| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
... | |
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Convert to CBS, use more appropriate variable names and improve validation.
Allocate a dedicated buffer to hold the decrypted result, rather than
decrypting into the handshake buffer (which is also used to send data).
ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
around the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 period... and buggy clients are buggy. This also
helps to clean up the RSA key exchange code.
ok "kill it with fire" beck@ tb@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This removes ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext() and allows the CBS to be
passed all the way through from ssl3_get_client_hello(). The renegotation
check gets pulled up into ssl3_get_client_hello() which is where other
such checks exist.
The TLS extension parsing now also ensures that we do not get duplicates
of any known extensions (the old pre-rewrite code only did this for some
extensions).
ok inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
| |
With review/feedback from inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
| |
Based on a diff from doug@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
length, since the caller has already been converted to CBS. A small amount
of additional clean up whilst here.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
NPN was never standardised and the last draft expired in October 2012.
ALPN was standardised in July 2014 and has been supported in LibreSSL
since December 2014. NPN has also been removed from Chromium in May 2016.
TLS clients and servers that try to use/enable NPN will fail gracefully and
fallback to the default protocol, since it will essentially appear that the
otherside does not support NPN. At some point in the future we will
actually remove the NPN related symbols entirely.
ok bcook@ beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
back.
ok guenther@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Over the years OpenSSL grew multiple ways of being able to specify EC keys
(and/or curves) for use with ECDH and ECDHE key exchange. You could specify
a static EC key (SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh()), use that as a curve and
generate ephemeral keys (SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE), provide the EC key via
a callback that was provided with insufficient information
(SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh_cb()) or enable automatic selection and generation
of EC keys via SSL{_CTX,}_set_ecdh_auto(). This complexity leads to
problems (like ECDHE not being enabled) and potential weird configuration
(like being able to do ECDHE without the ephemeral part...).
We no longer support ECDH and ECDHE can be disabled by removing ECDHE
ciphers from the cipher list. As such, permanently enable automatic EC
curve selection and generation, effectively disabling all of the
configuration knobs. The only exception is the
SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh() functions, which retain part of their previous
behaviour by configuring the curve of the given EC key as the only curve
being enabled. Everything else becomes a no-op.
ok beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
while we are at it, convert SSLerror to use a function
internally, so that we may later allocate the handshake
structure and check for it
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@, gcc@, regress@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
DTLS cookie validation. This can mask a later failure and result in a
positive return value being returned from ssl3_get_client_hello(), when
it should return a negative value to propagate the error.
Ironically this was introduced in OpenSSL 2e9802b7a7b with the commit
message "Fix DTLS cookie management bugs".
Fix based on OpenSSL.
Issue reported by Nicolas Bouliane <nbouliane at jive dot com>.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
less code, but there is also a potential performance gain since they can be
larger allocations.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
into the CBB memory, rather than mallocing and memcpying, which also makes
makes the code more consistent with the client. Add a missing check for the
first EC_POINT_point2oct() call.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
with the handshake hash. For now tls1_digest_cached_records() is retained
to release the handshake buffer.
ok beck@ inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
suite has been selected, and convert the final finish MAC to use this
handshake hash.
This is a first step towards cleaning up the current handshake
buffer/digest code.
ok beck@ inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@ inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
"ssl3-md5" and "ssl-sha1", call the EVP_md5() and EVP_sha1() functions
directly.
ok beck@ inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Make a table of "function codes" which maps the internal state of the SSL *
to something like a useful name so in a typical error in the connection you
know in what sort of place in the handshake things happened. (instead of
by arcane function name).
Add SSLerrorx() for when we don't have an SSL *
ok jsing@ after us both being prodded by bluhm@ to make it not terrible
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
line wraps that resulted
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We leave a single funciton code (0xFFF) to say "SSL_internal" so the public
API will not break, and we replace all internal use of the two argument
SSL_err() with the internal only SSL_error() that only takes a reason code.
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
and defines since they are the same everywhere.
ok beck@
|
|
longer SSLv3 code.
ok beck@
|