| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This allows for clients that willingly choose to perform a downgrade and
attempt to establish a second connection at a lower protocol after the
previous attempt unexpectedly failed, to be notified and have the second
connection aborted, if the server does in fact support a higher protocol.
TLS has perfectly good version negotiation and client-side fallback is
dangerous. Despite this, in order to maintain maximum compatability with
broken web servers, most mainstream browsers implement this. Furthermore,
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV only works if both the client and server support it and
there is effectively no way to tell if this is the case, unless you control
both ends.
Unfortunately, various auditors and vulnerability scanners (including
certain online assessment websites) consider the presence of a not yet
standardised feature to be important for security, even if the clients do
not perform client-side downgrade or the server only supports current TLS
protocols.
Diff is loosely based on OpenSSL with some inspiration from BoringSSL.
Discussed with beck@ and miod@.
ok bcook@
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Based on OpenSSL.
ok miod@
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those that use EVP_AEAD instead ov EVP_CIPHER. This means being able to
change cipher state with an EVP_AEAD and being able to encrypt/decrypt
TLS using the EVP_AEAD. This has no change on existing
non-SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD ciphers.
Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
Rides the recent libssl bump.
Tested by sthen@
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7 years ago and never made it into an RFC. That code wasn't compiled in
anyway unless one would define the actual on-the-wire extension id bytes;
crank libssl major.
With help and enlightenment from Brendan MacDonell.
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switching cipher states using an EVP_CIPHER. This will facilitate the
addition of cipher state changes for EVP_AEAD. No functional change.
Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
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From Marcos Marado:
OK from tedu@
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compression associated with the SSL session. Based on one of Adam Langley's
chromium diffs, factor out the compression handling code into a separate
ssl_cipher_get_comp() function.
Rewrite the compression handling code to avoid pointless duplication and so
that failures are actually returned to and detectable by the caller.
ok miod@
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readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using
tr and md5.
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new minor for libcrypto (_X509_REQ_print_ex)
tested by miod@, pb@
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http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=openssl-dev&m=102802395104110&w=2
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*warning* this bumps shared lib minors for libssl and libcrypto from 2.1 to 2.2
if you are using the ssl26 packages for ssh and other things to work you will
need to get new ones (see ~beck/libsslsnap/<arch>) on cvs or ~beck/src-patent.tar.gz on cvs
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functionality for shared libs.
Note that routines such as sslv2_init and friends that use RSA will
not work due to lack of RSA in this library.
Needs documentation and help from ports for easy upgrade to full
functionality where legally possible.
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