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* Return 0 on failure from send/get kex functions in the legacy stack.jsing2022-01-041-25/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | In the legacy stack, a message handling function returns -1 for failure, 0 for need more data and 1 for success (although in extra special cases 2 may also be used). However, the various send/get kex functions only need to indicate success or failure - switch these to return 0 on failure (rather than -1) and use normal result testing. This leaves GOST unchanged for now, as that code is special and needs extra work. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Use normal result testing for tls1_check_curve().jsing2022-01-041-2/+2
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* Refactor ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe() to separate parsing and validation.jsing2022-01-041-20/+18
| | | | | | | | | If we receive something other than a "named curve", send a handshake failure alert as we're unable to complete the handshake with the given parameters. If the server responded with a curve that we did not advertise send an illegal parameter alert. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Convert ssl_clnt.c to opaque EVP_MD_CTXtb2021-12-091-26/+29
| | | | ok inoguchi jsing
* Move the minimum DHE key size check into ssl_kex_peer_params_dhe()jsing2021-12-041-8/+5
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Check DH public key in ssl_kex_peer_public_dhe().jsing2021-12-041-2/+8
| | | | | | | Call DH_check_pub_key() after decoding the peer public key - this will be needed for the server DHE key exchange, but also benefits the client. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Factor out/rewrite DHE key exchange.jsing2021-11-291-64/+20
| | | | | | | | | This follows what was done previously for ECDHE EC point key exchange and will allow for deduplication and further code improvement. Convert the TLSv1.2 client to use the new DHE key exchange functions. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Stop reaching into EVP_PKEY in the rest of libssl.tb2021-11-261-12/+18
| | | | ok inoguchi jsing
* libssl: don't reach for pkey->save_type.tb2021-11-191-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | For some strange historical reason ECDSA_sign() and ECDSA_verify}() have a type argument that they ignore. For another strange historical reason, the type passed to them from libssl is pkey->save_type, which is used to avoid expensive engine lookups when setting the pkey type... Whatever the aforementioned reasons were, we can't access pkey->save_type with the OpenSSL 1.1 API, and this is thus in the way of making EVP_PKEY opaque. Simply pass in 0 instead. ok jsing
* Fold SSL_SESSION_INTERNAL back into SSL_SESSION.jsing2021-10-251-18/+18
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Unhandroll X509_up_ref()tb2021-10-231-3/+3
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Provide a way to determine our maximum legacy version.jsing2021-10-231-36/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the introduction of TLSv1.3, we need the ability to determine our maximum legacy version and to track our peer's maximum legacy version. This is needed for both the TLS record layer when using TLSv1.3, plus it is needed for RSA key exhange in TLS prior to TLSv1.3, where the maximum legacy version is incorporated in the pre-master secret to avoid downgrade attacks. This unbreaks RSA KEX for the TLS client when the non-version specific method is used with TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1 (clearly no one does this). ok tb@
* Fold DTLS1_STATE_INTERNAL into DTLS1_STATE.jsing2021-10-231-18/+18
| | | | | | | Now that DTLS1_STATE is opaque, fold DTLS1_STATE_INTERNAL back into DTLS1_STATE and remove D1I() usage. ok tb@
* Untangle ssl3_get_message() return values.jsing2021-10-231-94/+81
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This function currently has a long return type that may be <= 0 on error/retry (which is then cast to an int in order to return it up the stack), or it returns the length of the handshake message (on success). This obviously means that 0 can be returned for both success and failure, which is the reason why a separate 'ok' argument has to exist. Untangle this mess by changing the return value to an int that indicates success (1) or error/retry (<= 0). The length never needs to actually be returned as it is already stored in s->internal->init_num (which is where the return value is read from anyway). ok tb@
* Change tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint to uint32_t.jsing2021-10-231-5/+2
| | | | | | | | Now that SSL_SESSION is opaque, change tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint from long to uint32_t (matching RFC4507), rather than continuing to work around an inappropriate type choice. ok tb@
* Ensure that a server hello does not have trailing data.jsing2021-09-031-1/+4
| | | | | | Found by tlsfuzzer. ok beck@
* We need to allow for either a CERTIFICATE or CERTIFICATE_STATUS messagebeck2021-09-021-2/+3
| | | | | | here or we break the handshake with BAD_MESSAGE ok tb@
* RFC 6066 section 8 allows the server MAY choose not send the CertificateStatusbeck2021-09-021-3/+37
| | | | | | | | message, even if it has received a "status_request" extension in the client hello message and has sent a "status_request" extention in the server hello message. Genua found a site that is this broken. This makes it work. ok jsing@
* Clean up and simplify info and msg callbacks.jsing2021-08-301-16/+8
| | | | | | | | | The info and msg callbacks result in duplication - both for code that refers to the function pointers and for the call sites. Avoid this by providing typedefs for the function pointers and pulling the calling sequences into their own functions. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Correct sigalg hash usage when signing content for client verify.jsing2021-06-301-3/+2
| | | | This was inadvertently broken during sigalgs refactoring.
* Pull sigalg selection up into ssl3_send_client_verify().jsing2021-06-291-14/+11
| | | | | | | | This means that we do sigalg selection for all cases, including those where are are not sending sigalgs. This is needed in order to track our signature type in legacy cases. ok tb@
* Track sigalg used by ourselves and our peer in the legacy stack.jsing2021-06-291-1/+3
| | | | This is needed for upcoming API additions.
* Convert legacy stack client to ssl_sigalg_for_peer().jsing2021-06-291-34/+12
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Move the RSA-PSS check for TLSv1.3 to ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok().jsing2021-06-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Also, rather than passing in a check_curve flag, pass in the SSL * and handle version checks internally to ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(), simplifying the callers. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Have ssl3_send_client_verify() pass *pkey to called functions.jsing2021-06-271-22/+11
| | | | | | ssl3_send_client_verify() already has a pointer to the EVP_PKEY for the certificate - pass this as an argument to the functions that it calls, rather than duplicating code/variable declarations.
* Change ssl_sigalgs_from_value() to perform sigalg list selection.jsing2021-06-271-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | Rather that passing in a sigalg list at every call site, pass in the appropriate TLS version and have ssl_sigalgs_from_value() perform the sigalg list selection itself. This allows the sigalg lists to be made internal to the sigalgs code. ok tb@
* Rename ssl_sigalg() to ssl_sigalg_from_value().jsing2021-06-271-3/+3
| | | | | | | This makes the code more self-documenting and avoids the ambiguity between ssl_sigalg the struct and ssl_sigalg the function. ok tb@
* Make local header inclusion consistent.jsing2021-05-161-3/+2
| | | | | Consistently include local headers in the same location, using the same grouping/sorting across all files.
* Move DTLS structs/definitions/prototypes to dtls_locl.h.jsing2021-05-161-1/+2
| | | | | | | | Now that the DTLS structs are opaque, add a dtls_locl.h header and move internal-only structs from dtls1.h, along with prototypes from ssl_locl.h. Only pull this header in where DTLS code actually exists. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Explicitly include <openssl/opensslconf.h> in files using OPENSSL_NO_*jsing2021-05-161-1/+2
| | | | | | Where a file references to OPENSSL_NO_* conditions, ensure that we explicitly include <openssl/opensslconf.h> before any references, rather than relying on another header to pull this in.
* Clean up tls1_change_cipher_state().jsing2021-05-021-5/+3
| | | | | | | | Replace flag gymnastics at call sites with separate read and write, functions which call the common code. Condition on s->server instead of using SSL_ST_ACCEPT, for consistency and more readable code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up dtls1_reset_seq_numbers().jsing2021-05-021-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Rather than doing flag gymnastics, split dtls1_reset_seq_numbers() into separate read and write functions. Move the calls of these functions into tls1_change_cipher_state() so they directly follow the change of cipher state in the record layer, which avoids having to duplicate the calls in the client and server. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up and harden TLSv1.2 master key derivation.jsing2021-04-301-17/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | The master key and its length are only stored in one location, so it makes no sense to handle these outside of the derivation function (the current 'out' argument is unused). This simplifies the various call sites. If derivation fails for some reason, fail hard rather than continuing on and hoping that something deals with this correctly later. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up derivation of finished/peer finished.jsing2021-04-251-3/+2
| | | | | | | | Make this process more readable by having specific client/server functions, calling the correct one based on s->server. This allows to remove various SSL_ST_ACCEPT/SSL_ST_CONNECT checks, along with duplicate code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up TLSv1.2 certificate request handshake data.jsing2021-04-211-24/+12
| | | | | | | | | | Currently cert_req is used by clients and cert_request is used by servers. Replace this by a single cert_request used by either client or server. Remove the certificate types as they are currently unused. This also fixes a bug whereby if the number of certificate types exceeds SSL3_CT_NUMBER the number of bytes read in is insufficient, which will break decoding. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Move reuse_message, message_type, message_size and cert_verify into thejsing2021-04-191-21/+21
| | | | | | TLSv1.2 handshake struct. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Update a stale comment and fix a typo.tb2021-04-111-3/+3
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* Garbage collect s->internal->typetb2021-03-271-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This variable is used in the legacy stack to decide whether we are a server or a client. That's what s->server is for... The new TLSv1.3 stack failed to set s->internal->type, which resulted in hilarious mishandling of previous_{client,server}_finished. Indeed, both client and server would first store the client's verify_data in previous_server_finished and later overwrite it with the server's verify_data. Consequently, renegotiation has been completely broken for more than a year. In fact, server side renegotiation was broken during the 6.5 release cycle. Clearly, no-one uses this. This commit fixes client side renegotiation and restores the previous behavior of SSL_get_client_CA_list(). Server side renegotiation will be fixed in a later commit. ok jsing
* Rename new_cipher to cipher.jsing2021-03-241-14/+14
| | | | | | | | This is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct and is what we're currently negotiating, so there is really nothing more "new" about the cipher than there is the key block or other parts of the handshake data. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Add SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS12 for TLSv1.2 specific handshake data.jsing2021-03-241-7/+7
| | | | | | Move TLSv1.2 specific components over from SSL_HANDSHAKE. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove ssl_downgrade_max_version().jsing2021-03-111-7/+4
| | | | | | | Now that we store our maximum TLS version at the start of the handshake, we can check against that directly. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Improve internal version handling.jsing2021-03-101-3/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add handshake fields for our minimum TLS version, our maximum TLS version and the TLS version negotiated during the handshake. Initialise our min/max versions at the start of the handshake and leave these unchanged. The negotiated TLS version is set in the client once we receive the ServerHello and in the server at the point we select the highest shared version. Provide an ssl_effective_version() function that returns the negotiated TLS version if known, otherwise our maximum TLS version - this is effectively what is stored in s->version currently. Convert most of the internal code to use one of these three version fields, which greatly simplifies code (especially in the TLS extension handling code). ok tb@
* Factor out/change some of the legacy client version handling code.jsing2021-02-221-9/+4
| | | | | | | This consolidates the version handling code and will make upcoming changes easier. ok tb@
* ugly whitespacetb2021-02-201-8/+8
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* Rename f_err into fatal_err.tb2021-02-201-60/+60
| | | | discussed with jsing
* Rename the truncated label into decode_err. This describes its purposetb2021-02-201-46/+46
| | | | | | | better and doesn't look odd if there's trailing data for exapmle. Indent a few labels in the neighborhood while there. ok jsing
* Revise HelloVerifyRequest handling for DTLSv1.2.jsing2021-02-201-2/+7
| | | | | | | | Per RFC 6347 section 4.2.1, the HelloVerifyRequest should always contain DTLSv1.0 - ensure this is the case on the server side, allow both DTLSv1.0 and DTLSv1.2 on the client. ok tb@
* Group HelloVerifyRequest decoding and add missing check for trailing data.jsing2021-02-201-4/+5
| | | | ok tb@
* Absorb ssl3_get_algorithm2() into ssl_get_handshake_evp_md().jsing2021-02-071-2/+3
| | | | | | | | The mess that is ssl_get_algorithm2() only exists to upgrade the handshake MAC of a pre-TLSv1.2 cipher suite to SHA256 when used with TLSv1.2. We can readily do this in ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(), which is far more readable. ok tb@
* Factor out the legacy stack version checks.jsing2021-02-071-13/+5
| | | | | | | Also check for explicit version numbers, rather than just the major version value. ok tb@
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