| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
... | |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This was added as a workaround for broken F5 TLS termination, which then
created issues talking to broken IronPorts. The size of the padding is
hardcoded so it cannot be used in any generic sense.
ok bcook@ beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This was a workaround for a server that needed to talk GOST to old/broken
CryptoPro clients. This has no impact on TLS clients that are using GOST.
ok bcook@ beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
extension framework.
ok jsing@ beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
NPN was never standardised and the last draft expired in October 2012.
ALPN was standardised in July 2014 and has been supported in LibreSSL
since December 2014. NPN has also been removed from Chromium in May 2016.
TLS clients and servers that try to use/enable NPN will fail gracefully and
fallback to the default protocol, since it will essentially appear that the
otherside does not support NPN. At some point in the future we will
actually remove the NPN related symbols entirely.
ok bcook@ beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
back.
ok guenther@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
extension framework.
input + ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
new extension framework.
input + ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Over the years OpenSSL grew multiple ways of being able to specify EC keys
(and/or curves) for use with ECDH and ECDHE key exchange. You could specify
a static EC key (SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh()), use that as a curve and
generate ephemeral keys (SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE), provide the EC key via
a callback that was provided with insufficient information
(SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh_cb()) or enable automatic selection and generation
of EC keys via SSL{_CTX,}_set_ecdh_auto(). This complexity leads to
problems (like ECDHE not being enabled) and potential weird configuration
(like being able to do ECDHE without the ephemeral part...).
We no longer support ECDH and ECDHE can be disabled by removing ECDHE
ciphers from the cipher list. As such, permanently enable automatic EC
curve selection and generation, effectively disabling all of the
configuration knobs. The only exception is the
SSL{_CTX,}_set_tmp_ecdh() functions, which retain part of their previous
behaviour by configuring the curve of the given EC key as the only curve
being enabled. Everything else becomes a no-op.
ok beck@ doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
list or if we are negotiating an ECC cipher in the handshake. This dedups
some of the existing code and will make the EC extension rewrites easier.
ok doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
tlsext_sni_serverhello_parse(). This also adds a check to ensure that
if we have an existing session, the name matches what we specified via
SNI.
ok doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
and the new extension framework.
Feedback from doug@
ok inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
| |
Missed in the original commit.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Introduce a TLS extension handling framework that has per-extension type
functions to determine if an extension is needed, to build the extension
data and parse the extension data. This is somewhat analogous to BoringSSL,
however these build and parse functions are intentionally symetrical. The
framework is hooked into the existing TLS handling code in such a way that
we can gradual convert the extension handling code.
Convert the TLS Server Name Indication extension to the new framework,
while rewriting it to use CBB/CBS and be more strict in the process.
Discussed with beck@
ok inoguchi@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
while we are at it, convert SSLerror to use a function
internally, so that we may later allocate the handshake
structure and check for it
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@, gcc@, regress@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Make a table of "function codes" which maps the internal state of the SSL *
to something like a useful name so in a typical error in the connection you
know in what sort of place in the handshake things happened. (instead of
by arcane function name).
Add SSLerrorx() for when we don't have an SSL *
ok jsing@ after us both being prodded by bluhm@ to make it not terrible
|
|
|
|
| |
line wraps that resulted
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We leave a single funciton code (0xFFF) to say "SSL_internal" so the public
API will not break, and we replace all internal use of the two argument
SSL_err() with the internal only SSL_error() that only takes a reason code.
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
and defines since they are the same everywhere.
ok beck@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
will be revisited at some point in the near future.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
SSL{_CTX}_set1_groups{_list}() - also provide defines for the previous
SSL{_CTX}_set1_curves{_list} names.
This also changes the default list of EC curves to be X25519, P-256 and
P-384. If you want others (such a brainpool) you need to configure this
yourself.
Inspired by parts of BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
set and cleared via existing functions.
|
|
|
|
| |
Discussed with beck@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
so these should not be diddled with directly
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
known to be in use.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
internal.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
known to be used by ports.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Testing of an earlier revision by naddy@.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
| |
ok doug@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
in the process. This also fixes a long standing bug where
tls1_ec_curve_id2nid() is called with only one byte of the curve ID.
ok beck@ miod@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
and more importantly they do not provide PFS (if you want to use ECDH, use
ECDHE instead).
With input from guenther@.
ok deraadt@ guenther@
|
|
|
|
|
| |
based on openssl commit a5184a6c89ff954261e73d1e8691ab73b9b4b2d4
ok bcook@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
fails or the HMAC check fails.
Noted independently by jsing@ and Kurt Cancemi (kurt (at) x64architecture.com)
ok bcook@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
repeatedly renegotiating and sending OCSP Status Request TLS extensions.
Fix based on OpenSSL.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
chooses a different HMAC algorithm.
Avert memory leaks if the callback preps the HMAC in some way.
Based on openssl commit 1bbe48ab149893a78bf99c8eb8895c928900a16f
but retaining a pre-callback length check to guarantee the callback
is provided the buffer that the API claims.
ok bcook@ jsing@
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Based on a diff from Kinichiro Inoguchi.
ok beck@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
14 years ago these were changed in OpenSSL to be the same
as the _ex functions. We use the _ex functions only internally
to ensure it is obvious the ctx must be cleared.
ok bcook@
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We can now assume >= TLS v1.0 since SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION and
DTLS1_BAD_VER support was removed.
"reads ok" miod@
|