSH
has 103 calls to it. We feel safer with our use of calloc(). It is a
natural approach for us to use calloc(). How safe do you feel on systems
which lack that range check in their calloc()?
Good writeup from 2006: http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20060330071917
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OPENSSL_foo wrappers. This changes:
OPENSSL_malloc->malloc
OPENSSL_free->free
OPENSSL_relloc->realloc
OPENSSL_freeFunc->free
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meets their needs, but dumping it in here only penalizes the rest of us.
ok miod
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with the bearded ones...
some API's that nobody should be using will dissapear with this commit.
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and allow for the normal posix mandated return values instead of the
nonstandard one from BIO_snprintf.
ok miod@
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readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using
tr and md5.
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is for future safety and consistency.
OK krw@, markus@
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noticed by Sverre Froyen <sverre@viewmark.com>
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*warning* this bumps shared lib minors for libssl and libcrypto from 2.1 to 2.2
if you are using the ssl26 packages for ssh and other things to work you will
need to get new ones (see ~beck/libsslsnap/<arch>) on cvs or ~beck/src-patent.tar.gz on cvs
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functionality for shared libs.
Note that routines such as sslv2_init and friends that use RSA will
not work due to lack of RSA in this library.
Needs documentation and help from ports for easy upgrade to full
functionality where legally possible.
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