| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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* Improve client certificate selection to allow EC certificates
instead of only RSA certificates.
* Do not error out if a TLSv1.3 server requests an OCSP response as
part of a certificate request.
* Fix SSL_shutdown behavior to match the legacy stack. The previous
behaviour could cause a hang.
* Fix a memory leak and add a missing error check in the handling of
the key update message.
* Fix a memory leak in tls13_record_layer_set_traffic_key.
* Avoid calling freezero with a negative size if a server sends a
malformed plaintext of all zeroes.
* Ensure that only PSS may be used with RSA in TLSv1.3 in order
to avoid using PKCS1-based signatures.
* Add the P-521 curve to the list of curves supported by default
in the client.
This is errata/6.7/019_libssl.patch.sig
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The enc function pointers do not serve any purpose these days - remove
a layer of indirection and call dtls1_enc()/tls1_enc() directly.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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The decrypted session ticket contains key material.
ok tb@
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allocating on stack.
While here also check the return values from EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and
HMAC_Init_ex().
ok tb@
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Rename mlen to hlen since it is a hmac (and this matches hctx and hmac).
Rename ctx to cctx since it is a cipher context and ctx is usually used to
mean SSL_CTX in this code.
ok tb@
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This removes various pointer arithmetic and manual length checks.
ok tb@
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This handles the ret = 2 case and makes the code more readable.
ok tb@
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Convert ssl_get_prev_session(), tls1_process_ticket() and
tls1_decrypt_ticket() to handle the session ID from the client hello
as a CBS. While here also swap the order of arguments for
tls1_decrypt_ticket() so that it is consistent with the other functions.
ok tb@
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There is not much point having a tlsext_tick_md macro that replaces
EVP_sha256() in two places, when the cipher is just hardcoded.
ok tb@
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We only have to find one extension, so do that first then proceed with
processing and decryption. This makes the code more readable and drops
two levels of indent.
ok tb@
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Separate the malloc() check and EVP_DecryptUpdate() - the malloc() failure
is fatal while a EVP_DecryptUpdate() is a decryption failure.
Also ensure that we clear the error stack in all cases where we are
indicating a failure to decrypt or decode the ticket - otherwise
SSL_error() while later return failure when it should not.
ok tb@
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Rather than returning from multiple places and trying to clean up as we go,
move to a single exit point and clean/free in one place. Also invert the
logic that handles NULL sessions - fail early, rather than having an
indented if test for success.
ok tb@
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ok beck@
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- Make a separate sigalgs list for TLS 1.3 including only modern
algorithm choices which we use when the handshake will not negotiate
TLS 1.2.
- Modify the legacy sigalgs for TLS 1.2 to include the RSA PSS algorithms as
mandated by RFC8446 when the handshake will permit negotiation of TLS 1.2
from a 1.3 handshake.
ok jsing@ tb@
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to the one I intended to commit
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- Make a separate sigalgs list for TLS 1.3 including only modern
algorithm choices which we use when the handshake will not negotiate
TLS 1.2
- Modify the legacy sigalgs for TLS 1.2 to include the RSA PSS algorithms as
mandated by RFC8446 when the handshake will permit negotiation of TLS 1.2
ok jsing@ tb@
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just keep the sigalg around so we can remember what we actually
decided to use.
ok jsing@
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that will be usable with TLS 1.3 with less eye bleed.
ok jsing@ tb@
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ok beck@ tb@
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RFC 7919 renamed the Supported Elliptic Curves TLS extension to Supported
Groups and redefined it to include finite field DH (FFDH) in addition to
elliptic curve DH (ECDH). As such, rename the TLS extension and change the
associated code to refer to groups rather than curves.
ok beck@ tb@
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The tls1_check_ec_tmp_key() function is now rather misnamed, so just inline
the code. Also, rather than running tls1_get_shared_curve() once per EC
cipher suite, we can run it once at the start of the ssl3_choose_cipher()
function.
ok bluhm@ tb@
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ok bluhm@ tb@
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The original implementation is rather crazy and means that we effectively
have two lots of code that parse a ClientHello and two lots of code that
parse TLS extensions. Partially simplify this by passing a CBS containing
the extension block through to the session handling functions, removing the
need to reimplement the ClientHello parsing.
While here standarise on naming for session_id and session_id_len.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Now that all callers of tls12_get_sigandhash() have been converted to CBB,
collapse tls12_get_sigandhash() and tls12_get_sigandhash_cbb() into a
single function. Rename it to tls12_gethashandsig() to be representative
of the actual order of the sigalgs parameters, and perform some other
clean up.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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The RI logic gets pulled up into ssl3_get_server_hello() and
ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext() gets replaced by tlsext_client_parse(),
which allows a CBS to be passed all the way down.
This also deduplicates the tlsext_client_build() and tlsext_server_build()
code.
ok beck@
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This removes ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext() and allows the CBS to be
passed all the way through from ssl3_get_client_hello(). The renegotation
check gets pulled up into ssl3_get_client_hello() which is where other
such checks exist.
The TLS extension parsing now also ensures that we do not get duplicates
of any known extensions (the old pre-rewrite code only did this for some
extensions).
ok inoguchi@
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As part of this, change ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() to take a CBB argument,
rather than a pointer/length. Some additional clean up/renames while here.
Based on a diff from doug@
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Based on a diff from doug@
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leaving ssl_add_{client,server}hello_tlsext() as pointer to CBB wrappers.
ok doug@
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input + ok beck@, jsing@
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ok bcook@ beck@
input + ok jsing@
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This was added as a workaround for broken F5 TLS termination, which then
created issues talking to broken IronPorts. The size of the padding is
hardcoded so it cannot be used in any generic sense.
ok bcook@ beck@ doug@
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This was a workaround for a server that needed to talk GOST to old/broken
CryptoPro clients. This has no impact on TLS clients that are using GOST.
ok bcook@ beck@ doug@
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ok jsing@
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ok beck@ doug@
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extension framework.
ok jsing@ beck@
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NPN was never standardised and the last draft expired in October 2012.
ALPN was standardised in July 2014 and has been supported in LibreSSL
since December 2014. NPN has also been removed from Chromium in May 2016.
TLS clients and servers that try to use/enable NPN will fail gracefully and
fallback to the default protocol, since it will essentially appear that the
otherside does not support NPN. At some point in the future we will
actually remove the NPN related symbols entirely.
ok bcook@ beck@ doug@
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back.
ok guenther@
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extension framework.
input + ok jsing@
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new extension framework.
input + ok jsing@
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Over the years OpenSSL grew multiple ways of being able to specify EC keys
(and/or curves) for use with ECDH and ECDHE key exchange. You could specify
a static EC key (SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh()), use that as a curve and
generate ephemeral keys (SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE), provide the EC key via
a callback that was provided with insufficient information
(SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh_cb()) or enable automatic selection and generation
of EC keys via SSL{_CTX,}_set_ecdh_auto(). This complexity leads to
problems (like ECDHE not being enabled) and potential weird configuration
(like being able to do ECDHE without the ephemeral part...).
We no longer support ECDH and ECDHE can be disabled by removing ECDHE
ciphers from the cipher list. As such, permanently enable automatic EC
curve selection and generation, effectively disabling all of the
configuration knobs. The only exception is the
SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh() functions, which retain part of their previous
behaviour by configuring the curve of the given EC key as the only curve
being enabled. Everything else becomes a no-op.
ok beck@ doug@
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list or if we are negotiating an ECC cipher in the handshake. This dedups
some of the existing code and will make the EC extension rewrites easier.
ok doug@
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tlsext_sni_serverhello_parse(). This also adds a check to ensure that
if we have an existing session, the name matches what we specified via
SNI.
ok doug@
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and the new extension framework.
Feedback from doug@
ok inoguchi@
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Missed in the original commit.
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Introduce a TLS extension handling framework that has per-extension type
functions to determine if an extension is needed, to build the extension
data and parse the extension data. This is somewhat analogous to BoringSSL,
however these build and parse functions are intentionally symetrical. The
framework is hooked into the existing TLS handling code in such a way that
we can gradual convert the extension handling code.
Convert the TLS Server Name Indication extension to the new framework,
while rewriting it to use CBB/CBS and be more strict in the process.
Discussed with beck@
ok inoguchi@
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while we are at it, convert SSLerror to use a function
internally, so that we may later allocate the handshake
structure and check for it
ok jsing@
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