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* Add server side of versions, keyshare, and client and server of cookiebeck2019-01-241-1/+4
| | | | | | | | extensions for tls1.3. versions is currently defanged to ignore its result until tls13 server side wired in full, so that server side code still works today when we only support tls 1.2 ok bcook@ tb@ jsing@
* move the extensions_seen into the handshake structbeck2019-01-241-1/+4
| | | | ok jsing@
* Modify sigalgs extension processing to accomodate TLS 1.3.beck2019-01-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | - Make a separate sigalgs list for TLS 1.3 including only modern algorithm choices which we use when the handshake will not negotiate TLS 1.2. - Modify the legacy sigalgs for TLS 1.2 to include the RSA PSS algorithms as mandated by RFC8446 when the handshake will permit negotiation of TLS 1.2 from a 1.3 handshake. ok jsing@ tb@
* revert previous, accidentally contained another diff in additionbeck2019-01-231-8/+2
| | | | to the one I intended to commit
* Modify sigalgs extension processing for TLS 1.3.beck2019-01-231-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | - Make a separate sigalgs list for TLS 1.3 including only modern algorithm choices which we use when the handshake will not negotiate TLS 1.2 - Modify the legacy sigalgs for TLS 1.2 to include the RSA PSS algorithms as mandated by RFC8446 when the handshake will permit negotiation of TLS 1.2 ok jsing@ tb@
* Add ssl_cipher_is_permitted(), an internal helper function thattb2019-01-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | will be used in a few places shortly, e.g. in ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(). ok jsing
* Move struct tls13_ctx into a header since other things need access to it.jsing2019-01-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | | While here, rename struct handshake to struct handshake_stage to avoid potential ambiguity/conflict with the handshake data struct. Also add forward and back pointers between SSL and struct tls13_ctx. ok tb@
* Add client side of supported versions and keyshare extensions with basic regressbeck2019-01-181-1/+19
| | | | ok jsing@
* Fix DTLS transcript handling for HelloVerifyRequest.jsing2018-11-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If DTLS sees a HelloVerifyRequest the transcript is reset - the previous tls1_init_finished_mac() function could be called multiple times and would discard any existing state. The replacement tls1_transcript_init() is more strict and fails if a transcript already exists. Provide an explicit tls1_transcript_reset() function and call it from the appropriate places. This also lets us make DTLS less of a special snowflake and call tls1_transcript_init() in the same place as used for TLS. ok beck@ tb@
* Stop keeping track of sigalgs by guessing it from digest and pkey,beck2018-11-101-4/+6
| | | | | | just keep the sigalg around so we can remember what we actually decided to use. ok jsing@
* Reimplement the sigalgs processing code into a new implementationbeck2018-11-091-7/+1
| | | | | that will be usable with TLS 1.3 with less eye bleed. ok jsing@ tb@
* Clean up and simplify the handshake transcript code.jsing2018-11-081-7/+10
| | | | | | | This provides a cleaner, simpler and more readable API, with code that uses a BUF_MEM instead of a BIO. ok beck@ ("hurry up") and tb@.
* Stop pretending that a cert member in a SSL and SSL_CTX can be NULL.jsing2018-11-081-2/+1
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Add TLSv1.3 cipher suites (with appropriate guards).jsing2018-11-071-1/+4
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Rename the TLS Supported Elliptic Curves extension to Supported Groups.jsing2018-11-051-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | RFC 7919 renamed the Supported Elliptic Curves TLS extension to Supported Groups and redefined it to include finite field DH (FFDH) in addition to elliptic curve DH (ECDH). As such, rename the TLS extension and change the associated code to refer to groups rather than curves. ok beck@ tb@
* Clean up the code that checks if we can choose an EC cipher suite.jsing2018-11-051-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | The tls1_check_ec_tmp_key() function is now rather misnamed, so just inline the code. Also, rather than running tls1_get_shared_curve() once per EC cipher suite, we can run it once at the start of the ssl3_choose_cipher() function. ok bluhm@ tb@
* Mop up ecdh_tmp, since it is no longer used.jsing2018-11-051-3/+1
| | | | ok bluhm@ tb@
* Make more of libssl's record layer state internal.jsing2018-10-241-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | In January 2017, we changed large amounts of libssl's data structures to be non-visible/internal, however intentionally left things that the software ecosystem was needing to use. The four or so applications that reached into libssl for record layer related state now implement alternative code. As such, make these data structures internal. ok tb@
* SSL_MAX_DIGEST is no longer needed.jsing2018-09-081-5/+1
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* Drop SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD flag.jsing2018-09-061-10/+6
| | | | | | | All of our algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD cipher suites use EVP_AEAD, so we can condition on that rather than having a separate redundant flag. ok tb@
* Correctly clear the current cipher state, when changing cipher state.jsing2018-09-051-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a renegotiation results in a change of cipher suite, the renegotation would fail if it switched from AEAD to non-AEAD or vice versa. This is due to the fact that the previous EVP_AEAD or EVP_CIPHER state remained, resulting in incorrect logic that caused MAC failures. Rename ssl_clear_cipher_ctx() to ssl_clear_cipher_state() and split it into separate read/write components, then call these functions from the appropriate places when a ChangeCipherSpec message is being processed. Also, remove the separate ssl_clear_hash_ctx() calls and fold these into the ssl_clear_cipher_{read,write}_state() functions. Issue reported by Bernard Spil, who also tested this diff. ok tb@
* Nuke ssl_pending/ssl_shutdown function pointers.jsing2018-08-301-4/+1
| | | | | | | ssl3_pending() is used for all protocols and dtls1_shutdown() just calls ssl3_shutdown(), so just call the appropriate function directly instead. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* n2s and l2n3 finally bite the dust!jsing2018-08-271-7/+1
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* Simplify new session ticket encoding/generation.jsing2018-08-271-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | The original code did a crazy encode/malloc/encode/decode/modify/encode dance, in order to encode a session in the form needed to encrypt then add to a session ticket. By modifying the encoding functions slightly, we can do this entire dance as a single encode. Inspired by similar changes in BoringSSL. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Simplify session ticket parsing/handling.jsing2018-08-241-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | The original implementation is rather crazy and means that we effectively have two lots of code that parse a ClientHello and two lots of code that parse TLS extensions. Partially simplify this by passing a CBS containing the extension block through to the session handling functions, removing the need to reimplement the ClientHello parsing. While here standarise on naming for session_id and session_id_len. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up handshake message start/finish functions.jsing2018-08-241-5/+3
| | | | | | | | Now that all handshake messages are created using CBB, remove the non-CBB ssl3_handshake_msg_start()/ssl3_handshake_msg_finish() functions. Rename the CBB variants by dropping the _cbb suffix. ok bcook@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Rename and collapse tls12_get_sigandhash_cbb().jsing2018-08-191-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Now that all callers of tls12_get_sigandhash() have been converted to CBB, collapse tls12_get_sigandhash() and tls12_get_sigandhash_cbb() into a single function. Rename it to tls12_gethashandsig() to be representative of the actual order of the sigalgs parameters, and perform some other clean up. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Convert ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() to CBB.jsing2018-08-161-1/+3
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* OpenSSL started adding const to functions all over the place. Make alltb2018-04-251-3/+3
| | | | | | | | our libssl functions match theirs wrt const, except for BIO_f_ssl(3) which will be fixed in a later step. this went through a i386 bulk by sthen ok jsing
* Remove function pointers for ssl_{read,write,peek}.jsing2018-04-071-4/+1
| | | | | | | Now that everything goes through the same code path, we can remove a layer of indirection and just call ssl3_{read,write,peek} directly. ok beck@ inoguchi@
* Nuke SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED and SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.jsing2018-04-071-3/+1
| | | | | | | These flags enabled experimental behaviour in the write path, which nothing uses. Removing this code greatly simplifies ssl3_write(). ok beck@ inoguchi@ sthen@ tb@
* Complete the TLS extension handling rewrite for the server-side.jsing2018-01-271-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This removes ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext() and allows the CBS to be passed all the way through from ssl3_get_client_hello(). The renegotation check gets pulled up into ssl3_get_client_hello() which is where other such checks exist. The TLS extension parsing now also ensures that we do not get duplicates of any known extensions (the old pre-rewrite code only did this for some extensions). ok inoguchi@
* Rename ssl3_client_hello() to ssl3_send_client_hello() for consistency.jsing2017-10-121-2/+2
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* Fold dtls1_accept() into ssl_accept(), removing a lot of duplicated code.jsing2017-10-121-2/+2
| | | | With review/feedback from inoguchi@
* Drop prototypes for ssl23_*() functions, which no longer exist.jsing2017-10-121-11/+1
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* Convert ssl3_client_hello() to CBB.jsing2017-10-111-6/+2
| | | | | | | As part of this, change ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() to take a CBB argument, rather than a pointer/length. Some additional clean up/renames while here. Based on a diff from doug@
* Fully convert ssl3_send_server_hello() to CBB.jsing2017-10-111-4/+1
| | | | Based on a diff from doug@
* Make ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list() take a CBS, rather than a pointer andjsing2017-10-101-3/+2
| | | | | length, since the caller has already been converted to CBS. A small amount of additional clean up whilst here.
* Merge dtls1_connect() into ssl3_connect(), removing a large amount ofjsing2017-10-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | duplicated code. For now this is essentially adds a diff of the two functions with 'if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))' - further clean up and improvement will follow. ok inoguchi@
* Convert ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec() to use CBB and make it handle DTLS,jsing2017-10-081-3/+5
| | | | | | which allows us to drop dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec() entirely. ok inoguchi@
* Remove the original (pre-IETF) chacha20-poly1305 cipher suites.jsing2017-08-281-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Support for the IETF standardised chacha20-poly1305 cipher suites was added 16 months ago, which means they exist in both of the currently supported OpenBSD releases. Also prompted by Andreas Bartelt <obsd at bartula dot de>. ok beck@ doug@
* Rewrite SRTP extension using CBB/CBS and the new extension framework.doug2017-08-271-1/+10
| | | | input + ok beck@, jsing@
* Rewrite ALPN extension using CBB/CBS and the new extension framework.doug2017-08-261-2/+2
| | | | | ok bcook@ beck@ input + ok jsing@
* Convert TLS signature algorithms extension handling to the new framework.jsing2017-08-121-3/+4
| | | | ok beck@ doug@
* Remove NPN support.jsing2017-08-121-39/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | NPN was never standardised and the last draft expired in October 2012. ALPN was standardised in July 2014 and has been supported in LibreSSL since December 2014. NPN has also been removed from Chromium in May 2016. TLS clients and servers that try to use/enable NPN will fail gracefully and fallback to the default protocol, since it will essentially appear that the otherside does not support NPN. At some point in the future we will actually remove the NPN related symbols entirely. ok bcook@ beck@ doug@
* Remove support for DSS/DSA, since we removed the cipher suites a whilejsing2017-08-121-8/+5
| | | | | | back. ok guenther@
* Rewrite EllipticCurves TLS extension handling using CBB/CBS and the newdoug2017-08-111-1/+3
| | | | | | extension framework. input + ok jsing@
* Convert ssl3_send_certificate_request() to CBB.jsing2017-08-111-2/+2
| | | | ok beck@ doug@
* Rewrite the ECPointFormats TLS extension handling using CBB/CBS and thedoug2017-08-111-1/+4
| | | | | | new extension framework. input + ok jsing@
* Clean up the EC key/curve configuration handling.jsing2017-08-101-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Over the years OpenSSL grew multiple ways of being able to specify EC keys (and/or curves) for use with ECDH and ECDHE key exchange. You could specify a static EC key (SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh()), use that as a curve and generate ephemeral keys (SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE), provide the EC key via a callback that was provided with insufficient information (SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh_cb()) or enable automatic selection and generation of EC keys via SSL{_CTX,}_set_ecdh_auto(). This complexity leads to problems (like ECDHE not being enabled) and potential weird configuration (like being able to do ECDHE without the ephemeral part...). We no longer support ECDH and ECDHE can be disabled by removing ECDHE ciphers from the cipher list. As such, permanently enable automatic EC curve selection and generation, effectively disabling all of the configuration knobs. The only exception is the SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh() functions, which retain part of their previous behaviour by configuring the curve of the given EC key as the only curve being enabled. Everything else becomes a no-op. ok beck@ doug@
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