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* Unbreak bidirectional SSL_shutdown for TLSv1.3libressl-v3.1.4tb2020-08-171-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | The previous errata patch 019_libssl broke bidirectional SSL_shutdown. This can cause a hang in some software that calls SSL_shutdown in a loop. Problem reported and fix tested by Predrag Punosevac. Thanks to Steffen Nurpmeso who independently found that this was due to an SSL_shutdown loop. ok jsing This is errata/6.7/020_libssl.patch.sig
* LibreSSL 3.1.4 - Interoperability and bug fixes for the TLSv1.3 client:tb2020-08-108-66/+189
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Improve client certificate selection to allow EC certificates instead of only RSA certificates. * Do not error out if a TLSv1.3 server requests an OCSP response as part of a certificate request. * Fix SSL_shutdown behavior to match the legacy stack. The previous behaviour could cause a hang. * Fix a memory leak and add a missing error check in the handling of the key update message. * Fix a memory leak in tls13_record_layer_set_traffic_key. * Avoid calling freezero with a negative size if a server sends a malformed plaintext of all zeroes. * Ensure that only PSS may be used with RSA in TLSv1.3 in order to avoid using PKCS1-based signatures. * Add the P-521 curve to the list of curves supported by default in the client. This is errata/6.7/019_libssl.patch.sig
* OpenBSD 6.7 errata 004 6.7/004_libssl.patch.siglibressl-v3.1.2tb2020-05-193-3/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | original commits: CVSROOT: /cvs Module name: src Changes by: jsing@cvs.openbsd.org 2020/05/16 08:44:55 Modified files: lib/libssl : tls13_client.c Log message: Ensure that a TLSv1.3 server has provided a certificate. The RFC requires that a server always provide a certificate for authentication. Ensure that this is the case, rather than proceeding and attempting validation. In the case where validation was disabled and the server returned an empty certificate list, this would have previously resulted in a NULL pointer deference. Issue reported by otto@ ok inoguchi@ tb@ CVSROOT: /cvs Module name: src Changes by: jsing@cvs.openbsd.org 2020/05/17 08:26:15 Modified files: lib/libssl : tls13_client.c Log message: Send a decode error alert if a server provides an empty certificate list. According to RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.4, a client receiving an empty certificate list must abort the handshake with a decode error alert. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@ ('it rarely is the alert you'd expect it to be...')
* Accept two ChangeCipherSpec messages during a TLSv1.3 handshake.jsing2020-05-031-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In compatibility mode, a TLSv1.3 server MUST send a dummy CCS message immediately after its first handshake message. This is normally after the ServerHello message, but it can be after the HelloRetryRequest message. As such we accept one CCS message from the server during the handshake. However, it turns out that in the HelloRetryRequest case, Facebook's fizz TLSv1.3 stack sends CCS messages after both the HelloRetryRequest message and the ServerHello message. This is unexpected and as far as I'm aware, no other TLSv1.3 implementation does this. Unfortunately the RFC is rather ambiguous here, which probably means it is not strictly an RFC violation. Relax the CCS message handling to allow two dummy CCS messages during a TLSv1.3. This makes our TLSv1.3 client work with Facebook Fizz when HRR is triggered. Issue discovered by inoguchi@ and investigated by tb@. ok deraadt@ tb@
* Add const to TLS1.3 internal vectorsinoguchi2020-05-022-14/+14
| | | | ok tb@
* tls13_record_layer internal functions to static in libsslinoguchi2020-04-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | We might remove static again for further regress around record layer in the future. ok jsing@ tb@
* tls13_handshake internal functions to static in libsslinoguchi2020-04-291-11/+12
| | | | ok jsing@ tb@
* Move legacy stack interfacing functions into tls13_legacy.c.jsing2020-04-284-199/+206
| | | | | | No functional change. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rename tls13_client_synthetic_handshake_message() and move to tls13_lib.c.jsing2020-04-283-47/+48
| | | | | | | | The server-side will need to use the same function. No functional change. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Shuffle some functions around.jsing2020-04-272-329/+328
| | | | | | | | | | Move functions so that they are in the order that the TLSv1.3 messages are processed. While here, also move tls13_client_end_of_early_data_send() from tls13_client.c to tls13_server.c. No functional change. ok beck@ tb@
* Switch to NEGOTIATED when using WITHOUT_HRR.jsing2020-04-251-4/+9
| | | | | | | | | | This ensures that we remain in a valid handshake state in the TLSv1.3 server. Ideally we would not switch to NEGOTIATED until after record protection has been enabled, but we'll revisit this later. Issue noted by inoguchi@ ok tb@
* Move unsupported, obsolete ciphers and deprecated aliases out ofschwarze2020-04-251-31/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | the main list of words to make it more readable, even though it remains long. Avoid using deprecated aliases in explanations what other words mean. Stop documenting aDSS because it is *both* a deprecated alias *and* no longer matches anything at all. General direction discussed with jsing@ some time ago.
* tweak the wording to make it clearer under which conditions exactlyschwarze2020-04-251-4/+4
| | | | | the TLSv1.3 cipher suites are made available, too; related to ssl_ciph.c rev. 1.115
* Improve TLSv1.3 state machine for HelloRetryRequest handling.jsing2020-04-225-66/+104
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The state machine currently handles the HelloRetryRequest case by using WITH_HRR - in other words, we're explicitly indicating when we transition to the alternate path. The problem here is that we do not know if we're going to receive a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest until we process the message. This means that the ServerHello processing code has to handle both types of messages. The state machine and associated processing code becomes cleaner if we flip this around so that we assume we are going to receive a HelloRetryRequest and upon discovering that it is not, trigger WITHOUT_HRR and hand off to the ServerHello processing function. In particular, this makes the logic much more straight forward on the server side, when adding support for HRR. With feedback from tb@ ok tb@
* Handle TLSv1.3 key shares other than X25519 on the server side.jsing2020-04-212-16/+34
| | | | | | | | Previously we would only select an X25519 key share from the client, ignoring any others. Change this so that we will select the first of the key shares that matches one of our supported groups. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Consolidate TLSv1.3 constants.jsing2020-04-213-40/+47
| | | | | | | Move all of the TLSv1.3 constants to the top of tls13_lib.c. Also mark these all as const so that they end up in .rodata rather than .data. ok tb@
* Provide TLSv1.3 cipher suite aliases to match the names used in RFC 8446.jsing2020-04-191-2/+25
| | | | ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Fix wrapping/indentation.jsing2020-04-181-4/+3
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* Expose the peer ephemeral public key used for TLSv1.3 key exchange.jsing2020-04-185-36/+79
| | | | | | | | | SSL_get_server_tmp_key() provides the peer ephemeral public key used for key exchange. In the case of TLSv1.3 this is essentially the peer public key from the key share used for TLSv1.3 key exchange, hence make it availaable via SSL_get_server_tmp_key(). ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Tweak previous active cipher suite code.jsing2020-04-181-6/+5
| | | | | | | Use a boolean value rather than using a counter, as suggested by tb@ during the previous review. ok tb@
* Allow more key share groups for TLSv1.3.jsing2020-04-181-21/+12
| | | | | | | | The key share code previously only allowed for key shares to be generated using one of the groups in our default list (X25519, secp256r1, secp384r1). Relax this and allow key shares using any of the groups in our NID list. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Only include TLSv1.3 cipher suites if there are active cipher suites.jsing2020-04-171-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | Revise the previous so that we only include TLSv1.3 cipher suites if the cipher rule string resulted in at least one active cipher suite. This more closely matches OpenSSL behaviour. Noted and fix tested by schwarze@ ok beck@ tb@
* Generate client key share using our preferred group.jsing2020-04-174-25/+37
| | | | | | | | Generate a client key share using our preferred group, rather than always using X25519. This means that the key share group can be controlled via SSL{_CTX,}_set1_groups() and SSL{_CTX,}_set1_groups_list(). ok beck@
* Update in several respects:schwarze2020-04-141-13/+11
| | | | | | | | * mention TLSv1.3 * remove DSS, DES(56), RC4(64), and IDEA(128), which are no longer supported * remove ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old and STREEBOG512 which don't exist in LibreSSL * correct the instruction for printing the complete list OK jsing@
* add the missing sentence "LibreSSL no longer provides any suchschwarze2020-04-141-2/+3
| | | | | cipher suites" to the DES entry and use the same wording for DSS; OK jsing@
* Delete the three sentences listing the ciphers currently includedschwarze2020-04-141-15/+2
| | | | | | | | | in LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH. That's going to change repeatedly and the extra maintenance effort for keeping it up to date is a waste because people can trivially run "openssl ciphers -v LOW" to look it up. Besides, updating it will usually be forgotten; the LOW entry was already wrong. Suggested by jsing@.
* Document the TLSv1.3 control word, update the description of theschwarze2020-04-111-4/+30
| | | | | | | TLSv1 control word, and explain how TLSv1.3 cipher suites can be configured in LibreSSL and in OpenSSL. While here, also mention how users can inspect the DEFAULT list of cipher suites. Stimulus, feedback and OK from jsing@.
* Include TLSv1.3 cipher suites unless cipher string references TLSv1.3.jsing2020-04-091-6/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OpenSSL has always taken the approach of enabling almost everything by default. As a result, if you wanted to run a secure TLS client/server you had to specify your own "secure" cipher string, rather than being able to trust the defaults as being sensible and secure. The problem is that with the introduction of TLSv1.3, most of these "secure" cipher strings result in the new TLSv1.3 cipher suites being excluded. The "work around" for this issue in OpenSSL was to add a new TLSv1.3 API (SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(), SSL_set_ciphersuites()) and have separate knobs for the pre-TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.3 cipher suites. This of course means that every application now needs to call two APIs, but it does mean that applications that only call SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list()/SSL_set_cipher_list() cannot remove TLSv1.3 cipher suites and prevent TLSv1.3 from working. We've taken a different approach and have allowed TLSv1.3 cipher suites to be manipulated via the existing SSL_set_cipher_list() API. However, in order to avoid problems with hardcoded cipher strings, change this behaviour so that we always include TLSv1.3 cipher suites unless the cipher string has a specific reference to the TLSv1.3 protocol or a TLSv1.3 cipher suite. This means that: $ openssl ciphers -v TLSv1.2:!TLSv1.3 still gives TLSv1.2 only cipher suites and: $ openssl ciphers -v AEAD-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 only lists a single TLSv1.3 cipher, however: $ openssl ciphers -v ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 now includes both TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 and all TLSv1.3 cipher suites (which also matches OpenSSL's openssl(1) behaviour). Issue encountered by kn@ with mumble. ok tb@
* Tidy line wrapping and remove an extra blank line.jsing2020-04-091-4/+3
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* ssl_aes_is_accelerated() returns a boolean - treat it as such, rather thanjsing2020-04-091-2/+2
| | | | explicitly comparing against a value.
* Ensure legacy session ID is persistent during client TLS session.jsing2020-04-081-9/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | Generate an unpredictable 32-byte legacy session ID during client initialisation, rather than when the ClientHello message is being created. Otherwise in the case of a HelloRetryRequest the legacy session ID values will differ between the first and second ClientHello messages, which is not permitted by the RFC. Fixes an issue talking TLSv1.3 to smtp.mail.yahoo.com. ok beck@
* Send a zero-length session identifier if TLSv1.3 is not enabled.jsing2020-04-061-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | If the maximum version is less than TLSv1.3, send a zero-length session identifier (matching the behaviour of the legacy TLS stack), rather than a 32 byte random identifier. The 32 byte random identifier is only needed for "compatibility" mode in TLSv1.3. ok beck@
* Void functions obviously do not return values; no need to elaborate.schwarze2020-03-305-31/+10
| | | | Patch from Martin Vahlensieck <academicsolutions dot ch>.
* Void functions obviously do not return values; no need to elaborate.schwarze2020-03-291-5/+2
| | | | Patch from Martin Vahlensieck <academicsolutions dot ch>.
* Consistently spell 'unsigned' as 'unsigned int', as style(9) seemstb2020-03-167-44/+45
| | | | | | | | | to prefer that. No binary change except in d1_srtp.c where the generated assembly differs only in line numbers (due to a wrapped long line) and in s3_cbc.c where there is no change in the generated assembly. ok inoguchi jsing
* The RFC is clear (section 5.3) that sequence number should never wrap.tb2020-03-161-5/+12
| | | | | | | | | We currently throw an error on overflow, but still wrap. Check up front if we would need to wrap and only increment if that case is excluded. This simplifies the increment loop and makes the returns in this function less magic. ok jsing
* Remove dtls1_enc().jsing2020-03-135-222/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Like much of the original DTLS code, dtls1_enc() is effectively a renamed copy of tls1_enc(). Since then tls1_enc() has been modified, however the non-AEAD code remains largely the same. As such, remove dtls1_enc() and instead call tls1_enc() from the DTLS code. The tls1_enc() AEAD code does not currently work correctly with DTLS, however this is a non-issue since we do not support AEAD cipher suites with DTLS currently. ok tb@
* Correct TLSv1.3 sequence number increment and wrapping check.jsing2020-03-131-3/+3
| | | | Fix proposed by tb@
* Ensure that CBB_add_space() always provides zeroed memory.jsing2020-03-131-1/+2
| | | | ok tb@
* Use calloc() rather than malloc() when allocating initial CBB buffer.jsing2020-03-121-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | CBB uses recallocarray() to expand buffers, however was still using malloc() for the initial buffer, which could result in memory being leaked in incorrect use cases. While here also use calloc() to allocate internal structs. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Use calloc() rather than malloc() when allocating buffers.jsing2020-03-121-3/+3
| | | | | | This reduces the chance of accidently leaking stack memory. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Stop overloading the record type for padding length.jsing2020-03-125-13/+10
| | | | | | | | Currently the CBC related code stuffs the padding length in the upper bits of the type field... stop doing that and add a padding_length field to the record struct instead. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Use internal versions of SSL3_BUFFER, SSL3_RECORD and DTLS1_RECORD_DATA.jsing2020-03-129-53/+83
| | | | | | | | | SSL3_BUFFER, SSL3_RECORD and DTLS1_RECORD_DATA are currently still in public headers, even though their usage is internal. This moves to using _INTERNAL suffixed versions that are in internal headers, which then allows us to change them without any potential public API fallout. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Use ctx->hs->secrets rather than the S3I(s) version.jsing2020-03-102-4/+4
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove some unnecessary handshake enums/functions.jsing2020-03-104-26/+4
| | | | | | | Both session tickets and key updates are post-handshake handshake messages, which were originally included in the handshake code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Add a return value check to tls13_buffer_extend().jsing2020-03-101-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | In the unlikely event that the return value from the read callback is larger than the number of bytes we asked for, we can end up incrementing buf->len beyond capacity. Check the return value from the read callback to prevent this. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove the enc function pointers.jsing2020-03-106-22/+12
| | | | | | | The enc function pointers do not serve any purpose these days - remove a layer of indirection and call dtls1_enc()/tls1_enc() directly. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* RFC 8446, section 4.1.3: If a TLSv1.2 client receives a ServerHello fortb2020-03-061-1/+27
| | | | | | | | TLSv1.1 or below, it should check whether the server's random value contains the magic downgrade protection cookie and in that case abort the handshake with an illegal parameter alert. ok inoguchi, jsing
* TLSv1.3 servers that intend to downgrade are required to set the lasttb2020-03-061-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | eight bytes of the server's random to a magic cookie (RFC 8446, 4.1.3). The TLSv1.3 spec changes the TLSv1.2 spec in that it recommends that TLSv1.2 servers that negotiate TLSv1.1 or below do the same. This gives a limited additional protection against downgrade attacks beyond what is already present in the Finished exchange. The TLSv1.3 part was already implemented in Hobart and can be trivially modified to do the TLSv1.2 bit as well. ok inoguchi, jsing
* The decryption_failed alert must not be sent by compliant implementations.tb2020-02-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Use a bad_record_mac alert instead. Found with tlsfuzzer's ChaCha20 test. ok beck inoguchi jsing
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