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* Disable TLSv1.3 client while some known issues are being addressed.jsing2020-02-011-1/+3
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* Provide struct/functions for handling TLSv1.3 key shares.jsing2020-01-301-6/+2
| | | | | | | Pull out the key share handling code and provide a clean/self contained interface. This will make it easier to support groups other than X25519. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Factor out/rewrite the ECDHE EC point key exchange code.jsing2020-01-301-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | This reduces replication between the existing TLS client/server and allows the code to soon be reused for TLSv1.3. With feedback from inoguchi@ and tb@ ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove dead prototypes.jsing2020-01-291-10/+1
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* Remove the ssl_get_message function pointer from SSL_METHOD_INTERNAL.jsing2020-01-231-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | ssl_get_message is essentially a switch between ssl3_get_message and dtls1_get_message, both only used by the legacy stack. Instead, use SSL_IS_DTLS() in ssl3_get_message to call the DTLS function when necessary. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Correctly handle TLSv1.3 ciphers suites in ssl3_choose_cipher().jsing2020-01-231-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | Currently, TLSv1.3 cipher suites are filtered out by the fact that they have authentication and key exchange algorithms that are not being set in ssl_set_cert_masks(). Fix this so that ssl3_choose_cipher() works for TLSv1.3, however we also now need to ensure that we filter out TLSv1.3 for non-TLSv1.3 and only select TLSv1.3 for TLSv1.3. ok beck@ tb@
* Save the legacy session id in the client, and enforce that it is returnedbeck2020-01-231-1/+5
| | | | | | the same from the server. ok jsing@ tb@
* Switch back to a function pointer for ssl_pending.jsing2020-01-231-3/+4
| | | | | | | This will allow the TLSv1.3 stack to provide its own implementation. Nuke a completely bogus comment from SSL_pending() whilst here. ok beck@
* Wire up the TLSv1.3 server.jsing2020-01-221-1/+2
| | | | | | | | This currently only has enough code to handle fallback to the legacy TLS stack for TLSv1.2 or earlier, however allows for further development and testing. ok beck@
* Fix things so that `make -DTLS1_3` works again.jsing2020-01-221-1/+3
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* Enable the TLSv1.3 client in libssl.jsing2020-01-221-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This also makes it available to clients that use libtls, including ftp(1) and nc(1). Note that this does not expose additional defines via public headers, which means that any code conditioning on defines like TLS1_3_VERSION or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 will not enable or use TLSv1.3. This approach is necessary since too many pieces of software assume that if TLS1_3_VERSION is available, other OpenSSL 1.1 API will also be available, which is not necessarily the case. ok beck@ tb@
* Move guards from public to internal headers, and fix not use values.beck2020-01-221-1/+6
| | | | | | reverts previous attempt which would have broken ports ok jsing@
* Bring back the ssl_shutdown internal method pointer.jsing2019-11-171-1/+2
| | | | | | | For now ssl3_shutdown() is called in all cases, however TLSv1.3 will soon get its own version. ok beck@
* Pass the session ID down to the session/ticket handling code as a CBS.jsing2019-04-221-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | Convert ssl_get_prev_session(), tls1_process_ticket() and tls1_decrypt_ticket() to handle the session ID from the client hello as a CBS. While here also swap the order of arguments for tls1_decrypt_ticket() so that it is consistent with the other functions. ok tb@
* Inline and remove the tlsext_tick_md macro.jsing2019-04-221-2/+1
| | | | | | | There is not much point having a tlsext_tick_md macro that replaces EVP_sha256() in two places, when the cipher is just hardcoded. ok tb@
* Clean up the cipher/digest table mess.jsing2019-04-041-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | The original implementation allows for libcrypto to be compiled without a given algorithm and libssl then detects that ciphers or digests are unavailable so that it can disable the associated cipher suites. This is unnecessary since we do not compile out algorithms. ok beck@, tb@ (a while back)
* Strip out all of the pkey to sigalg and sigalg to pkey linkages.jsing2019-03-251-3/+1
| | | | | | These are no longer used now that we defer signature algorithm selection. ok beck@
* tls1_process_sigalgs() is no longer needed.jsing2019-03-251-2/+1
| | | | ok beck@
* Defer sigalgs selection until the certificate is known.jsing2019-03-251-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously the signature algorithm was selected when the TLS extension was parsed (or the client received a certificate request), however the actual certificate to be used is not known at this stage. This leads to various problems, including the selection of a signature algorithm that cannot be used with the certificate key size (as found by jeremy@ via ruby regress). Instead, store the signature algorithms list and only select a signature algorithm when we're ready to do signature generation. Joint work with beck@.
* Remove ssl_get_server_send_cert() which is now unused.jsing2019-03-251-2/+1
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Rework ssl3_output_cert_chain() to take a CERT_PKEY and consider chains.jsing2019-03-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | We will now include the certificates in the chain in the certificate list, or use the existing extra_certs if present. Failing that we fall back to the automatic chain building if not disabled. This also simplifies the code significantly. ok beck@ tb@
* Add a chain member to CERT_PKEY and provide functions for manipulating it.jsing2019-03-251-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | Note that this is not the full chain, as the leaf certificate currently remains in the x509 member of CERT_PKEY. Unfortunately we've got to contend with the fact that some OpenSSL *_chain_* APIs exclude the leaf certificate while others include it... ok beck@ tb@
* revert "Move struct ssl_handshake_tls13_st definition", i.e., movetb2019-02-251-1/+24
| | | | | | SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 back to ssl_locl.h. discussed with jsing and inoguchi
* Move struct ssl_handshake_tls13_st definitioninoguchi2019-02-251-24/+1
| | | | | | This solves build error on luna88k with gcc3. ok aoyama@ jca@ jsing@ tb@
* Provide a TLS 1.3 capable client method.jsing2019-02-141-1/+3
| | | | ok tb@
* Preserve the transcript hash at specific stages of the TLSv1.3 handshake.jsing2019-02-101-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | There are various points where we need the hash of all messages prior to the current message. Support this by having the handshake code preserve the transcript hash prior to recording the current message, which avoids the need to sprinkle this throughout multiple handlers. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rename tls1_handshake_hash*() to tls1_transcript_hash*().jsing2019-02-091-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | While handshake hash is correct (in as far as it is a hash of handshake messages), using tls1_transcript_hash*() aligns them with the naming of the tls1_transcript*() functions. Additionally, the TLSv1.3 specification uses Transcript-Hash and "transcript hash", which this matches. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Add server side of versions, keyshare, and client and server of cookiebeck2019-01-241-1/+4
| | | | | | | | extensions for tls1.3. versions is currently defanged to ignore its result until tls13 server side wired in full, so that server side code still works today when we only support tls 1.2 ok bcook@ tb@ jsing@
* move the extensions_seen into the handshake structbeck2019-01-241-1/+4
| | | | ok jsing@
* Modify sigalgs extension processing to accomodate TLS 1.3.beck2019-01-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | - Make a separate sigalgs list for TLS 1.3 including only modern algorithm choices which we use when the handshake will not negotiate TLS 1.2. - Modify the legacy sigalgs for TLS 1.2 to include the RSA PSS algorithms as mandated by RFC8446 when the handshake will permit negotiation of TLS 1.2 from a 1.3 handshake. ok jsing@ tb@
* revert previous, accidentally contained another diff in additionbeck2019-01-231-8/+2
| | | | to the one I intended to commit
* Modify sigalgs extension processing for TLS 1.3.beck2019-01-231-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | - Make a separate sigalgs list for TLS 1.3 including only modern algorithm choices which we use when the handshake will not negotiate TLS 1.2 - Modify the legacy sigalgs for TLS 1.2 to include the RSA PSS algorithms as mandated by RFC8446 when the handshake will permit negotiation of TLS 1.2 ok jsing@ tb@
* Add ssl_cipher_is_permitted(), an internal helper function thattb2019-01-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | will be used in a few places shortly, e.g. in ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(). ok jsing
* Move struct tls13_ctx into a header since other things need access to it.jsing2019-01-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | | While here, rename struct handshake to struct handshake_stage to avoid potential ambiguity/conflict with the handshake data struct. Also add forward and back pointers between SSL and struct tls13_ctx. ok tb@
* Add client side of supported versions and keyshare extensions with basic regressbeck2019-01-181-1/+19
| | | | ok jsing@
* Fix DTLS transcript handling for HelloVerifyRequest.jsing2018-11-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If DTLS sees a HelloVerifyRequest the transcript is reset - the previous tls1_init_finished_mac() function could be called multiple times and would discard any existing state. The replacement tls1_transcript_init() is more strict and fails if a transcript already exists. Provide an explicit tls1_transcript_reset() function and call it from the appropriate places. This also lets us make DTLS less of a special snowflake and call tls1_transcript_init() in the same place as used for TLS. ok beck@ tb@
* Stop keeping track of sigalgs by guessing it from digest and pkey,beck2018-11-101-4/+6
| | | | | | just keep the sigalg around so we can remember what we actually decided to use. ok jsing@
* Reimplement the sigalgs processing code into a new implementationbeck2018-11-091-7/+1
| | | | | that will be usable with TLS 1.3 with less eye bleed. ok jsing@ tb@
* Clean up and simplify the handshake transcript code.jsing2018-11-081-7/+10
| | | | | | | This provides a cleaner, simpler and more readable API, with code that uses a BUF_MEM instead of a BIO. ok beck@ ("hurry up") and tb@.
* Stop pretending that a cert member in a SSL and SSL_CTX can be NULL.jsing2018-11-081-2/+1
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Add TLSv1.3 cipher suites (with appropriate guards).jsing2018-11-071-1/+4
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Rename the TLS Supported Elliptic Curves extension to Supported Groups.jsing2018-11-051-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | RFC 7919 renamed the Supported Elliptic Curves TLS extension to Supported Groups and redefined it to include finite field DH (FFDH) in addition to elliptic curve DH (ECDH). As such, rename the TLS extension and change the associated code to refer to groups rather than curves. ok beck@ tb@
* Clean up the code that checks if we can choose an EC cipher suite.jsing2018-11-051-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | The tls1_check_ec_tmp_key() function is now rather misnamed, so just inline the code. Also, rather than running tls1_get_shared_curve() once per EC cipher suite, we can run it once at the start of the ssl3_choose_cipher() function. ok bluhm@ tb@
* Mop up ecdh_tmp, since it is no longer used.jsing2018-11-051-3/+1
| | | | ok bluhm@ tb@
* Make more of libssl's record layer state internal.jsing2018-10-241-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | In January 2017, we changed large amounts of libssl's data structures to be non-visible/internal, however intentionally left things that the software ecosystem was needing to use. The four or so applications that reached into libssl for record layer related state now implement alternative code. As such, make these data structures internal. ok tb@
* SSL_MAX_DIGEST is no longer needed.jsing2018-09-081-5/+1
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* Drop SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD flag.jsing2018-09-061-10/+6
| | | | | | | All of our algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD cipher suites use EVP_AEAD, so we can condition on that rather than having a separate redundant flag. ok tb@
* Correctly clear the current cipher state, when changing cipher state.jsing2018-09-051-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a renegotiation results in a change of cipher suite, the renegotation would fail if it switched from AEAD to non-AEAD or vice versa. This is due to the fact that the previous EVP_AEAD or EVP_CIPHER state remained, resulting in incorrect logic that caused MAC failures. Rename ssl_clear_cipher_ctx() to ssl_clear_cipher_state() and split it into separate read/write components, then call these functions from the appropriate places when a ChangeCipherSpec message is being processed. Also, remove the separate ssl_clear_hash_ctx() calls and fold these into the ssl_clear_cipher_{read,write}_state() functions. Issue reported by Bernard Spil, who also tested this diff. ok tb@
* Nuke ssl_pending/ssl_shutdown function pointers.jsing2018-08-301-4/+1
| | | | | | | ssl3_pending() is used for all protocols and dtls1_shutdown() just calls ssl3_shutdown(), so just call the appropriate function directly instead. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* n2s and l2n3 finally bite the dust!jsing2018-08-271-7/+1
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