| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Tidy up CBS code and remove some unnecessary length checks. Use 'cert' and
'certs' for certificates, rather than 'x' and 'sk'.
ok tb@
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This reworks various tls1_ curve APIs to indicate success via a boolean
return value and move the output to an out parameter. This makes the
caller code easier and more consistent.
Based on a suggestion by jsing
ok jsing
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versions below the minimum required by the security level.
input & ok jsing
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ok beck jsing
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ok beck, looks good to jsing
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Now that session_id_length is a size_t, we can pass it directly to
CBS_write_bytes() instead of using a temporary variable.
ok jsing
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EVP_Digest() can fail, so handle failure appropriately and prepare
switch of session_id_length to a size_t.
ok jsing
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respectively
ok jsing
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Failure of this undocumented callback was previously silently ignored.
Follow OpenSSL's behavior and throw an internal error (for lack of a
better choice) if the callback failed or if it set the master_key_length
to a negative number.
Unindent the success path and clean up some strange idioms.
ok jsing
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The fallback to SHA-1 if SHA-256 is disabled fell victim to tedu many
moons ago when this file was still called s3_clnt.c and had no RCS ID.
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S3I has served us well, however now that libssl is fully opaque it is time
to say goodbye. Aside from removing the calloc/free/memset, the rest is
mechanical sed.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Remove the X509 argument as it is unused - this was passed so that
ssl_cert_type() can get the public key from the X509 object if the
EVP_PKEY argument is NULL, however this is never the case.
ok tb@
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ret is used to bubble up an error from ssl3_get_message() and is unused
otherwise. Zap dead store and silly ret = 1; return ret;
ok inoguchi jsing
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'goto fatal_err' so that the illegal_parameter alert is
actually sent in case of X509_get0_pubkey() failure.
ok inoguchi jsing
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peer_pkeys comes from some world where peers can send multiple certificates
- in fact, one of each known type. Since we do not live in such a world,
get rid of peer_pkeys and simply use peer_cert instead (in both TLSv1.2
and TLSv1.3, both clients and servers can only send a single leaf
(aka end-entity) certificate).
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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The 'peer' member of SSL_SESSION is the leaf/end-entity certificate
provided by our peer. Rename it since 'peer' on its own is unhelpful.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Distinguish between decode errors and other errors, so that we can send
a SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR alert when appropriate.
Fixes a tlsfuzzer failure, due to it expecting a decode error alert and
not receiving one.
Prompted by anton@
ok tb@
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If a libssl function takes an SSL *, it should normally be the first
argument.
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Fix leaks, use sizeof() instead of hardcoded sizes, actually check return
codes, explicit_bzero() the premaster secret on the server side and
generally try to kick the GOST kex code into some sort of shape.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Like other KEX handling functions, there is no need to return anything
other than failure/success here.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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With TLSv1.2 and earlier, the authentication algorithm used to sign the
ServerKeyExchange message is dependent on the cipher suite in use and has
nothing to do with the key exchange algorithm. As such, check the
authentication algorithm based on the cipher suite in
ssl3_get_server_key_exchange() and handle things accordingly.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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There is no reason for SESS_CERT to exist - remove it and merge its members
into SSL_SESSION for the time being. More clean up to follow.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This requires adding DHE support to tls_key_share. In doing so,
tls_key_share_peer_public() has to lose the group argument and gains
an invalid_key argument. The one place that actually needs the group
check is tlsext_keyshare_client_parse(), so add code to do this.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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In the legacy stack, a message handling function returns -1 for failure,
0 for need more data and 1 for success (although in extra special cases
2 may also be used). However, the various send/get kex functions only
need to indicate success or failure - switch these to return 0 on failure
(rather than -1) and use normal result testing.
This leaves GOST unchanged for now, as that code is special and needs
extra work.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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If we receive something other than a "named curve", send a handshake
failure alert as we're unable to complete the handshake with the given
parameters. If the server responded with a curve that we did not advertise
send an illegal parameter alert.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi jsing
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Call DH_check_pub_key() after decoding the peer public key - this will be
needed for the server DHE key exchange, but also benefits the client.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This follows what was done previously for ECDHE EC point key exchange and
will allow for deduplication and further code improvement.
Convert the TLSv1.2 client to use the new DHE key exchange functions.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi jsing
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For some strange historical reason ECDSA_sign() and ECDSA_verify}() have
a type argument that they ignore. For another strange historical reason,
the type passed to them from libssl is pkey->save_type, which is used to
avoid expensive engine lookups when setting the pkey type... Whatever the
aforementioned reasons were, we can't access pkey->save_type with the
OpenSSL 1.1 API, and this is thus in the way of making EVP_PKEY opaque.
Simply pass in 0 instead.
ok jsing
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ok beck@ tb@
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ok beck jsing
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With the introduction of TLSv1.3, we need the ability to determine our
maximum legacy version and to track our peer's maximum legacy version.
This is needed for both the TLS record layer when using TLSv1.3, plus
it is needed for RSA key exhange in TLS prior to TLSv1.3, where the
maximum legacy version is incorporated in the pre-master secret to
avoid downgrade attacks.
This unbreaks RSA KEX for the TLS client when the non-version specific
method is used with TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1 (clearly no one does this).
ok tb@
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Now that DTLS1_STATE is opaque, fold DTLS1_STATE_INTERNAL back into
DTLS1_STATE and remove D1I() usage.
ok tb@
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This function currently has a long return type that may be <= 0 on
error/retry (which is then cast to an int in order to return it up the
stack), or it returns the length of the handshake message (on success).
This obviously means that 0 can be returned for both success and failure,
which is the reason why a separate 'ok' argument has to exist.
Untangle this mess by changing the return value to an int that indicates
success (1) or error/retry (<= 0). The length never needs to actually be
returned as it is already stored in s->internal->init_num (which is where
the return value is read from anyway).
ok tb@
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Now that SSL_SESSION is opaque, change tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint from long
to uint32_t (matching RFC4507), rather than continuing to work around an
inappropriate type choice.
ok tb@
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Found by tlsfuzzer.
ok beck@
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here or we break the handshake with BAD_MESSAGE
ok tb@
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message, even if it has received a "status_request" extension in the client
hello message and has sent a "status_request" extention in the server hello
message. Genua found a site that is this broken. This makes it work.
ok jsing@
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The info and msg callbacks result in duplication - both for code that
refers to the function pointers and for the call sites. Avoid this by
providing typedefs for the function pointers and pulling the calling
sequences into their own functions.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This was inadvertently broken during sigalgs refactoring.
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This means that we do sigalg selection for all cases, including those
where are are not sending sigalgs. This is needed in order to track our
signature type in legacy cases.
ok tb@
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This is needed for upcoming API additions.
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Also, rather than passing in a check_curve flag, pass in the SSL * and
handle version checks internally to ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(), simplifying
the callers.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ssl3_send_client_verify() already has a pointer to the EVP_PKEY for the
certificate - pass this as an argument to the functions that it calls,
rather than duplicating code/variable declarations.
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