| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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When parsing a cipher string, a cipher list is created, before being
duplicated and sorted - the second copy being stored as cipher_list_by_id.
This is done only so that a client can ensure that the cipher selected by
a server is in the cipher list. This is pretty pointless given that most
clients are short-lived and that we already had to iterate over the cipher
list in order to build the client hello. Additionally, any update to the
cipher list requires that cipher_list_by_id also be updated and kept in
sync.
Remove all of this and replace it with a simple linear scan - the overhead
of duplicating and sorting the cipher list likely exceeds that of a simple
linear scan over the cipher list (64 maximum, more typically ~9 or so).
ok beck@ tb@
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Move is_server and msg_type right after the SSL object so that CBS
and CBB and alert come last. This brings these functions more in
line with other internal functions and separates state from data.
requested by jsing
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This allows clients to use EC certificates.
ok inoguchi, jsing
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ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
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Some time prior to SSLeay 0.8.1b, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN got added with the
intention of handling RSA sign only certificates... this incomplete code
had the following comment:
/* check to see if this is a signing only certificate */
/* EAY EAY EAY EAY */
And while the comment was removed in 2005, the incomplete RSA sign-only
handling has remained ever since.
Remove SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN and rename SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC to SSL_PKEY_RSA. While
here also remove the unused SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA.
ok tb@
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messages with oscp staples.
ok jsing@ tb@
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According to RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.4, a client receiving an empty
certificate list must abort the handshake with a decode error alert.
ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@ ('it rarely is the alert you'd expect it to be...')
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The RFC requires that a server always provide a certificate for
authentication. Ensure that this is the case, rather than proceeding and
attempting validation. In the case where validation was disabled and the
server returned an empty certificate list, this would have previously
resulted in a NULL pointer deference.
Issue reported by otto@
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Switch the legacy version when processing the server hello, rather than
when the client hello has been sent. This ensures that we accept a
response from the server that has a record version other than
TLS1_2_VERSION, as is the case where the server is negotiating TLSv1.0
or TLSv1.1.
Issue spotted by inoguchi@
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Rather than using a mess of SSL_AL_*, SSL_AD_*, SSL3_AD_* and TLS1_AD_*
defines, provide our own TLS13_ALERT_* defines and use those. This also
provides the alerts that are new to TLSv1.3.
ok beck@
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When operating in middlebox compatibility mode, the TLSv1.3 client needs
to send a dummy ChangeCipherSpec message immediately before its second
flight of handshake messages (when early data is not offered).
ok tb@
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ok tb@
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ok jsing@, tb@, inoguchi@
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No functional change.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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The server-side will need to use the same function.
No functional change.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Move functions so that they are in the order that the TLSv1.3 messages are
processed. While here, also move tls13_client_end_of_early_data_send() from
tls13_client.c to tls13_server.c.
No functional change.
ok beck@ tb@
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The state machine currently handles the HelloRetryRequest case by using
WITH_HRR - in other words, we're explicitly indicating when we transition
to the alternate path. The problem here is that we do not know if we're
going to receive a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest until we process
the message. This means that the ServerHello processing code has to handle
both types of messages.
The state machine and associated processing code becomes cleaner if we flip
this around so that we assume we are going to receive a HelloRetryRequest
and upon discovering that it is not, trigger WITHOUT_HRR and hand off to
the ServerHello processing function. In particular, this makes the logic
much more straight forward on the server side, when adding support for HRR.
With feedback from tb@
ok tb@
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Move all of the TLSv1.3 constants to the top of tls13_lib.c. Also mark
these all as const so that they end up in .rodata rather than .data.
ok tb@
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Generate a client key share using our preferred group, rather than always
using X25519. This means that the key share group can be controlled via
SSL{_CTX,}_set1_groups() and SSL{_CTX,}_set1_groups_list().
ok beck@
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Generate an unpredictable 32-byte legacy session ID during client
initialisation, rather than when the ClientHello message is being created.
Otherwise in the case of a HelloRetryRequest the legacy session ID values
will differ between the first and second ClientHello messages, which is
not permitted by the RFC.
Fixes an issue talking TLSv1.3 to smtp.mail.yahoo.com.
ok beck@
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If the maximum version is less than TLSv1.3, send a zero-length session
identifier (matching the behaviour of the legacy TLS stack), rather than
a 32 byte random identifier. The 32 byte random identifier is only needed
for "compatibility" mode in TLSv1.3.
ok beck@
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ok inoguchi@ tb@
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messages must terminate the connection with a decrypt_error alert, so
replace the use of the deprecated decryption_failed alert accordingly.
ok beck inoguchi jsing
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ok inoguchi jsing
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In the case of a hello retry request, we need to replace the client hello
with a synthetic handshake message, switch key share to that selected by
the server, build and send a new client hello, then process the resulting
server hello.
ok tb@
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Use flags to signal the need to switch to the legacy client and to identify
a hello retry request. This allows the caller to take appropriate action,
rather than trying to do this in the parsing/processing code.
Split the key deriviation and record protection engagement code into a
separate function, both for readability and reuse.
Change handshake states outside of the processing code.
ok tb@
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This got added to the wrong functions (server side, not client) - swap the
now unimplemented send/recv functions between client and server.
ok tb@
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Unlike TLSv1.2 there is only a single hash in use, hence as soon as we
know what the hash is and have initialised the transcript hash, we can
free the transcript buffers.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Pull out the key share handling code and provide a clean/self contained
interface. This will make it easier to support groups other than X25519.
ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
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on the error stack, refrain from pushing an 'unknown' error on the stack.
This should allow libcrypto errors (including bio) to be visible, where we
have nothing better to offer.
ok tb@
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handshake function pointer.
Fixes an isssue found by jca@ with OpenVPN.
ok beck@ tb@
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ok jsing@
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ok jsing@
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Issue noticed by kn@ when talking to a TLSv1.3 capable mail server, but
with smtpd capping max version to TLSv1.2.
ok beck@
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client hello.
Allow pre-TLSv1.3 alerts (including warnings) to be received before the
server hello message. Disallow pre-TLSv1.3 alerts as soon as we know that
we are using TLSv1.3.
Noticed by ajacoutot@ while connecting to www.openprinting.org.
ok tb@
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according to RFC8446.
ok jsing@
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set by a 1.3 server when it downgrades to tls 1.2 or 1.1 as per
RFC 8446 section 4.1.3
ok jsing@
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the same from the server.
ok jsing@ tb@
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This avoids the need for each send handler to call
tls13_handshake_msg_start() and tls13_handshake_msg_finish().
ok beck@ tb@
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This avoids every receive handler from having to get the handshake message
content itself. Additionally, pull the trailing data check up so that each
receive handler does not have to implement it. This makes the code more
readable and reduces duplication.
ok beck@ tb@
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ok tb@
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Finished message has been received, a change cipher spec may be received
and must be ignored. Add a flag to the record layer struct and set it at
the appropriate moments during the handshake so that we will ignore it.
ok jsing
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The legacy version field is capped at TLSv1.2, however it may be lower than
this if we are only choosing to use TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1.
ok beck@ tb@
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in the ClientHello where it may be set to TLS1_VERSION. Use
the minimal supported version to decide whether we choose to do
so or not. Use a sent hook to set it back TLS1_2_VERSION right
after the ClientHello message is on the wire.
ok beck jsing
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We currently don't support sending a modified clienthello
ok jsing@ tb@
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When falling back to the legacy TLS client, in the case where a server has
sent a TLS record that contains more than one handshake message, we also
need to stash the unprocessed record data for later processing. Otherwise
we end up with missing handshake data.
ok beck@ tb@
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tls13 context, and emiting the alert at the upper layers when
the lower level code fails
ok jsing@, tb@
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This is based on the libtls error handling code, but adds machine readable
codes and subcodes. We then map these codes back to libssl error codes.
ok beck@ inoguchi@
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ok jsing@
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