| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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There are several paths where a subtle bug could result in
tls1_transcript_hash_value() being called with a NULL handshake hash - add
an explicit check for this case. As noted by tb@, due to the wonders of
the libcrypto EVP APIs, combined with integer promotion, we already have
a NULL check - this one is just more obvious.
ok tb@
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Require master key length to be greater than zero if we're asked to derive
verify data for a finished or peer finished message.
ok tb@
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We already derive the peer finished in ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(), which
DTLS relies on. In the case of TLS we've been doing it twice - once in
ssl3_get_message() and once in ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec().
ok tb@
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The master key and its length are only stored in one location, so it makes
no sense to handle these outside of the derivation function (the current
'out' argument is unused). This simplifies the various call sites.
If derivation fails for some reason, fail hard rather than continuing on
and hoping that something deals with this correctly later.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Make this process more readable by having specific client/server functions,
calling the correct one based on s->server. This allows to remove various
SSL_ST_ACCEPT/SSL_ST_CONNECT checks, along with duplicate code.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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RFC 4.1.2 specifies the ways in which the extensions in the first and
the second ClientHello may differ. It basically says that extensions
not known to a server must not change. This in turn makes it impossible
to introduce new extensions that do change. It makes little sense to
enforce that extensions we don't know and care about aren't modified,
so make the hashing more lenient and restrict it to the extensions we
do care about. Arguably, enforcing no change in an unknown extension
is incompatible with the requirement that it be ignored.
ok bcook jsing
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Currently cert_req is used by clients and cert_request is used by servers.
Replace this by a single cert_request used by either client or server.
Remove the certificate types as they are currently unused. This also fixes
a bug whereby if the number of certificate types exceeds SSL3_CT_NUMBER
the number of bytes read in is insufficient, which will break decoding.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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These can be replaced with accessors that allow this information to be
retrieved from the new record layer.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Drop the 'new_' prefix in the process.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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TLSv1.2 handshake struct.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This is not strictly necessary since we proceed to zero the entire struct,
however it keeps the code consistent and easily auditable.
ok tb@
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In order to fail gracefully on encountering a self-signed cert, curl looks
at the top-most error on the stack and needs specific SSL_R_ error codes.
This mechanism was broken when the tls13_alert_sent_cb() was added after
people complained about unhelpful unknown errors. Fix this by only setting
the error code from a fatal alert if no error has been set previously.
Issue reported by Christopher Reid
ok jsing
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ok bcook inoguchi jsing
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ok bcook inoguchi jsing
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ok bcook inoguchi jsing
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ok bcook inoguchi jsing
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ok bcook inoguchi jsing
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ok tb@
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When server side renegotiation is triggered, the TLSv1.2 state machine
sends a HelloRequest before going to ST_SW_FLUSH and ST_OK. In this case
we do not need the transcript and currently hit the sanity check in ST_OK
that ensures the transcript has been freed, breaking server initiated
renegotiation. We do however need the transcript in the DTLS case.
ok tb@
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This moves the finish_md and peer_finish_md from the 'tmp' struct to the
handshake struct, renaming to finished and peer_finished in the process.
This also allows the remaining S3I(s) references to be removed from the
TLSv1.3 client and server.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This adds checks (based on the TLSv1.3 implementation) to ensure that the
TLS/DTLS sequence numbers do not wrap, as required by the respective RFCs.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This variable is used in the legacy stack to decide whether we are
a server or a client. That's what s->server is for...
The new TLSv1.3 stack failed to set s->internal->type, which resulted
in hilarious mishandling of previous_{client,server}_finished. Indeed,
both client and server would first store the client's verify_data in
previous_server_finished and later overwrite it with the server's
verify_data. Consequently, renegotiation has been completely broken
for more than a year. In fact, server side renegotiation was broken
during the 6.5 release cycle. Clearly, no-one uses this.
This commit fixes client side renegotiation and restores the previous
behavior of SSL_get_client_CA_list(). Server side renegotiation will
be fixed in a later commit.
ok jsing
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This is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct and is what we're currently
negotiating, so there is really nothing more "new" about the cipher
than there is the key block or other parts of the handshake data.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Move TLSv1.2 specific components over from SSL_HANDSHAKE.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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The CBC code path initializes rrec.padding_length in an indirect fashion
and later makes use of it for copying the MAC. This is confusing some
static analyzers as well as people investigating the whining. Avoid this
confusion and add a bit of robustness by clearing the stack variable up
front.
ok jsing
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There are currently three different handshake structs that are in use -
the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct (as S3I(s)->hs), the SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 struct
(as S3I(s)->hs_tls13 or ctx->hs in the TLSv1.3 code) and the infamous
'tmp' embedded in SSL3_STATE_INTERNAL (as S3I(s)->tmp)).
This is the first step towards cleaning up the handshake structs so that
shared data is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct, with sub-structs for TLSv1.2
and TLSv1.3 specific information. Place SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 inside
SSL_HANDSHAKE and change ctx->hs to refer to the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct
instead of the SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS13 struct. This allows the TLSv1.3 code
to access the shared handshake data without needing the SSL struct.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This makes the TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3 record layers more consistent and while
it is not currently necessary from a functionality perspective, it makes
for more readable and simpler code.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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A parent CBB retains a reference to a child CBB until CBB_flush() or
CBB_cleanup() is called. As such, the cert_exts CBB must be at function
scope.
Reported by Ilya Shipitsin.
ok tb@
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This is the same as SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() but for an
SSL object instead of an SSL_CTX object. remi found this in a recent
librelp update, so we need to provide it. The function will be exposed
in an upcoming library bump.
ok inoguchi on an earlier version, input/ok jsing
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This means that the DTLS_method() will now use DTLSv1.2 rather than DTLSv1.
Additional DTLSv1.2 related symbols and defines will be made publicly
visible in the near future.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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This teaches the version functions that handle protocol versions about
DTLSv1.2 and the SSL_OP_NO_DTLS* options. We effectively convert between
TLS and TLS protocol versions where necessary.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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Now that we store our maximum TLS version at the start of the handshake,
we can check against that directly.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
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These are no longer used (and should not be used) internally.
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Add handshake fields for our minimum TLS version, our maximum TLS version
and the TLS version negotiated during the handshake. Initialise our min/max
versions at the start of the handshake and leave these unchanged. The
negotiated TLS version is set in the client once we receive the ServerHello
and in the server at the point we select the highest shared version.
Provide an ssl_effective_version() function that returns the negotiated TLS
version if known, otherwise our maximum TLS version - this is effectively
what is stored in s->version currently.
Convert most of the internal code to use one of these three version fields,
which greatly simplifies code (especially in the TLS extension handling
code).
ok tb@
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Requested by tb@
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Noted by tb@
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Also add explicit checks against EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and
EVP_CIPHER_key_length().
Requested by tb@ during review.
ok tb@
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