| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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* Improve client certificate selection to allow EC certificates
instead of only RSA certificates.
* Do not error out if a TLSv1.3 server requests an OCSP response as
part of a certificate request.
* Fix SSL_shutdown behavior to match the legacy stack. The previous
behaviour could cause a hang.
* Fix a memory leak and add a missing error check in the handling of
the key update message.
* Fix a memory leak in tls13_record_layer_set_traffic_key.
* Avoid calling freezero with a negative size if a server sends a
malformed plaintext of all zeroes.
* Ensure that only PSS may be used with RSA in TLSv1.3 in order
to avoid using PKCS1-based signatures.
* Add the P-521 curve to the list of curves supported by default
in the client.
This is errata/6.7/019_libssl.patch.sig
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checking the curve.
ok jsing@ tb@
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These are no longer used now that we defer signature algorithm selection.
ok beck@
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Previously the signature algorithm was selected when the TLS extension was
parsed (or the client received a certificate request), however the actual
certificate to be used is not known at this stage. This leads to various
problems, including the selection of a signature algorithm that cannot be
used with the certificate key size (as found by jeremy@ via ruby regress).
Instead, store the signature algorithms list and only select a signature
algorithm when we're ready to do signature generation.
Joint work with beck@.
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Found by oss-fuzz, fixes issue #13797.
ok beck@ tb@
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Remove GOST based sigalgs from TLS 1.2 since they don't work with TLS 1.2.
ok jsing@
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spotted by naddy@
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- Make a separate sigalgs list for TLS 1.3 including only modern
algorithm choices which we use when the handshake will not negotiate
TLS 1.2.
- Modify the legacy sigalgs for TLS 1.2 to include the RSA PSS algorithms as
mandated by RFC8446 when the handshake will permit negotiation of TLS 1.2
from a 1.3 handshake.
ok jsing@ tb@
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to the one I intended to commit
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- Make a separate sigalgs list for TLS 1.3 including only modern
algorithm choices which we use when the handshake will not negotiate
TLS 1.2
- Modify the legacy sigalgs for TLS 1.2 to include the RSA PSS algorithms as
mandated by RFC8446 when the handshake will permit negotiation of TLS 1.2
ok jsing@ tb@
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sigalg for MD5_SHA1 and using it as the non sigalgs default
ok jsing@
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Makes connections to outlook.office365.com work
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ok tb@
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Include check for appropriate RSA key size when used with PSS.
ok tb@
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to allow for adding PSS, Nuke the now unneejded guard around the PSS
algorithms in the sigalgs table
ok jsing@ tb@
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ok jsing@
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just keep the sigalg around so we can remember what we actually
decided to use.
ok jsing@
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ok jsing@
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Add a priority list for tls 1.2
ok jsing@
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that will be usable with TLS 1.3 with less eye bleed.
ok jsing@ tb@
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