| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | ||
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| * | Wrap some long lines. | jsing | 2014-05-27 | 1 | -4/+8 | |
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| * | Remove MemCheck_{on,off} that escaped last time around. | jsing | 2014-05-27 | 1 | -4/+0 | |
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| * | More KNF. | jsing | 2014-05-27 | 1 | -2/+2 | |
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| * | Unchecked malloc() return value in SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(), in the | miod | 2014-05-26 | 1 | -0/+4 | |
| | | | | | | !OPENSSL_NO_COMP case. Does not affect OpenBSD as we compile the opposite code path. | |||||
| * | Remove TLS_DEBUG, SSL_DEBUG, CIPHER_DEBUG and OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG. Much of | jsing | 2014-05-25 | 1 | -13/+0 | |
| | | | | | | | | this is sporadic, hacked up and can easily be put back in an improved form should we ever need it. ok miod@ | |||||
| * | Turn off MemCheck_on and MemCheck_off. These calls are pointless since the | jsing | 2014-05-25 | 1 | -2/+0 | |
| | | | | | | | crypto memory debugging code has been castrated. ok miod@ "kill it" beck@ | |||||
| * | The ssl_ciper_get_evp() function is currently overloaded to also return the | jsing | 2014-05-25 | 1 | -22/+32 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | compression associated with the SSL session. Based on one of Adam Langley's chromium diffs, factor out the compression handling code into a separate ssl_cipher_get_comp() function. Rewrite the compression handling code to avoid pointless duplication and so that failures are actually returned to and detectable by the caller. ok miod@ | |||||
| * | In ssl_cipher_get_evp(), fix off-by-one in index validation before accessing | miod | 2014-05-24 | 1 | -2/+2 | |
| | | | | | | | arrays. "kind of scary" deraadt@, ok guenther@ | |||||
| * | KSSL is dead... nuke KSSL_DEBUG from orbit. | jsing | 2014-05-20 | 1 | -14/+0 | |
| | | | | | ok beck@ miod@ | |||||
| * | Remove SRP and Kerberos support from libssl. These are complex protocols | tedu | 2014-05-05 | 1 | -4/+0 | |
| | | | | | | all on their own and we can't effectively maintain them without using them, which we don't. If the need arises, the code can be resurrected. | |||||
| * | switch to reallocarray | tedu | 2014-04-22 | 1 | -2/+2 | |
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| * | use mallocarray(a,b) instead of malloc(a*b) | deraadt | 2014-04-21 | 1 | -2/+2 | |
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| * | more malloc/realloc/calloc cleanups; ok beck kettenis | deraadt | 2014-04-21 | 1 | -2/+2 | |
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| * | Use calloc(a,b) instead of malloc(a*b) + memset(a*b). I don't know if | deraadt | 2014-04-20 | 1 | -2/+1 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | this instance is integer-overflowable, but we cannot keep hand-auditing every instance (or apathetically ignoring these issues) when the simple calloc idiom is better in the presence of a good calloc(). It is simply unfeasible to always enter correct range checks before the aggregate size calculation, just go find some 4000 lines of code, REPAIR THEM ALL, then come back and tell me I am wrong. This only works on systems where calloc() does the integer overflow check, but if your system doesn't do this, you need to ask your vendor WHY THEY ARE 10 YEARS BEHIND IN BEST PRACTICE? This is the kind of problem that needs to be solved at the right layer. malloc integer-overflow was implicated in the 2002 OpenSSH hole. OpenSSH and much other code is now written to use calloc(), for instance OpenSSH has 103 calls to it. We feel safer with our use of calloc(). It is a natural approach for us to use calloc(). How safe do you feel on systems which lack that range check in their calloc()? Good writeup from 2006: http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20060330071917 | |||||
| * | More KNF and style consistency tweaks | guenther | 2014-04-19 | 1 | -18/+18 | |
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| * | always build in RSA and DSA. ok deraadt miod | tedu | 2014-04-17 | 1 | -7/+0 | |
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| * | Change library to use intrinsic memory allocation functions instead of | beck | 2014-04-17 | 1 | -17/+17 | |
| | | | | | | | | | OPENSSL_foo wrappers. This changes: OPENSSL_malloc->malloc OPENSSL_free->free OPENSSL_relloc->realloc OPENSSL_freeFunc->free | |||||
| * | add back SRP. i was being too greedy. | tedu | 2014-04-16 | 1 | -0/+2 | |
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| * | disentangle SRP code from TLS | tedu | 2014-04-16 | 1 | -2/+0 | |
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| * | repair some whitespace | tedu | 2014-04-15 | 1 | -50/+44 | |
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| * | remove FIPS mode support. people who require FIPS can buy something that | tedu | 2014-04-15 | 1 | -14/+1 | |
| | | | | | | meets their needs, but dumping it in here only penalizes the rest of us. ok miod | |||||
| * | Send the rotIBM stream cipher (ebcdic) to Valhalla to party for eternity | beck | 2014-04-15 | 1 | -4/+0 | |
| | | | | | | with the bearded ones... some API's that nobody should be using will dissapear with this commit. | |||||
| * | Flense all use of BIO_snprintf from ssl source - use the real one instead, | beck | 2014-04-14 | 1 | -4/+7 | |
| | | | | | | | and allow for the normal posix mandated return values instead of the nonstandard one from BIO_snprintf. ok miod@ | |||||
| * | First pass at applying KNF to the OpenSSL code, which almost makes it | jsing | 2014-04-14 | 1 | -713/+680 | |
| | | | | | | readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using tr and md5. | |||||
| * | Merge conflicts; remove MacOS, Netware, OS/2, VMS and Windows build machinery. | miod | 2014-04-13 | 1 | -2/+3 | |
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| * | resolve conflicts | djm | 2012-10-13 | 1 | -14/+119 | |
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| * | OpenSSL 1.0.0f: merge | djm | 2012-01-05 | 1 | -0/+1 | |
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| * | openssl-1.0.0e: resolve conflicts | djm | 2011-11-03 | 1 | -4/+2 | |
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| * | resolve conflicts, fix local changes | djm | 2010-10-01 | 1 | -331/+692 | |
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| * | resolve conflicts | djm | 2009-04-06 | 1 | -1/+1 | |
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| * | resolve conflicts | djm | 2009-01-09 | 1 | -0/+3 | |
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| * | update to openssl-0.9.8i; tested by several, especially krw@ | djm | 2009-01-05 | 1 | -0/+10 | |
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| * | resolve conflicts | djm | 2008-09-06 | 1 | -72/+307 | |
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| * | resolve conflicts | djm | 2006-06-27 | 1 | -41/+23 | |
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| * | resolve conflicts | djm | 2005-04-29 | 1 | -5/+16 | |
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| * | merge 0.9.7d | markus | 2004-04-08 | 1 | -39/+40 | |
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| * | Correct some off-by-ones. They currently don't matter, but this | cloder | 2003-10-01 | 1 | -3/+3 | |
| | | | | | | is for future safety and consistency. OK krw@, markus@ | |||||
| * | merge 0.9.7b with local changes; crank majors for libssl/libcrypto | markus | 2003-05-12 | 1 | -4/+10 | |
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| * | merge openssl-0.9.7-beta3, tested on vax by miod@ | markus | 2002-09-10 | 1 | -7/+8 | |
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| * | do not propose IDEA cipher on SSL connection. tested by beck | itojun | 2002-06-07 | 1 | -0/+6 | |
| | | | | | noticed by Sverre Froyen <sverre@viewmark.com> | |||||
| * | OpenSSL 0.9.7 stable 2002 05 08 merge | beck | 2002-05-15 | 1 | -8/+69 | |
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| * | openssl-engine-0.9.6 merge | beck | 2000-12-15 | 1 | -15/+17 | |
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| * | OpenSSL 0.9.5a merge | beck | 2000-04-15 | 1 | -38/+39 | |
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| * | OpenSSL 0.9.5 merge | beck | 2000-03-19 | 1 | -296/+529 | |
| | | | | | | | *warning* this bumps shared lib minors for libssl and libcrypto from 2.1 to 2.2 if you are using the ssl26 packages for ssh and other things to work you will need to get new ones (see ~beck/libsslsnap/<arch>) on cvs or ~beck/src-patent.tar.gz on cvs | |||||
| * | OpenSSL 0.9.4 merge | beck | 1999-09-29 | 1 | -58/+135 | |
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| * | Import of SSLeay-0.9.0b with RSA and IDEA stubbed + OpenBSD build | ryker | 1998-10-05 | 1 | -0/+758 | |
| functionality for shared libs. Note that routines such as sslv2_init and friends that use RSA will not work due to lack of RSA in this library. Needs documentation and help from ports for easy upgrade to full functionality where legally possible. | ||||||
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