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* Add a mechanism to set an alert in those parts of the read half oftb2020-06-011-3/+21
| | | | | | | | | | the record layer that don't do I/O themselves. Use this mechanism to send a record overflow alert for messages that have overlong plaintext or inner plaintext. Fixes most of the remaining record-layer-limits failures of tlsfuzzer. ok jsing
* Replace ssl_max_server_version() with ssl_downgrade_max_version()jsing2020-05-313-30/+6
| | | | | | | Replace the only occurrence of ssl_max_server_version() with a call to ssl_downgrade_max_version() and remove ssl_max_server_version(). ok beck@ tb@
* Correct downgrade sentinels when a version pinned method is in use.jsing2020-05-314-7/+40
| | | | | | | | | Previously only the enabled protocol versions were considered, however we also have to consider the method in use which may be version pinned. Found the hard way by danj@ with haproxy and force-tlsv12. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Improve server certificate selection for TLSv1.3.jsing2020-05-292-23/+94
| | | | | | | | | This allows an EC certificate to be selected and used, if the client sigalgs would allow it. With feedback from tb@ ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Handle the case where we receive a valid 0 byte application data record.jsing2020-05-291-1/+10
| | | | | | | | In this situation we cannot return zero bytes, as that signals EOF. Rather we need to return TLS13_IO_WANT_POLLIN so tell the caller to call us again, at which point we'll pull up the next record. ok tb@
* Wire up the servername callback in the TLSv1.3 server.jsing2020-05-293-3/+45
| | | | | | | | This makes SNI work correctly with TLSv1.3. Found the hard way by danj@, gonzalo@ and others. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Mop up servername_done, which is unused.jsing2020-05-293-14/+3
| | | | ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* minor cleanup ahead of the following work:schwarze2020-05-261-12/+14
| | | | | remove references to the SSL protocol which is no longer supported and use .Xr rather than .Fn for functions documented elsewhere
* Add additional length checks for TLSv1.3 plaintext and inner plaintext.jsing2020-05-261-1/+6
| | | | Reminded by and ok beck@
* Fix some stylistic nits from jsing.tb2020-05-241-8/+11
| | | | ok jsing
* Enforce that SNI hostnames be correct as per rfc 6066 and 5980.beck2020-05-232-17/+80
| | | | | | | Correct SNI alerts to differentiate between illegal parameter and an unknown name. ok tb@`
* Enable SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY by default.jsing2020-05-231-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In TLSv1.2 and earlier, when an application goes to read application data, handshake messages may be received instead, when the peer has triggered renegotation. A similar thing occurs in TLSv1.3 when key updates are triggered or the server sends new session tickets. Due to the SSL_read() API there is no way to indicate that we got no application data, instead after processing the in-band handshake messages it would be normal to return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ and have the caller call SSL_read() again. However, various applications expect SSL_read() to return with either application data or a fatal error, when used on a blocking socket. These applications do not play well with TLSv1.3 post-handshake handshake messages (PHH), as they fail to handle SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ. The same code is also broken in the case of a TLSv1.2 or older renegotiation, however these are less likely to be encountered. Such code should set SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY in order to avoid these issues. Contrary to the naming, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY does not actually retry in every case - it retries following handshake messages in the application data stream (i.e. renegotiation and PHH messages). This works around the unretried SSL_read() on a blocking socket case, however in the case where poll/select is used with blocking sockets, the retry will likely result in the read blocking after the handshake messages are processed. Rather than pushing for broken code to be fixed, OpenSSL decided to enable SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY by default, instead breaking code that does poll or select on blocking sockets (like s_client and s_server). Unfortunately we get to follow suit. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Wire up SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY mode to retrying after PHH messages.jsing2020-05-232-2/+8
| | | | ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Provide the option to retry or return after post-handshake messages.jsing2020-05-232-4/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | In TLSv1.3 post-handshake handshake messages are used for key updates and session tickets. These are in-band and mean that when the upper layer goes to read application data, we can end up reading and having to process handshake messages - this option changes whether we retry and read the next TLS record, or if we return, signalling that we want more data to be available. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* fix a confusingly wrapped linetb2020-05-231-3/+3
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* Do not assume that server_group != 0 or tlsext_supportedgroups != NULLtb2020-05-232-9/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | implies that we're dealing with a HRR in the extension handling code. Explicitly check that we're in this situation by inspecting the flag in the handshake context. Add missing error checks and send the appropriate alerts. The hrr flag needs to be unset after parsing the client hello retry to avoid breaking the server hello handling. All this is far from ideal, but better than nothing. The correct fix would likely be to make the message type available but that would need to be part of a more extensive rearchitecture of the extension handling. Discussed at length with jsing
* Ensure we only attach an ocsp staple to a leaf certificate, becausebeck2020-05-222-5/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | for the moment that is all we support. fixes an issue where gnuTLS cares that mistmatching staples come back on the certs in the chain. This should be fixed correctly later by associating the staple to the individual certs rather than the ssl, so this is temporary. running on www@. ok tb@, "got that's oopy but an interim ok" jsing@
* Simplify: transform a dangling else into an early return andtb2020-05-211-20/+20
| | | | | | unindent a bunch of code. Suggested by jsing
* Make ssl_set_cert_masks() more consistent and closer to readable.jsing2020-05-211-44/+27
| | | | | | Prompted by tb@ ok tb@
* Avoid a shadowing issue by renaming cbs and cbb to cbb_hs and cbb_hs,tb2020-05-211-8/+7
| | | | | | respectively. Discussed with jsing
* A failure of tls13_handshake_msg_new() could lead to a NULL dereftb2020-05-211-11/+15
| | | | | | | | | in the following tls13_handshake_msg_start() call. Add a check. Stop clobbering the ctx's hs_msg variable, use a local variable instead. ok beck jsing
* Actually set the hrr flag when sending a HelloRetryRequest.jsing2020-05-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | Without this, when SNI is in use the second ClientHello will result in an error. Found the hard way by sthen@. ok sthen@ tb@
* Revert 1.43 - this fix for PHH in blocking mode breaks SSL_accept andbeck2020-05-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | SSL_connect in blocking mode. While this will probably need a rethink, until we land on a solution for PHH in blocking mode, the breakage this causes is visible in real things, and we've only managed to hit the PHH breakage in a test case. ok tb@
* Replace SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC/SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN with SSL_PKEY_RSA.jsing2020-05-198-46/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some time prior to SSLeay 0.8.1b, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN got added with the intention of handling RSA sign only certificates... this incomplete code had the following comment: /* check to see if this is a signing only certificate */ /* EAY EAY EAY EAY */ And while the comment was removed in 2005, the incomplete RSA sign-only handling has remained ever since. Remove SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN and rename SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC to SSL_PKEY_RSA. While here also remove the unused SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA. ok tb@
* Only send ocsp staples if the client asked for ocsp certificate status.beck2020-05-191-1/+2
| | | | | | noticed by dlg@ on www.openbsd.org with curl. ok dlg@
* Add support for TLS 1.3 server to send certificate statusbeck2020-05-195-15/+38
| | | | | | messages with oscp staples. ok jsing@ tb@
* Send alerts back correctly when handling key shares, includingbeck2020-05-171-8/+19
| | | | | | | sending back illegal parameter if our phh key share request type is not 0 or 1. ok jsing@ tb@
* Free handshake message correctly, noticed by tb@beck2020-05-171-2/+2
| | | | ok tb@ jsing@
* Send a decode error alert if a server provides an empty certificate list.jsing2020-05-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | According to RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.4, a client receiving an empty certificate list must abort the handshake with a decode error alert. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@ ('it rarely is the alert you'd expect it to be...')
* Return TLS13_IO_WANT_POLLIN after processing post-handshake messages.jsing2020-05-161-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | After post-handshake handshake messages have been processed, we need to return TLS13_IO_WANT_POLLIN rather than TLS13_IO_WANT_RETRY. The latter will cause us to try to read another TLS record, when there may not be any data available - this will then block in the case of a blocking read. This reverts part of r1.25. Issue noticed by inoguchi@ ok beck@ tb@
* Ensure that a TLSv1.3 server has provided a certificate.jsing2020-05-161-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | The RFC requires that a server always provide a certificate for authentication. Ensure that this is the case, rather than proceeding and attempting validation. In the case where validation was disabled and the server returned an empty certificate list, this would have previously resulted in a NULL pointer deference. Issue reported by otto@ ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Add TLS13_ERR_NO_CERTIFICATE.jsing2020-05-162-3/+7
| | | | | | This was missed in previous tls13_server.c commit. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Avoid sending an empty certificate list from the TLSv1.3 server.jsing2020-05-161-5/+8
| | | | | | | A TLSv1.3 server must always send a certificate - return an error and abort the handshake if none is available. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Fix pesky whitespace.jsing2020-05-131-2/+2
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* Remove a no longer relevant XXX comment.jsing2020-05-131-3/+1
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* Switch back to the legacy stack where the maximum is less than TLSv1.3.jsing2020-05-131-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | This allows a server configured to only support TLSv1.2 and earlier, to correctly handle connections from a TLSv1.3 capable client. Issue reported by pvk@ ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Switch the legacy version to TLS1_2_VERSION when processing server hello.jsing2020-05-131-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Switch the legacy version when processing the server hello, rather than when the client hello has been sent. This ensures that we accept a response from the server that has a record version other than TLS1_2_VERSION, as is the case where the server is negotiating TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1. Issue spotted by inoguchi@ ok inoguchi@ tb@
* there should only be one i in gratuitoustb2020-05-121-3/+3
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* Enable the TLSv1.3 server.jsing2020-05-111-1/+5
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Propagate record overflows to the record layer and alert.jsing2020-05-113-6/+8
| | | | ok beck@ tb@
* Add record version checks.jsing2020-05-113-18/+28
| | | | | | | | When legacy version is below TLSv1.2 ensure that the record version is SSL3/TLS, however when the legacy version is set to TLSv1.2 require this specifically. ok beck@ tb@
* Set the record layer legacy version from the TLSv1.3 server.jsing2020-05-111-1/+5
| | | | | | This will be used to handle record version checks. ok tb@
* Provide an alert sent record layer callback.jsing2020-05-114-8/+29
| | | | | | | | Use this to push an error on to the SSL error stack so that we report the details of the alert that we sent, rather than failing with an unknown error. ok tb@
* Move the record layer callbacks into a struct.jsing2020-05-113-35/+33
| | | | | | | | This makes the code more readable, requires less code churn when adding a new callback and is likely to avoid bugs due to function argument ordering. ok beck@ inoguchi@ tb@
* Use ssl_get_new_session() in the TLSv1.3 server.jsing2020-05-111-4/+3
| | | | | | | | This correctly handles session being non-NULL and sets up a few more things, including ssl_version. Also stop setting the ssl_version to the server_version, as this is only used on the client side. ok tb@
* Send dummy ChangeCipherSpec messages from the TLSv1.3 servertb2020-05-103-3/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the client has requested middle box compatibility mode by sending a non-empty legacy_session_id, the server must send a dummy CCS right after its first handshake message. This means right after ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest. Two important improvements over the backed-out diffr: make sure that First: client and server can send their dummy CCS at the correct moment (right before the next flight or right after the current flight). Second: as jsing noted, we also need to deal with the corner case that tls13_send_dummy_ccs() can return TLS13_IO_WANT_POLLOUT. with/ok jsing
* Honour SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT in the TLSv1.3 server.jsing2020-05-103-8/+16
| | | | ok beck@
* Provide alert defines for TLSv1.3 and use in the TLSv1.3 code.jsing2020-05-107-65/+97
| | | | | | | | Rather than using a mess of SSL_AL_*, SSL_AD_*, SSL3_AD_* and TLS1_AD_* defines, provide our own TLS13_ALERT_* defines and use those. This also provides the alerts that are new to TLSv1.3. ok beck@
* Provide an easy way to get debug information from TLSv1.3 handshakes.jsing2020-05-102-3/+61
| | | | | | This makes it easier to debug TLSv1.3 handshake failures. "Yes please!" tb@, ok beck@
* Use size_t for OCSP response length.jsing2020-05-108-27/+35
| | | | | | | | | The OCSP response length is currently an integer, which is overloaded with -1 meaning "unset". Use a size_t for the OCSP response length and infer unset from the OCSP response being NULL. This makes code more readable, simpler and less error prone. ok beck@
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