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Rename the existing ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites with an "-OLD" suffix,
effectively replaces the original Google implementation. We continue to
support both the IETF and Google versions, however the existing names
now refer to the ciphers from draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04.
Feedback from doug@
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This allows for clients that willingly choose to perform a downgrade and
attempt to establish a second connection at a lower protocol after the
previous attempt unexpectedly failed, to be notified and have the second
connection aborted, if the server does in fact support a higher protocol.
TLS has perfectly good version negotiation and client-side fallback is
dangerous. Despite this, in order to maintain maximum compatability with
broken web servers, most mainstream browsers implement this. Furthermore,
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV only works if both the client and server support it and
there is effectively no way to tell if this is the case, unless you control
both ends.
Unfortunately, various auditors and vulnerability scanners (including
certain online assessment websites) consider the presence of a not yet
standardised feature to be important for security, even if the clients do
not perform client-side downgrade or the server only supports current TLS
protocols.
Diff is loosely based on OpenSSL with some inspiration from BoringSSL.
Discussed with beck@ and miod@.
ok bcook@
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however it is not likely to be removed any time soon.
ok beck@ miod@
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the Camellia ciphersuites for TLS 1.2 introduced in RFC 5932. From OpenSSL HEAD.
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This causes a libssl major version bump as this affects the layout of some
internal-but-unfortunately-made-visible structs.
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there are backwards compatible names/aliases for EDH.
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drafts are now RFCs. Also add the TLS extension type for ALPN and be
consistent with RFC reference formatting.
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Based on Adam Langley's chromium patches.
Tested by and ok sthen@
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7 years ago and never made it into an RFC. That code wasn't compiled in
anyway unless one would define the actual on-the-wire extension id bytes;
crank libssl major.
With help and enlightenment from Brendan MacDonell.
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OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT.
ok tedu@
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a not quite appropriate data structure. ok jsing
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with the bearded ones...
some API's that nobody should be using will dissapear with this commit.
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readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using
tr and md5.
There is still a huge amount of inconsistency within these headers.
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*warning* this bumps shared lib minors for libssl and libcrypto from 2.1 to 2.2
if you are using the ssl26 packages for ssh and other things to work you will
need to get new ones (see ~beck/libsslsnap/<arch>) on cvs or ~beck/src-patent.tar.gz on cvs
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functionality for shared libs.
Note that routines such as sslv2_init and friends that use RSA will
not work due to lack of RSA in this library.
Needs documentation and help from ports for easy upgrade to full
functionality where legally possible.
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