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* Clean up and harden TLSv1.2 master key derivation.jsing2021-04-301-15/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | The master key and its length are only stored in one location, so it makes no sense to handle these outside of the derivation function (the current 'out' argument is unused). This simplifies the various call sites. If derivation fails for some reason, fail hard rather than continuing on and hoping that something deals with this correctly later. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up derivation of finished/peer finished.jsing2021-04-251-5/+3
| | | | | | | | Make this process more readable by having specific client/server functions, calling the correct one based on s->server. This allows to remove various SSL_ST_ACCEPT/SSL_ST_CONNECT checks, along with duplicate code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up TLSv1.2 certificate request handshake data.jsing2021-04-211-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | Currently cert_req is used by clients and cert_request is used by servers. Replace this by a single cert_request used by either client or server. Remove the certificate types as they are currently unused. This also fixes a bug whereby if the number of certificate types exceeds SSL3_CT_NUMBER the number of bytes read in is insufficient, which will break decoding. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Move reuse_message, message_type, message_size and cert_verify into thejsing2021-04-191-11/+11
| | | | | | TLSv1.2 handshake struct. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Avoid transcript initialisation when sending a TLS HelloRequest.jsing2021-03-291-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | When server side renegotiation is triggered, the TLSv1.2 state machine sends a HelloRequest before going to ST_SW_FLUSH and ST_OK. In this case we do not need the transcript and currently hit the sanity check in ST_OK that ensures the transcript has been freed, breaking server initiated renegotiation. We do however need the transcript in the DTLS case. ok tb@
* Garbage collect s->internal->typetb2021-03-271-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This variable is used in the legacy stack to decide whether we are a server or a client. That's what s->server is for... The new TLSv1.3 stack failed to set s->internal->type, which resulted in hilarious mishandling of previous_{client,server}_finished. Indeed, both client and server would first store the client's verify_data in previous_server_finished and later overwrite it with the server's verify_data. Consequently, renegotiation has been completely broken for more than a year. In fact, server side renegotiation was broken during the 6.5 release cycle. Clearly, no-one uses this. This commit fixes client side renegotiation and restores the previous behavior of SSL_get_client_CA_list(). Server side renegotiation will be fixed in a later commit. ok jsing
* Rename new_cipher to cipher.jsing2021-03-241-17/+17
| | | | | | | | This is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct and is what we're currently negotiating, so there is really nothing more "new" about the cipher than there is the key block or other parts of the handshake data. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Add SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS12 for TLSv1.2 specific handshake data.jsing2021-03-241-9/+9
| | | | | | Move TLSv1.2 specific components over from SSL_HANDSHAKE. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove ssl_downgrade_max_version().jsing2021-03-111-7/+5
| | | | | | | Now that we store our maximum TLS version at the start of the handshake, we can check against that directly. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Improve internal version handling.jsing2021-03-101-2/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add handshake fields for our minimum TLS version, our maximum TLS version and the TLS version negotiated during the handshake. Initialise our min/max versions at the start of the handshake and leave these unchanged. The negotiated TLS version is set in the client once we receive the ServerHello and in the server at the point we select the highest shared version. Provide an ssl_effective_version() function that returns the negotiated TLS version if known, otherwise our maximum TLS version - this is effectively what is stored in s->version currently. Convert most of the internal code to use one of these three version fields, which greatly simplifies code (especially in the TLS extension handling code). ok tb@
* ugly whitespacetb2021-02-201-6/+6
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* Rename f_err into fatal_err.tb2021-02-201-69/+69
| | | | discussed with jsing
* Rename the truncated label into decode_err. This describes its purposetb2021-02-201-27/+27
| | | | | | | better and doesn't look odd if there's trailing data for exapmle. Indent a few labels in the neighborhood while there. ok jsing
* Revise HelloVerifyRequest handling for DTLSv1.2.jsing2021-02-201-2/+7
| | | | | | | | Per RFC 6347 section 4.2.1, the HelloVerifyRequest should always contain DTLSv1.0 - ensure this is the case on the server side, allow both DTLSv1.0 and DTLSv1.2 on the client. ok tb@
* Factor out the legacy stack version checks.jsing2021-02-071-13/+6
| | | | | | | Also check for explicit version numbers, rather than just the major version value. ok tb@
* Move sequence numbers into the new TLSv1.2 record layer.jsing2021-01-261-4/+3
| | | | | | | This allows for all of the DTLS sequence number save/restore code to be removed. ok inoguchi@ "whee!" tb@
* Provide functions to determine if TLSv1.2 record protection is engaged.jsing2021-01-191-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Call these functions from code that needs to know if we've changed cipher state and enabled record protection, rather than inconsistently checking various pointers from other places in the code base. This also fixes a minor bug where the wrong pointers are checked if we're operating with AEAD. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Replace SSL_IS_DTLS with SSL_is_dtls().jsing2020-10-141-26/+26
| | | | | | Garbage collect the now unused SSL_IS_DTLS macro. ok tb@
* Condense and simplify TLS methods.jsing2020-10-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Historically, OpenSSL has had client and server specific methods - the only difference between these is that the .ssl_connect or .ssl_accept function pointer is set to ssl_undefined_function, with the intention of reducing code size for a statically linked binary that was only a client or server. These days the difference is minimal or non-existant in many cases and we can reduce the amount of code and complexity by having single method. Internally remove all of the client and server specific methods, simplifying code in the process. The external client/server specific API remain, however these now return the same thing as TLS_method() does. ok tb@
* Merge d1_{clnt,srvr}.c into ssl_{clnt,srvr}.cjsing2020-10-031-2/+41
| | | | | | | The d1_{clnt,srvr}.c contain a single function each - merge these into the ssl_{clnt,srvr}.c, renaming them with an ssl3_ prefix for consistency. ok beck@ tb@
* Simplify the cleanup of init_buf via a ssl3_release_init_buffer() function.jsing2020-09-241-5/+3
| | | | ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Simplify SSL method lookups.jsing2020-09-171-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | There are three places where we call tls1_get_{client,server}_method() and if that returns NULL, call dtls1_get_{client,server}_method(). Simplify this by combining the lookup into a single function. While here also use uint16_t for version types. ok inoguchi@ millert@
* Use the correct type for tls1_set_ec_id()tb2020-09-121-3/+3
| | | | | | The curve_id is a uint16, not an int. ok beck jsing
* Remove cipher_list_by_id.jsing2020-09-111-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When parsing a cipher string, a cipher list is created, before being duplicated and sorted - the second copy being stored as cipher_list_by_id. This is done only so that a client can ensure that the cipher selected by a server is in the cipher list. This is pretty pointless given that most clients are short-lived and that we already had to iterate over the cipher list in order to build the client hello. Additionally, any update to the cipher list requires that cipher_list_by_id also be updated and kept in sync. Remove all of this and replace it with a simple linear scan - the overhead of duplicating and sorting the cipher list likely exceeds that of a simple linear scan over the cipher list (64 maximum, more typically ~9 or so). ok beck@ tb@
* Send alert on ssl_get_prev_session failuretb2020-08-311-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | ssl_get_prev_session() can fail for various reasons some of which may be internal_error others decode_error alerts. Propagate the appropriate alert up to the caller so we can abort the handshake by sending a fatal alert instead of rudely closing the pipe. Currently only 28 of 292 test cases of tlsfuzzer's test-extension.py pass. With this diff, 272 pass. The rest will require fixes elsewhere. ok beck inoguchi jsing
* Improve argument order for the internal tlsext APItb2020-07-031-3/+3
| | | | | | | | Move is_server and msg_type right after the SSL object so that CBS and CBB and alert come last. This brings these functions more in line with other internal functions and separates state from data. requested by jsing
* Enable GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE when verifying certificate signatures.jsing2020-06-051-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | GOST cipher suites requires that CertVerify signatures be generated in a special way (see ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(), ssl3_get_cert_verify()). However, the GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE flag was not passed in case of TLS 1.2 connections (because they use different code path). Set this flag on GOST PKEYs. Diff from Dmitry Baryshkov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com> Sponsored by ROSA Linux ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Send an illegal_parameter alert if a client sends us invalid DH keytb2020-06-011-3/+15
| | | | | | | | | shares. Previously we would fail and just close the pipe. Fixes the remaining failing test-dhe-rsa-key-exchange-with-bad-messages.py tests of tlsfuzzer. ok beck (earlier version) jsing
* Correct downgrade sentinels when a version pinned method is in use.jsing2020-05-311-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | Previously only the enabled protocol versions were considered, however we also have to consider the method in use which may be version pinned. Found the hard way by danj@ with haproxy and force-tlsv12. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Replace SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC/SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN with SSL_PKEY_RSA.jsing2020-05-191-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some time prior to SSLeay 0.8.1b, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN got added with the intention of handling RSA sign only certificates... this incomplete code had the following comment: /* check to see if this is a signing only certificate */ /* EAY EAY EAY EAY */ And while the comment was removed in 2005, the incomplete RSA sign-only handling has remained ever since. Remove SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN and rename SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC to SSL_PKEY_RSA. While here also remove the unused SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA. ok tb@
* Use size_t for OCSP response length.jsing2020-05-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | The OCSP response length is currently an integer, which is overloaded with -1 meaning "unset". Use a size_t for the OCSP response length and infer unset from the OCSP response being NULL. This makes code more readable, simpler and less error prone. ok beck@
* On receiving an overlong session ID terminate with an illegal_parametertb2020-05-091-1/+6
| | | | | | alert. Found with tlsfuzzer. ok jsing
* TLSv1.3 servers that intend to downgrade are required to set the lasttb2020-03-061-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | eight bytes of the server's random to a magic cookie (RFC 8446, 4.1.3). The TLSv1.3 spec changes the TLSv1.2 spec in that it recommends that TLSv1.2 servers that negotiate TLSv1.1 or below do the same. This gives a limited additional protection against downgrade attacks beyond what is already present in the Finished exchange. The TLSv1.3 part was already implemented in Hobart and can be trivially modified to do the TLSv1.2 bit as well. ok inoguchi, jsing
* Avoid leak for tmp.x25519inoguchi2020-02-161-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | Changed to use local variable to hold malloc address rather than directly set to S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, and set that private_key pointer to S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 after all the "goto err;". Also added freezero for S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 to ssl3_free() and ssl3_clear(). ok jsing@ tb@
* Factor out/rewrite the ECDHE EC point key exchange code.jsing2020-01-301-77/+21
| | | | | | | | | This reduces replication between the existing TLS client/server and allows the code to soon be reused for TLSv1.3. With feedback from inoguchi@ and tb@ ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove the ssl_get_message function pointer from SSL_METHOD_INTERNAL.jsing2020-01-231-6/+5
| | | | | | | | | ssl_get_message is essentially a switch between ssl3_get_message and dtls1_get_message, both only used by the legacy stack. Instead, use SSL_IS_DTLS() in ssl3_get_message to call the DTLS function when necessary. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* If we are building a legacy server hello, check to see if we arebeck2020-01-231-1/+20
| | | | | | | | downgrading from TLS 1.3. If we are, set the last 8 bytes of the server_random value to the required values as per RFC 8446 section 4.1.3 indicating that we deliberately meant to downgrade. ok jsing@
* Pass the session ID down to the session/ticket handling code as a CBS.jsing2019-04-221-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | Convert ssl_get_prev_session(), tls1_process_ticket() and tls1_decrypt_ticket() to handle the session ID from the client hello as a CBS. While here also swap the order of arguments for tls1_decrypt_ticket() so that it is consistent with the other functions. ok tb@
* Inline and remove the tlsext_tick_md macro.jsing2019-04-221-2/+2
| | | | | | | There is not much point having a tlsext_tick_md macro that replaces EVP_sha256() in two places, when the cipher is just hardcoded. ok tb@
* Defer sigalgs selection until the certificate is known.jsing2019-03-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously the signature algorithm was selected when the TLS extension was parsed (or the client received a certificate request), however the actual certificate to be used is not known at this stage. This leads to various problems, including the selection of a signature algorithm that cannot be used with the certificate key size (as found by jeremy@ via ruby regress). Instead, store the signature algorithms list and only select a signature algorithm when we're ready to do signature generation. Joint work with beck@.
* Rework ssl3_output_cert_chain() to take a CERT_PKEY and consider chains.jsing2019-03-251-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | We will now include the certificates in the chain in the certificate list, or use the existing extra_certs if present. Failing that we fall back to the automatic chain building if not disabled. This also simplifies the code significantly. ok beck@ tb@
* Rename tls1_handshake_hash*() to tls1_transcript_hash*().jsing2019-02-091-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | While handshake hash is correct (in as far as it is a hash of handshake messages), using tls1_transcript_hash*() aligns them with the naming of the tls1_transcript*() functions. Additionally, the TLSv1.3 specification uses Transcript-Hash and "transcript hash", which this matches. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rename TLS extension handling to use less "hello".jsing2019-01-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the TLS extension code was rewritten, TLS extensions could only exist in ClientHello and ServerHello messages - as such, they were named in pairs of *_clienthello_{needs,build} which would be called by the client and *_clienthello_parse. Likewise for *_serverhello_{needs,build} which would be called by a server and *_serverhello_parse, which would be called by a client. Enter TLSv1.3 - TLS extensions can now exist in one of seven messages, with only certain types being allowed to appear in each, meaning the naming scheme no longer works. Instead, rename them to indicate the caller rather than the message type - this effectively means: clienthello_needs -> client_needs clienthello_build -> client_build clienthello_parse -> server_parse serverhello_needs -> server_needs serverhello_build -> server_build serverhello_parse -> client_parse ok beck@ tb@
* Remove an ugly hack in the client certificate verification code that workstb2018-12-071-48/+44
| | | | | | | | | | around broken GOST implementations. It looks like client certificates with GOST have been completely broken since reimport of the GOST code, so no-one is using LibreSSL this way. The client side was fixed only last week for TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1. This workaround is now in the way of much needed simplifcation and cleanup, so it is time for it to go. suggested by and ok jsing
* Fix DTLS transcript handling for HelloVerifyRequest.jsing2018-11-211-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If DTLS sees a HelloVerifyRequest the transcript is reset - the previous tls1_init_finished_mac() function could be called multiple times and would discard any existing state. The replacement tls1_transcript_init() is more strict and fails if a transcript already exists. Provide an explicit tls1_transcript_reset() function and call it from the appropriate places. This also lets us make DTLS less of a special snowflake and call tls1_transcript_init() in the same place as used for TLS. ok beck@ tb@
* Add check function to verify that pkey is usable with a sigalg.beck2018-11-111-3/+3
| | | | | Include check for appropriate RSA key size when used with PSS. ok tb@
* quiet warning on other compilersbcook2018-11-111-3/+3
| | | | ok beck@
* Free the server tls transcript in case session reuse did not work.bluhm2018-11-111-3/+4
| | | | | Regression found by Perl module p5-IO-Socket-SSL tests. with beck@ tb@
* Add support for RSA PSS algorithims being used in sigalgs.beck2018-11-111-1/+15
| | | | | | lightly tested, but will need sanity checks and regress test changes before being added to any sigalgs list for real ok jsing@ tb@
* Convert signatures and verifcation to use the EVP_DigestXXX apibeck2018-11-111-18/+40
| | | | | | to allow for adding PSS, Nuke the now unneejded guard around the PSS algorithms in the sigalgs table ok jsing@ tb@
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