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* Use a relative path against BSDOBJDIR to pick libcrypto; makes cross-libmiod2015-05-261-2/+2
| | | | work again.
* Add OPENSSL_NO_EGD to opensslfeatures.h.bcook2015-05-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | Since RAND_egd has been removed from LibreSSL, simplify porting software that relies on it. See https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/pull/34 from Bernard Spil, ok deraadt@
* Make SSL_CIPHER_get_bits() report ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphers as usingguenther2015-05-252-8/+8
| | | | | | | 256bit keys problem noted by Tim Kuijsten (info (at) netsend.nl) ok deraadt@ miod@ bcook@
* Maximilian dot Fillinger at uni-duesseldorf dot deschwarze2015-05-241-72/+0
| | | | | | starts helping with the pod2mdoc(1)-based conversion of LibreSSL crypto manuals from perlpod(1) to mdoc(7). Here comes the first file, slightly tweaked by me.
* bump to version 2.2bcook2015-05-231-2/+2
| | | | ok deraadt@
* No need to check the return value of memcpy() if you actually checked thismiod2015-05-201-3/+2
| | | | pointer for NULL the line above; ok doug@
* Record inter-library dependencies between libcrypto, libssl and libtlskettenis2015-05-173-1/+5
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* Fix return paths with missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() calls.jsg2015-05-157-17/+20
| | | | ok doug@
* use strdup() to init stringderaadt2015-04-301-3/+2
| | | | ok doug millert
* Add whitespace and replace OPENSSL_free with free in documentation.doug2015-04-296-22/+22
| | | | ok jsing@
* Call CBB_add_space() rather than reimplementing it.doug2015-04-292-4/+4
| | | | ok jsing@
* Rename cbb_buffer_add_u to cbb_add_u and remove redundant code.doug2015-04-292-30/+12
| | | | | | | All of cbb_buffer_add_u's callers first call CBB_flush and send cbb->base. cbb_add_u() now has that common code in one place. ok jsing@
* Added len_len error checking for internal cbb_buffer_add_u().doug2015-04-292-2/+8
| | | | ok jsing@
* Call CBS_mem_equal() rather than reimplementing it.doug2015-04-292-6/+4
| | | | ok jsing@
* Avoid NULL deref in CBS_get_any_asn1_element().doug2015-04-292-4/+6
| | | | | | This function is documented as allowing NULL for out_header_len. ok jsing@
* Added error checking for len argument in cbs_get_u().doug2015-04-292-2/+8
| | | | tweak + ok jsing@
* free() can handle NULL.doug2015-04-292-16/+8
| | | | ok jsing@
* Add missing BN_CTX_end() calls.doug2015-04-294-18/+18
| | | | | | | | After calling BN_CTX_start(), there must be a BN_CTX_end() before returning. There were missing BN_CTX_end() calls in error paths. One diff chunk was simply removing redundant code related to this. ok deraadt@
* Don't ignore the reference count in X509_STORE_free.doug2015-04-251-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | Based on this upstream commit: bff9ce4db38b297c72a6d84617d71ae2934450f7 which didn't make it into a release until 1.0.2. Thanks to william at 25thandclement dot com for reporting this! ok deraadt@ jsing@ beck@
* Check for invalid leading zeros in CBS_get_asn1_uint64.doug2015-04-252-6/+16
| | | | | | | | | | ASN.1 integers cannot have all zeros or all ones for the first 9 bits. This rule ensures the numbers are encoded with the smallest number of content octets (see ITU-T Rec X.690 section 8.3.2). Based on BoringSSL commit 5933723b7b592e9914f703d630b596e140c93e16 ok deraadt@ jsing@
* Do not need to buf[0] = 0 before strlcpy(buf, ...deraadt2015-04-231-2/+1
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* Clean up the ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list() API - rather than having thejsing2015-04-156-42/+30
| | | | | | | | | | ability to pass or not pass a STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *, which is then either zeroed or if NULL a new one is allocated, always allocate one and return it directly. Inspired by simliar changes in BoringSSL. ok beck@ doug@
* Remove d2i_X509_PKEY and i2d_X509_PKEY from the SSLeay days.doug2015-04-122-44/+2
| | | | | | | | i2d_X509_PKEY is a "needs to implement" and d2i_X509_PKEY is broken. Removed upstream in commit b1f3442857c1fd76e91941141bf671d19e90a79d. ok deraadt@, jsing@
* Send OPENSSL_issetugid() straight to hell, no final cigarette.deraadt2015-04-112-15/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The issetugid() API is supposed to make a strong promise where "0 means it is safe to look at the environment". Way back in the past someone on the OpenSSL team responded to the environment access danger by creating a wrapper called OPENSSL_issetugid, and went to use it a number of places. However, by default on systems lacking true issetugid(), OPENSSL_issetugid returns 0. 0 indicating safely. False safety. Which means OPENSSL_issetugid() fails to make any sort of promise about safety, in fact it is just the opposite. Can you believe the OpenSSL team? This nastiness was noticed over the years, however noone could gain traction and get it fixed in OpenSSL. Also see a paragraph about this in http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/worst-common-denominator-programming ok jsing
* Remove all getenv() calls, especially those wrapped by issetugid().deraadt2015-04-117-60/+16
| | | | | | | | | getenv()'s wrapped by issetugid() are safe, but issetugid() is correct difficult to impliment on many operating systems. By accident, a grand experiment was run over the last year, where issetugid() returned 1 (the safe value) on a few operating systems. Noone noticed & complained that certain environment variables were not working....... ok doug beck jsing, discussion with others
* readdir() is thread-safe when DIR handles aren't shared, so delete the lock.guenther2015-04-062-6/+2
| | | | | | | (POSIX is fixing its description: readdir_r() was a botch) Patch from Carlos Mart�n Nieto (cmn (at) dwim.me) no -portable concerns bcook@
* Nuke the OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH hack - this has to be enabled atjsing2015-03-314-44/+4
| | | | | | | compile time, which we do not do and are unlikely to ever do. Additionally, there are two runtime configurable alternatives that exist. ok bcook@ doug@
* Factor out the init_buf initialisation code, rather than duplicating itjsing2015-03-2716-206/+112
| | | | | | in four different places. ok doug@ guenther@
* BUF_MEM_free() has its own explicit NULL check.jsing2015-03-272-18/+12
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* Fix indentation that incorrectly implies a different control flow.doug2015-03-213-8/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The actual control flow is intentional while the indenting is incorrect. This is intended to be a cosmetic change. Verified that each of these was part of a KNF commit that wasn't intending to change behavior. Also, double checked against the history of changes in OpenSSL and BoringSSL. Addresses Coverity CIDs: 78842, 78859, 78863. ok tedu@
* Fix a memory leak in an error path.doug2015-03-201-1/+3
| | | | | | From OpenSSL commit 5e5d53d341fd9a9b9cc0a58eb3690832ca7a511f. ok guenther@, logan@
* Fix several crash causing defects from OpenSSL.tedu2015-03-1913-64/+166
| | | | | | | | | | | | | These include: CVE-2015-0209 - Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error CVE-2015-0286 - Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp CVE-2015-0287 - ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption CVE-2015-0289 - PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences Several other issues did not apply or were already fixed. Refer to https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150319.txt joint work with beck, doug, guenther, jsing, miod
* Avoid a NULL pointer deref when X509_get_pubkey() returns NULL.doug2015-03-151-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | A NULL pointer could be dereferenced when X509_REQ_set_pubkey() calls X509_PUBKEY_set() with pktmp. OpenSSL says it's the fix for CVE-2015-0288, but there aren't any public details yet to confirm. Either way, we should fix this. Based on OpenSSL commit 28a00bcd8e318da18031b2ac8778c64147cd54f9 and BoringSSL commit 9d102ddbc0f6ed835ed12272a3d8a627d6a8e728. "looks sane" beck@ ok miod@, bcook@
* delay EVP_MD_CTX_init so we don't forget to clean it up.tedu2015-03-112-6/+8
| | | | spotted by miod. ok miod.
* Reject DH keys sent by a server if they are considered too small; inspiredmiod2015-03-082-2/+24
| | | | | by a similar BoringSSL change, but raising the limit to 1024 bits. ok jsing@ markus@ guenther@ deraadt@
* Fix a minor information leak that was introduced in t1_lib.c r1.71, wherebyjsing2015-03-022-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | an additional 28 bytes of .rodata (or .data) is provided to the network. In most cases this is a non-issue since the memory content is already public. Issue found and reported by Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team. ok bcook@ beck@
* Fix CVE-2014-3570: properly calculate the square of a BIGNUM value.bcook2015-02-253-654/+303
| | | | | | | | | | | See https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150108.txt for a more detailed discussion. Original OpenSSL patch here: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a7a44ba55cb4f884c6bc9ceac90072dea38e66d0 The regression test is modified a little for KNF. ok miod@
* Fix CVE-2015-0205: Do not accept client authentication with Diffie-Hellmanbcook2015-02-252-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | certificates without requiring a CertificateVerify message. From OpenSSL commit: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1421e0c584ae9120ca1b88098f13d6d2e90b83a3 Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this. ok miod@
* fourth batch of perlpod(1) to mdoc(7) conversionschwarze2015-02-2318-1273/+0
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* Bump libcrypto and libssl majors, due to various recent churn.jsing2015-02-222-2/+2
| | | | Discussed with/requested by deraadt@ at the conclusion of s2k15.
* Reluctantly add server-side support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.jsing2015-02-2215-25/+159
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows for clients that willingly choose to perform a downgrade and attempt to establish a second connection at a lower protocol after the previous attempt unexpectedly failed, to be notified and have the second connection aborted, if the server does in fact support a higher protocol. TLS has perfectly good version negotiation and client-side fallback is dangerous. Despite this, in order to maintain maximum compatability with broken web servers, most mainstream browsers implement this. Furthermore, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV only works if both the client and server support it and there is effectively no way to tell if this is the case, unless you control both ends. Unfortunately, various auditors and vulnerability scanners (including certain online assessment websites) consider the presence of a not yet standardised feature to be important for security, even if the clients do not perform client-side downgrade or the server only supports current TLS protocols. Diff is loosely based on OpenSSL with some inspiration from BoringSSL. Discussed with beck@ and miod@. ok bcook@
* There is not much point constructing an SSL_CIPHER, then callingjsing2015-02-222-14/+6
| | | | | ssl3_cipher_get_value() to get the cipher suite value that we just put in the struct - use the cipher suite value directly.
* Remove IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF noops.jsing2015-02-223-6/+3
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* If BN_rand() or BN_pseudo_rand() are called with a NULL rnd argument,jsing2015-02-191-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | BN_bin2bn() will helpfully allocate a BN which is then leaked. Avoid this by explicitly checking for NULL at the start of the bnrand() function. Fixes Coverity ID 78831. ok miod@
* Memory leak in error path. Coverity CID 78822.miod2015-02-171-8/+9
| | | | ok doug@
* third batch of perlpod(1) to mdoc(7) conversionschwarze2015-02-1612-1364/+0
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* Avoid calling BN_CTX_end() on a context that wasn't started.doug2015-02-151-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | In dsa_builtin_paramgen(), if BN_MONT_CTX_new() fails, the BN_CTX_new() call above it will have allocated a ctx without calling BN_CTX_start() on it. The error handling calls BN_CTX_end() when ctx is allocated. Move the BN_MONT_CTX_new() call up so it will fail first without splitting up the BN_CTX_new() and BN_CTX_start(). tweak + ok miod@, ok bcook@
* Regenmiod2015-02-153-264/+282
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* If we decide to discard the provided seed buffer because its size is notmiod2015-02-151-8/+6
| | | | | | | | large enough, do it correctly so that the local seed buffer on the stack gets properly initialized in the first iteration of the loop. While there, remove an outdated and bogus comment. Coverity CID 21785 ok doug@ jsing@
* Check ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new() for failure. Coverity CID 78904miod2015-02-151-6/+8
| | | | ok doug@
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