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* Stop using ssl{_ctx,}_security() outside of ssl_seclevel.ctb2022-07-021-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | The API is ugly and we can easily abstract it away. The SSL_SECOP_* stuff is now confined into ssl_seclevel.c and the rest of the library can make use of the more straightforward wrappers, which makes it a lot easier on the eyes. ok beck jsing
* Rename uses 'curve' to 'group' and rework tls1 group API.tb2022-07-021-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | This reworks various tls1_ curve APIs to indicate success via a boolean return value and move the output to an out parameter. This makes the caller code easier and more consistent. Based on a suggestion by jsing ok jsing
* Check security level for supported groups.tb2022-06-301-1/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Add checks to ensure we do not initiate or negotiate handshakes withtb2022-06-301-1/+2
| | | | | | versions below the minimum required by the security level. input & ok jsing
* Make ssl_cert_add{0,1}_chain_cert() take ssl/ctxtb2022-06-291-3/+3
| | | | ok beck jsing
* ssl_cert_set{0,1}_chain() take ssl/ctxtb2022-06-291-3/+3
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Refactor use_certificate_chain_* to take ssl/ctx instead of a certtb2022-06-291-1/+2
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Add functions that check security level in certs and cert chains.tb2022-06-291-1/+5
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Parse the @SECLEVEL=n annotation in cipher stringstb2022-06-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | To this end, hand the SSL_CERT through about 5 levels of indirection to set an integer on it. ok beck jsing
* Add support for sending QUIC transport parametersbeck2022-06-291-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | This is the start of adding the boringssl API for QUIC support, and the TLS extensions necessary to send and receive QUIC transport data. Inspired by boringssl's https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24464 ok jsing@ tb@
* whitespace nittb2022-06-291-2/+2
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* Also check the security level of the 'tmp dh'tb2022-06-291-1/+2
| | | | ok beck jsing
* Check the security of DH key sharestb2022-06-291-1/+2
| | | | ok beck, looks good to jsing
* Rename one s to ssl for consistencytb2022-06-291-2/+2
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* Add prototypes for ssl{_ctx,}_security()tb2022-06-281-1/+5
| | | | ok beck jsing sthen
* Implement the default security level callbacktb2022-06-281-1/+6
| | | | | | And here is where the fun starts. The tentacles will grow everywhere. ok beck jsing sthen
* Add security callback, level and ex_data fields to SSL_CERTtb2022-06-281-1/+6
| | | | ok beck jsing sthen
* Switch sid_ctx_length in SSL, SSL_CTX and SSL_SESSION to a size_ttb2022-06-071-4/+4
| | | | ok jsing
* Switch SSL_SESSION's session_id_length to a size_ttb2022-06-071-2/+2
| | | | ok jsing
* Switch the SSL_SESSION's master_key_length to a size_ttb2022-06-071-2/+2
| | | | ok jsing
* Tweak comment describing the SSL_SESSION ASN.1tb2022-06-061-4/+5
| | | | ok jsing
* Fix spaces before tabstb2022-06-061-12/+12
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* Add a use_psk_dhe_ke flag to the TLSv1.3 handshake structtb2022-06-031-1/+4
| | | | | | | This will be used to indicate client side support for DHE key establishment. ok jsing
* Remove const from tls1_transcript_hash_value()jsing2022-03-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | This function populates the passed *out argument, hence it should not be marked const. ok tb@
* Factor out change cipher spec handing code in the legacy stack.jsing2022-03-121-1/+2
| | | | | | | | Factor out the code that handles the processing of a change cipher spec message that has been read in the legacy stack, deduplicating code in the DTLS stack. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Factor out alert handing code in the legacy stack.jsing2022-02-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull out the code that processes incoming alerts - a chunk of the complexity is due to the fact that in TLSv1.2 and earlier, alerts can be fragmented across multiple records or multiple alerts can be delivered in a single record. In DTLS there is no way that we can reassemble fragmented alerts (although the RFC is silent on this), however we could have multiple alerts in the same record. This change means that we will handle this situation more appropriately and if we encounter a fragmented alert we will now treat this as a decode error (instead of silently ignoring it). ok beck@ tb@
* Bye bye S3I.jsing2022-02-051-15/+7
| | | | | | | | S3I has served us well, however now that libssl is fully opaque it is time to say goodbye. Aside from removing the calloc/free/memset, the rest is mechanical sed. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Cleanup/simplify ssl_cert_type()jsing2022-02-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Remove the X509 argument as it is unused - this was passed so that ssl_cert_type() can get the public key from the X509 object if the EVP_PKEY argument is NULL, however this is never the case. ok tb@
* Remove peer_pkeys from SSL_SESSION.jsing2022-01-111-10/+3
| | | | | | | | | | peer_pkeys comes from some world where peers can send multiple certificates - in fact, one of each known type. Since we do not live in such a world, get rid of peer_pkeys and simply use peer_cert instead (in both TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3, both clients and servers can only send a single leaf (aka end-entity) certificate). ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rename 'peer' to 'peer_cert' in SSL_SESSION.jsing2022-01-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | The 'peer' member of SSL_SESSION is the leaf/end-entity certificate provided by our peer. Rename it since 'peer' on its own is unhelpful. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Plumb decode errors through key share parsing code.jsing2022-01-111-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | Distinguish between decode errors and other errors, so that we can send a SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR alert when appropriate. Fixes a tlsfuzzer failure, due to it expecting a decode error alert and not receiving one. Prompted by anton@ ok tb@
* Swap arguments to ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg()jsing2022-01-091-2/+2
| | | | | If a libssl function takes an SSL *, it should normally be the first argument.
* Merge SESS_CERT into SSL_SESSION.jsing2022-01-081-19/+10
| | | | | | | There is no reason for SESS_CERT to exist - remove it and merge its members into SSL_SESSION for the time being. More clean up to follow. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove commented out CERT_* defines.jsing2022-01-081-7/+1
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* Rename CERT to SSL_CERT and CERT_PKEY to SSL_CERT_PKEY.jsing2022-01-081-45/+45
| | | | | | | Nearly all structs in libssl start with an SSL_ suffix, rename CERT and CERT_PKEY for consistency. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rename dh_tmp to dhe_params.jsing2022-01-071-4/+4
| | | | | | | | Support for non-ephemeral DH was removed a long time ago - as such, the dh_tmp and dh_tmp_cb are used for DHE parameters. Rename them to reflect reality. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Convert legacy server to tls_key_share.jsing2022-01-071-10/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | This requires a few more additions to the DHE key share code - we need to be able to either set the DHE parameters or specify the number of key bits for use with auto DHE parameters. Additionally, we need to be able to serialise the DHE parameters to send to the client. This removes the infamous 'tmp' struct from ssl3_state_internal_st. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Convert legacy TLS client to tls_key_share.jsing2022-01-061-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | This requires adding DHE support to tls_key_share. In doing so, tls_key_share_peer_public() has to lose the group argument and gains an invalid_key argument. The one place that actually needs the group check is tlsext_keyshare_client_parse(), so add code to do this. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rename tls13_key_share to tls_key_share.jsing2022-01-051-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | In preparation to use the key share code in both the TLSv1.3 and legacy stacks, rename tls13_key_share to tls_key_share, moving it into the shared handshake struct. Further changes will then allow the legacy stack to make use of the same code for ephemeral key exchange. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up and refactor server side DHE key exchange.jsing2021-12-041-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Provide ssl_kex_generate_dhe_params_auto() which handles DHE key generation based on parameters determined by the specified key bits. Convert the existing DHE auto parameter selection code into a function that just tells us how many key bits to use. Untangle and rework the server side DHE key exchange to use the ssl_kex_* functions. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Move the minimum DHE key size check into ssl_kex_peer_params_dhe()jsing2021-12-041-2/+2
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Check DH public key in ssl_kex_peer_public_dhe().jsing2021-12-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | Call DH_check_pub_key() after decoding the peer public key - this will be needed for the server DHE key exchange, but also benefits the client. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Factor out/rewrite DHE key exchange.jsing2021-11-291-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | This follows what was done previously for ECDHE EC point key exchange and will allow for deduplication and further code improvement. Convert the TLSv1.2 client to use the new DHE key exchange functions. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Use ssl_force_want_read() in the DTLS code.jsing2021-10-251-1/+3
| | | | | | Also mop up some mostly unhelpful comments while here. ok beck@ tb@
* Fold SSL_SESSION_INTERNAL back into SSL_SESSION.jsing2021-10-251-24/+19
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Add SSL_get0_verified_chain - needed by some new stuffbeck2021-10-231-1/+2
| | | | | | symbol will be exposed with tb@'s forthcoming bump ok tb@
* Add new OpenSSL API SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets and friends.beck2021-10-231-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | Since we don't support session tickets in LibreSSL at the moment these functions currently do not have any effect. Again, symbols will appear with tb@'s reptar sized bump.. ok tb@
* Mop up enc_read_ctx and read_hash.jsing2021-10-231-13/+1
| | | | | | | These are no longer public, so we can mop them up along with the machinery needed to set/clear them. ok beck@ tb@
* Provide a way to determine our maximum legacy version.jsing2021-10-231-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the introduction of TLSv1.3, we need the ability to determine our maximum legacy version and to track our peer's maximum legacy version. This is needed for both the TLS record layer when using TLSv1.3, plus it is needed for RSA key exhange in TLS prior to TLSv1.3, where the maximum legacy version is incorporated in the pre-master secret to avoid downgrade attacks. This unbreaks RSA KEX for the TLS client when the non-version specific method is used with TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1 (clearly no one does this). ok tb@
* Add SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback and SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callbackbeck2021-10-231-1/+2
| | | | | | | | Some things in ports care about calling these functions. Since we will not provide private key logging functionality they are documented as being for compatibility and that they don't do anything. ok tb@
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